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CHAPTER I 
THE RATIONALE 
Much of contemporary American educational theory is dominated by 
liberal and progressive viewpoints which include several varieties of 
unmodified and unmodified experimentalism, social reconstructionism, 
and current versions of Rousseauistic naturalism. Educational conser-
vatism is today very much on the defensive. This situation makes an 
examination of the educational implications of conservatism an espe-
cially valuable exercise. A consideration of conservative educational 
theory may aid in broadening the range of alternatives available to 
educators in dealing with educational problems. At the same time, it 
may enable them to see the regnant educational philosophies in greater 
perspective. Since both the assumptions and implications of conserva-
tism differ from those of liberalism and progressivism, the conclusions 
based upon those assumptions should also be different. Additional crea-
tive possibilities would thereby presumably become apparent. 
Specifically, this study seeks to ascertain the implications of 
neo-conservatism, the dominant contemporary form of conservative 
thought, with respect to educational values and methods of imparting 
these values. For the purposes of this study, values will be construed 
to mean goods which can act as guides and goals of human endeavor. We 
will be especially concerned with intellectual and moral values and with 
those criteria of values which neo-conservatives employ to evaluate 
educational outcomes. We will also consider the neo-conservative 
recommendations that are designed to bring educational procedures in 
closer conformity with these standards. 
Essentially, this study examines the writings of representative 
neo-conservative writers in historical perspective. As such, it is a 
work of intellectual history. By analyzing neo-conservative thought, 
the conclusions we will reach will be based on the literature of the 
major theorists rather than on mere conjectures. By relating our 
conclusions to the various historical trends of the twentieth century, 
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we can make important inferences concerning the causes and significance 
of neo-conservatism as a movement. To explain the method to be utilized, 
it seems advisable to first depict the author's conception of intellec-
tua 1 hi story. 
Intellectual history is, to begin with, a branch of history. The 
latter subject has usually been defined in terms of the study of the 
human past. The subject shou~d however be delimited further lest we 
include such fields as cultural and physical anthropology within history. 
More specifically, history pertains to the literate human past. It must 
be so limited because, to a large extent, the historian is trained to 
work with such written materials as documents, books, letters, diaries, 
and inscriptions. Where non-written materials are concerned, we generally 
rely on the services of archeologists, anthropologists, and other such 
specialists. 
Even more distinctive than the kind of material with which the 
historian deals is the method which he pursues. The historian views 
developments in relationship to the perspective of time. Thus, when 
de a 1 i ng with ide as, he does not consider them 1.!! vacuo_ but rather in 
relationship to the attitudes and problems characteristic of the age in 
which the ideas exist. The constellation of ideas which constitute the 
New Deal viewpoint would, for example, be considered in relationship to 
the particular problems of the 1930 1 s such as the Great Depression and 
its accompanying political unrest. A consideration of New Deal ideas in 
vacuo would not be considered history in the sense in which the writer 
has used the term because of the lack of such a time perspective. 
Intellectual history can be briefly defined as the application of 
the historical method to the study and interpretation of ideas. Three 
methods of approaching intellectual history can be distinguished. The 
first of these is the study of the ideas and attitudes of the common 
people as revealed through popular magazines, newspapers, comic books, 
and memorabilia of all sorts. To do this work effectively, the histori-
an must be a capable cultural anthropologist and sociologist as well as 
3 
a competent historian. Second, there is the study of the attitudes and 
ideas of the dominant elites (in all the major areas of human endeavor) 
and of the rival minorities striving to displace them. Finally, we study 
those ideas which form part of the Weltanschauung of any well-educated 
person. To perform capably on either of the two latter levels, the 
historian should be acquainted with relevant branches of philosophy and 
sometimes with the arts as well. The first form of intellectual history 
is chiefly important because it pertains to matters which affect large 
numbers of people and through them the cultures to which the people be-
long. The second and third forms pertain to matters affecting the elites 
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~"hich pm'lerfully influence the destiny of man and nations.l 
The dissertation will deal with intellectual history in the latter 
two senses of the term. Since conservatism has been one of the major 
philosophies espoused by members of many of the dominant elites of 
history, it would qualify for consideration by those historians who ad-
here to intellectual history in the second sense of the term. Conserv-
atism would also qualify for consideration by those who adhere to 
intellectual history in the third sense of the term; for an acquaintance-
ship with conservative ideas has generally been deemed essential to an 
understanding of the political and social conflicts of the recent past. 
No attempt will be made to analyze the popular usage of 11 conserva-
tism 11 which has been confused and often very inconsistent in character. 
There apparently has not been a discernible common thread in the varied 
ways in which 11 conservative11 has been applied. It is hoped that this 
dissertation will contribute to a more precise formulation of the meaning 
of conservatism. 
This study will consider the educational implications of neo-
conservative thought by surveying those conservative writers who have 
done a substantial analysis of educational issues to enable us to form 
some conception of their general educational viewpoint. In addition, 
only those writers will be discussed whose writings are on a level above 
lThe classification of intellectual history given above is based on 
H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1958), pp. 9-10. I have however drastically modified his treatment. 
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that of invective, vituperation, and mere polemics. The following con-
servative writers will be treated in this study: Irving Babbitt, G. H. 
Bantock, Bernard I. Bell, T. S. Eliot, and Russell Kirk. To judge by the 
number of citations in works on conservatism, three of these writers, 
Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk, have had a greater influence on the neo-con-
servative movement than any other neo-conservative writer. 
Since an essentially historical approach will be used, the ideas 
to be analyzed will be viewed in relationship to the particular problems 
of the age in which they were expounded -- both in respect to the causes 
which led to the advocacy of these ideas and the significance thereof. 
Where adequate material is available, the historical influences which 
have been of importance in the formation of the views of neo-conservative 
writers will be identified. To demarcate the boundaries of this inquiry, 
it is necessary to define conservatism and to know how neo-conservatism 
differs from other forms of conservatism. 
To define a concept adequately, a writer should first give some 
indication of his method for arriving at a definition. One could take 
common usage as the basis for one•s definition but this immediately leads 
to difficulties. Most people do not possess the background needed to 
formulate careful definitions nor to use concepts with precision and 
care. There has been little consistency in the way the term "conserva-
tive" has been applied in common discourse. Alternative definitions may 
be derived from the usage of persons trained in fields where conceptual 
discrimination is important, but, as we will see shortly, such definitions 
have generally been inadequate. A much more promising technique is to 
examine the contextual usage of the term 11 Conservative 11 and of cognate 
terms by scholars to discover the logic behind their usage. Historical 
evidence will also be cited but since the meanings of general concepts 
tends to vary with the Zeitgeist, this evidence will not be emphasized. 
The most common definition of conservatism used by scholars is the 
disposition to preserve whatever has been established. This common 
definition lacks discriminative value because if it is applied consist-
ently, then the Marxist in Russia, the Fascist in Spain, and the liberal 
in the United States would all have to be labelled 11 conservative. 11 Such 
imprecise usage tends to make conservatism synonomous with either 
conformity or opportunism. This is so contrary to the way political and 
social theorists generally use the conservative appellation that it 
scarcely merits serious consideration. In fact, contemporary conserva-
tives in the United States are generally very dissatisfied with the 
general liberal character of American society. The ounce of truth in 
this definition relates to the conservative advocacy of tradition, but, 
as we shall see later, this traditionalism pertains only to those 
elements of the cultural heritage which have survived for many centuries 
and only when these elements harmonize with other aspects of conserva-
tism. 
Another definition which has gained wide currency was originally 
offered by Russell Kirk. Unfortunately, Professor Kirk did not give us 
an analytical definition but rather a list of symptoms of conservatism. 
By analyzing this definition, we should however be able to arrive at a 
more precise conception of the essence of conservatism; especially if we 
consider how widely his definition has been accepted by intellectuals. 
Kirk's definition consists of six planks which we will give in order and 
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then analyze. 
(1) A belief in an order that is more than human which has im-
planted in man a character of mingled good and evil, susceptible 
of improvement only by an inner working, not by mundane schemes 
for perfectability. This conviction lies at the heart of American 
respect for the past, as the record of Providential purpose. The 
conservative mind is suffused with veneration. Men and nations, 
the conservative believes, are governed by moral laws, and political 
problems, at bottom, are moral and religious problems. An 
eternal chain of duties links the generations that are dead, and 
the generation that is living now, and the generations yet to be 
born. We have no right, in this brief existence of ours, to alter 
irrevocably the shape of things, in contempt of our ancestors and 
of the rights of posterity. Politics is the art of apprehending 
and applying the justice which stands above statutory law. 
(2} An affection for variety and complexity and individuality, 
even for singularity, which has exerted a powerful check upon the 
political tendency toward that Tocquevi1le calls "democratic 
despotism." Variety and complexity, in the opinion of conserva-
tives, are the high gifts of truly civilized society. The uni-
formity and standardization of liberal·and radical planners would 
be the death of vitality and freedom, a life-in-death, every man 
precisely like his neighbor - and, like the damned of the Inferno, 
forever deprived of hope. 
(3) A conviction that justice properly defined, means "to each the 
things that go with his ovm nature," not a levelling equality; and 
joined with this is a correspondent respect for private property 
of every sort. Civilized society requires distinctions of order, 
wealth, and responsibility; it cannot exist without true leader-
ship. A free society will endeavor, indeed, to afford to men of 
natural abilities every opportunity to rise by their own efforts, 
but it will resist strenuously the radical delusion that exact 
equality of station and wealth can benefit everyone. Society longs 
for just leadership, and if people destroy natural distinctions 
among men, presently some Bonaparte wi11 fill the vacuum - or worse 
than Bonaparte. 
(4) A suspicion of concentrated power, and a consequent attach-
ment to our federal principle and to division and balancing of 
authority at every level of government. 
(5) A reliance upon private endeavor and sagacity in nearly every 
walk of life, together with a contempt for the abstract designs 
of the collectivistic reformer. But to this self-reliance in the 
mind of the American conservative, is joined the conviction that 
in matters beyond the scope of material endeavor and the present 
moment, the individual tends to be foolish, but the species is 
wise; therefore, we rely in great matters upon the wisdom of our 
ancestot·s. History is an immense storehouse of knowledge. We pay 
a decent respect to the moral traditions and immemorial customs of 
mankind; for men who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. 
The conservative distrusts the radical visionary and the planner 
who would chop society into pieces and mold it nearer to his 
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heart's desire. The conservative appeals beyond the fickle 
opinion of the hour to what Chesterton called 11 the democracy of 
the dead .. - that is, the considered judgment of the wise men who 
died before our time. To presume that men can plan rationally the 
whole of existence is to expose mankind to a terrible danger from 
the collapse of existing institutions; for, conservatives know that 
most men are governed, on many occasions, more by emotion than by 
pure reason. 
(6) A prejudice against organic change, a feeling that it is un-
wise to break radically with political prescription, an inclina-
tion to tolerate what abuses may exist in present institutions out 
of a practical acquaintanceship with the violent and unpredictable 
nature of doctrinaire reform.2 
Although Kirk's definition contains much impassioned rhetoric and 
imprecision, it nevertheless reveals fundamental conservative attitudes. 
These attitudes become more evident when his six points are rearranged 
into two broad general categories: the first of which pertains to man's 
weakness and irrational nature and his consequent need for traditional 
authority; the second, to the desirability of an aristocratic, elitist 
social order. Points two and three relate to the second category; the 
other four points of Kirk's definition to the first category. 
Concerning the first category, Kirk began his definition of 
conservatism with an expression of skepti~ism concerning schemes for the 
perfection of humanity. He felt that men could not plan rationally for 
the future of other men because of their own irrationality which he 
blamed on their alleged emotionalism. Because of this doubt, Kirk 
preferred to rely on private endeavor with respect to matters of limited 
scope, and on traditional wisdom, with regard to matters of greater 
scope. Evidently, because of this same basic distrust of human nature, he 
2Quoted from Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1954), pp. 41-43. 
9 
advocated the division and balancing of political powers. 
With regard to the second category, Kirk advocated the encourage-
ment of variety because of his evident fear of a dead-level equalitarian-
ism and advocated proportionate rather than equalitarian justice because 
of the need for true leadership. He felt that men must have leaders, 
and, if these are not selected consciously, leaders would arise anyway 
but a rather undesirable type. 
It seems evident from the preceding analysis that the essential 
features of Kirk's conservatism were the advocacy of an aristocratic 
elitism and of traditional authority. In these respects, Kirk was 
typical of conservative thinkers as a group. Ultimately, the aristo-
cratic side of conservatism was based upon a conception of the universe 
as rationally ordered in a hierarchical pattern of superordination and 
subordination. This conception was in fundamental accord with the 
British Tories' insistence that each individual should find the place 
in the social hierarchy most suitable to him and should be content with 
it. Traditional conservatism was based partially on an acute conscious-
ness of the moral and intellectual limitations of the individual and 
partially upon a belief in the superiority of tradition as a standard of 
judgment based upon the collective experience of generations of human 
beings. These points will be discussed in greater detail in the second 
chapter where the conservative viewpoint will be analyzed and its 
implications developed. 
Conservatism therefore should be considered to be that social 
philosophy whose advocates espouse an aristocratic elitism and also 
stress the value of traditional authority. The adjective, aristocratic, 
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refers in this instance both to a hierarchical conception of values and 
to a hierarchical conception of humanity. Because of this viewpoint,. 
conservatism is elitist in the sense that conservatives traditionally 
have advocated rule by a select group and have stressed the importance of 
the careful selection and training of elite groups in all the major realms 
of human endeavor. Conservative traditionalism in turn has been based 
upon an acute consciousness of the limitations of the individual to-
gether with a belief in the value of the collective experience of peoples 
and nations. Ultimately, the most essential ingredient in the conserv-
ative constellation of beliefs is the hierarchical conception of reality. 
Not only is the aristocratic nature of conservatism based upon hierarchy 
but also, in part, the traditional as well. Has not the conservative's 
consciousness of human limitations been based to some extent on his con-
ception of the place of humans in the hierarchy of the universe? Also, 
as we shall see later, traditional authority was considered to be a means 
whereby the fruits of excellence could be portected against the menace of 
revolution. The term 11 0rder11 more than any other word symbolizes the 
uniqueness of conservatism. Order stands for the hierarchical arrange-
ment of the universe and for the emphasis upon the importance of authority 
in human affairs. 
It is important to distinguish conservatism from classical liberal-
ism with which it is often confused. Indeed, classical liberalism is 
in many respects opposed to conservatism. It has·become customary to 
equate classical liberalism with conservatism-- especially in the United 
StJtes but also to a lesser degree in other countries. Such a confusion 
of labels can only lead to a neglect of the peculiar excellences of each 
of th2se philosophies. To the classical liberal, the primary objective 
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of government is the protection and enhancement of the liberties of the 
people. In contrast, although the conservative recognizes the value of 
freedom, he considers it to be secondary to the attainment and preserva-
tion of order in both senses of the term that is to say both the pre-
servation of peace and the protection of the hierarchical order of soci-
ety. In addition5 the classical liberal is committed to the advocacy of 
a free market economy while the conservative would either favor such an 
economy, as in the case of Edmund Burke, or favor a considerable amount 
of government contro15 like Oswald Spengler. But5 perhaps the most 
salient differences between classical liberals and conservatives relate 
to their attitudes toward tradition and toward the aristocratic view-
point. While conservatives tend to be champions of traditional authori-
ty, classical liberals are more likely to advocate the removal of tradi-
tional barriers to the expansion of business enterprise. Furthermore, 
classical liberals tend to be democratic rather than aristocratic in 
their social philosophy. Even when they evince elitist tendencies, as 
in the case of the social Darwinians, they tend to have faith in the 
processes of natural selection in the recruitment of elites while con-
servatives have no such trust in natural processes. The latter are much 
more likely to favor selective education and the development of elite 
training schools. Finally, conservatives are more likely to favor the 
encouragement of organized religion while classical liberals either op-
pose such encouragement or keep their religious and political viewpoint 
separate from one another. 
To a considerable extent, the differences between classical 
liberals and conservatives relate to their differing views of human 
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nature. Traditionally, the leading expositors of classical liberalism 
have tended to view man as essentially selfish but rational. Because of 
their selfishness, men could be depended upon to strive for their own 
self-interest. Because of their alleged rationality, they would be 
considered to be consistent in striving for this goal. Thus, if they 
were to be left alone to strive for their own selfish goods, the good of 
society as a whole would be advanced. On the other hand, because of 
human selfishness, governments must be limited in their powers for govern-
ments are made up of human beings, all of whom possess this type of 
character. In contrast, while the conservatives would agree that human 
beings are selfish, they would also maintain that most people, at least, 
are irrational. Hence, they would evince less faith in the automatic 
workings of a free society. 
If classical liberals like Herbert Hoover and Barry Goldwater are 
today often confused with conservatives, this confusion is probably due 
to the fact that both groups have tended to unite on certain issues in 
common opposition to the doctrines espoused by adherents of doctrines of 
both the extreme and moderate Left. This unity is based upon the common 
opposition of both groups to schemes of collectivistic social reform. 
Classical liberals oppose these plans because they consider them to be 
meances to freedom; conservatives, because they consider them to be 
equalitarian in tendency. 
Historically, conservatives and classical liberals were on opposing 
sides until well into the twentieth century. In fact, the term 
11 COnservative 11 acquired its present meaning in the early nineteenth 
century when it was used to designate those individuals and groups which 
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opposed the principles associated with the French Revolution. These 
conservatives were aristocratic, traditionalist, and generally favorable 
to the mercantilist economic principles that were still dominant in much 
of Europe. Their chief opponents were the liberals who at that time 
championed progressivism and laissez-faire. These liberals would now be 
regarded as adherents of classical liberalism in contradistinction to 
the adherents of the social democratic liberalism of today, who are 
prepared to accept a considerable amount of government control in the 
pursuit of their objectives. Conservatism is, of course, much older than 
the French Revolution for essentially the same principles were expounded 
by Pythagoras. 3 It is of considerable significance that modern conserv-
atism was originally directed primarily in opposition to classical 
liberalism, a philosophy with which conservatism has recently been fre-
quently confused. 
It is symptomatic of the confusion of terms that is so prevalent 
today that Michael Oakeshott has been frequently labeled a conservative. 
Yet, if we examine his interpretation of conservatism carefully, we can-
not fail to notice how divergent it is from the views of the major 
expositors of conservatism and how similar it is to the views of clas-
sical liberal writers in general. As far as Oakeshott was concerned, 
3For a discussion of the place of Pythagoras in the history of 
conservative thought see Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (New York: MacMillan, 1961), pp. 186-188, 196-197. 
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conservatism was purely a political doctrine without any entailments 
pertaining to the nature of man. This in itself would have astonished 
such distinguished conservatives as Edmund Burke, Prince Metternich, and 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Oakeshott placed the essence of conservatism in 
the belief that government should confine itself to keeping the peace and 
regulating the currency. It was not to indulge itself in social reform. 
As far as he was concerned, happiness could only come through the volun-
tary and free choices of the individual. On the basis of this position, 
Oakeshott should be classified as a classical liberal rather than a 
conservative. His paramount political value was obviously freedom 
rather than order. He should therefore be placed in the same ideological 
camp with Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek rather than in the camp of 
Edmund Bruke and Benjamin Disraeli. 4 
To establish the precise parameters of this study, it is important 
to consider briefly other viewpoints \'lhich have sometimes been confused 
with conservatism. They include the views of Admiral Hyman Rickover 
whose educational elitism would link him to the conservative position 
but whose main-concern has been to recruit academic talent suited to 
grapple with contemporary problems rather than to reassert the values of 
the past. In American educational history, there has also been a con-
siderable number of influential thinkers who have espoused the values of 
a traditional liberal arts education and, at the same time, have 
rejected the aristocratic viewpoint which has traditionally been 
4For evidence of Michael Oakeshott's views on conservatism see his 
Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Metheun, 1962), 
especia11y pages 183, 189, 191. Incidentally, in spite of his denial, 
his political views most certainly entail certain definite views per-
taining to bqth human nature and the nature of the universe. 
15 
associated with this kind of education. They include the rationalistic 
humanists, Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler. Hutchins, in 
particular, has publicly taken an anti-Burkean position and has attached 
T. s. Eliot because of the aristocratic proclivities of the latter.S 
Russell Kirk was undoubtedly at least partially correct in viewing 
Hutchins as a democratic rationalist; for Hutchins has tended to 
emphasize critical independent thought combined with a strong faith in 
democratic values, both in politics and in education.6 Mortimer Adler 
has evinced a similar reliance upon democratic values in education in 
contradistinction to the aristocratic values espoused by conservatives, 
even to the extent of advocating mass college education.? Neither indi-
vidual has been commonly regarded by conservative intellectuals as 
representative of their viewpoint; for, like the classical libera-ls, the 
rationalistic humanists resemble the conservatives in some respects but 
differ greatly from them in other equally important ways. These two 
schools appear to be allied only when contrasted to those schools which 
are characterized by a more relativistic and less academic approach than 
either. In much the same manner, the similarities between conservatives 
and classical liberals become vividly apparent when contrasted with the 
5Russell Kirk has listed the writings by Hutchins in which these 
views \-Jere expressed in Kirk's Eliot and His Age {New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 357-358. 
6Kirk's characterization of Hutchins can be found in Kirk•s 
Academic Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. 74. 
7
see Adler's essay in Robert Hemenway, ed., A Great Books Primer (Chicago: Great Books Foundation, 1955), pp. 25-27. 
socialists and other variants of the political Center and Left. But we 
must not let the similarities blind us to the differences lest we over-
look the peculiar values of each viewpoint. 
In addition to Hutchins and Adler, there have been many other 
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writers on education who have eagerly espoused the benefits of an academic 
liberal arts education and, at the same time, have shied away from the 
aristocratic ethos with which such an education has been traditionally 
associated. This has been especially true of American writers. Such 
primary figures as William Chandler Bagley and Arthur Bester have 
exhibited this combination of attitudes and, unlike Hutchins and Adler, 
they have also opposed traditionalism -- preferring to justify their 
educational programs on utilitarian grounds.B In this respect, Bester 
has not exhibited the same faith in the educability of the masses as has 
Bagley but his antipathy to traditionalistic concepts of education has 
been no les~ unequivocal. In general, the American cultural atmosphere 
has not been very conducive to the emergence of an aristocratic tradi-
tionalism; for a landed aristocracy that might have served as a model and 
support for this viewpoint has never become firmly established on American 
soil. In addition, in so new a nation, sufficient time has not elapsed 
for a strong traditionalism to become firmly established. Seen in such a 
light, the neo-conservative movement is a radical departure from the 
established American way of life. 
Bsagley's general position is generally familiar to students of his 
philosophy. For examples of Bestor's viewpoint see his The Restoration 
of Learning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 48, 87, 94. 
There has been at least as much confusion concerning the question 
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of how neo-conservatism differs from conservatism proper as there has 
been over the meaning of conservatism itself. Some writers have failed 
to detect any difference and thus classify neo-conservatism as merely a 
revival of traditional conservatism. 9 Others, including a number of 
writers on education, have drawn a distinction between the humanism of 
Irving Babbitt and his associates in contrast to the alleged "new conserv-
atism11 of the Council for Basic Education which in turn has been linked 
to the old theory of formal discipline. 10 The humanists were allegedly 
exponents of ideals while the neo-conservatives were more interested in 
training mental faculties by emphasizing the most valuable courses of 
study. Actual1y, the facts do not support such a distinction. As we 
shall see later, humanist ideals are as important to contemporary neo-
conservatives as these ideals were to Irving Babbitt and his supporters. 
Furthermore, instead of Babbitt's humanism being deemed to be separate 
from contemporary conservatism, it would be more correct to view both as 
part of one single movement in response to the same kind of pressures, 
the gap having been bridged through the existence of two short-lived but 
highly influential magazines; The American Revi~ (1933-1937) and Measure 
(1949-1950). Furthermore, the Council on Basic Education has hardly been 
9
see ~r example Edward M. Burns and Philips L. Ralph, World 
CiVilizations (2 vo 1 s. New York: li. W. Norton Company, 1968), Vo I. 2, 
p. 699. In this generally excellent college text, the authors have also 
made the mistake of classifying the classical liberal economist, Friedrich Hayek as a conservative. 
I Osee for ex amp I e, John P. fly nne, Theories of Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 401, 492, 498-499. 
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confined to conservatives but has actually included people representing 
a wide range of educational opinion, such as the disciples of William 
Bagley and of Admiral Hyman Rickover. 
In actuality, the distinctiveness of the new conservatism does 
not consist of any new or unique doctrines but rather of a difference 
in emphasis as compared with traditional conservatism. In its modern 
form, conservatism arose in response to the excesses of the French 
Revolution. As the first influential spokesman of modern conservatism, 
Edmund Burke defended the status quo against what was primarily a 
political menace. In the twentieth century, conservatives can no longer 
defend the status quo for their principles no longer dominate any 
important Western society. Instead, they are the spokesmen of reform; 
-- but reform in a vastly different direction from what the liberals and 
radicals recommend. Furthermore, the neo-conservatives are today 
primarily concerned with educational and intellectual rather than 
political matters. They are therefore primarily cultural critics of the 
contemporary age. Two trends have particularly aroused their fears. One 
of these has been the gradual erosion of religious and moral beliefs in 
response to the apotheosis of science which became important in the 
nineteenth century and to the twentieth century trends toward meta-
physical skepticism and moral relativism. The second tendency has been 
the gradual replacement of academic values and high standards of 
selective education by an increasing stress upon mass culture which has 
apparently, in itself, been a by-product of both the decline of tradition 
and the spread of democratic, as against aristocratic values, throughout 
the Western world. The latter trends have been most pronounced in the 
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United States, which factors in turn might explain the high proportion of 
Americans among neo-conservative ~'/riters. The high percentage of 
academics and intellectuals found within this group might well be an 
indication of their fear of trends which would undermine the status of 
intellectuals and of the values which they represent, for the dis-
interested pursuit of intellectual excellence is sometimes difficult to 
maintain in a milieu in which mass appeal is the touchstone. 
Among contemporary conservative thinkers, the views of tvvo writers 
on the causes of the perplexities of the contemporary age have been 
especially influential.ll One of these was the late Richard Weaver, a 
professor of English at the University of Chicago. He felt that the 
present decline in moral and intellectual standards began in the late 
fourteenth century when William of Ockham denied the reality of the 
Platonic universals. This rejection was to lead ultimately to the denial 
of the existence of a source of truth higher than man. The consequences 
have included the spread of ethical relativims, metaphysical skepticism, 
and the concomitant repudiation of cultural standards. For Weaver, the 
problems of the contemporary period was that of enabling humans to 
perceive again an ordered hierarchy of values.l2 
llAs evidenced by the spate of articles on both of these writers 
which have appeared in the past two decades in such conservative journals 
as Modern~ and The Intercollegiate Review. A Richard t•l. Weaver 
Fellov1ship A\t~ards Program has been established by the right-wing 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute. 
12Richard Weaver, Ideas have Conseauences (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 2-3, 19-20. 
An especially outspoken critic of contemporary thought was Eric 
voegelin, who has been Director of the Institute for Political Science 
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at the University of Munich. Central to Voegelin 1 s approach to 
contemporary problems, as shown in his previous publications, has been the 
contrast he made between the political 11 Science11 of Plato and Aristotle 
and the so-called gnostic approach of recent writers. Plato and 
Aristotle were characterized as engaged in the search for the order of 
being while the 11 gnostics 11 were seen as dissatisfied with this order. 
The latter have therefore sought to replace the order of being with a man-
centered one, thereby implicitly denying the existence of a transcendent 
source of being and order. Among the movements which Voegelin character-
ized as being gnostic were national socialism, fascism, Marxism, Freud-
ianism, progressivism, and positivism. The adherents of all of these 
movements had in effect denied the validity of faith, preferring to rely 
on their own special brands of "knowledge" and on earthlyforms of 
salvation. The remedy that he recommended was to somehow restore faith 
in a transcendent order of being.l3 
In spite of their obvious differences in approach, both Weaver and 
Voegelin saw the ills of the modern world as due fundamentally to the 
repudiation of the existence of a hierarchical order of goods and the 
remedy thereof in the revival of belief in such an order, although 
neither writer was very explicit on how this was to be attained. The 
13see especially Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968), pp. 15-18, 86-88. 
writings of both of these men provides an insight into the neo-conser-
vative approach to contemporary problems. In their hopes and fears, 
weaver and Voegelin were typical of many neo-conservative writers. 
In brief, our task will be to analyze the writings of those neo-
21 
conservatives who have written extensive and serious expositions of their 
educational views and who have had some influence on other conservatives.14 
The purpose wi 11 be .to uncover the education a 1 va 1 ues of the neo-
conservative movement. By treating this matter historically, on the 
basis of past writings in relationship to the Zeitgeist, it is hoped 
that a better understanding will be obtained of the ultimate signifi-
cance of neo-conservative educational thought. Before we can deal 
directly with this matter, we should, however, first analyze the 
fundamental theoretical assumptions of neo-conservative writers 
concerning the nature of the universe and of man's place therein. 
l4sy influence is meant the power of producing an effect upon 
another person. In the sense in which this writer has used the term, 
he has reference to effects produced on the political, social, and 
educational ideas of others. The primary criterion for measuring this 
influence are citations by those who have been affected -- both by 
specific references in footnotes and in the texts of writings of those 
presumably influenced. The work of all the figures selected for study 
have been cited in the writings of other influential authors. In 
addition, figures like Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk are generally familiar 
to educated laymen while Bell and Bantock are well-known to those who 
have done research on the progressive education movement and its critics; 
for the reputation of the figures involved, while not necessarily an 
indication of outstanding ability, certainly bears some relationship to 
the amount of influence exerted. An unknown is generally unlikely to 
exert much influence. To a historian, influence must be important 
consideration due to his interest in the Zeitgeist. 
CHAPTER II 
FOUNDATIONS OF NEO-CONSERVATISM 
In essence, neo-conservatism should be considered a social 
philosophy in the broadest sense of the term. It is a philosophy which 
describes the nature of society including man's place therein and also 
prescribes certain policies for the good of man and of society. It also 
implies a characteristic viewpoint pertaining to the nature of being and 
of the universe. This chapter will explore the fundamental neo-conserv-
ative concepts pertaining to the nature of the universe, man, and society 
as a means of preparing a foundation for the explication of the neo-
conservative educational viewpoint to follow. Since, as was pointed out 
in the first chapter, neo-conservatism differs from traditional con-
servatism only in emphasis, the basic doctrinal assumptions of both are 
identical. Therefore, the terms "conservatism" and "neo-conservatism" 
will be used interchangeably. 
Perhaps the most fundamental concept for understanding the conserva-
tive metaphysics is hierarchy; for the conservative tends to conceive of 
the universe in terms of a gradual unilinear graduation in contrast to 
both the single-level equalitarian viewpoint and the two-layer elite-mass 
dichtomy. Historically, the conservative concept of hierarchy, as employ-
ed by writers belonging to Occidental cultures, was largely derived from 
and stated in the terminology of Aristotle. Through two British 
Aristotelians, Richard Hooker and Edmund Burke, this concept became 
fundamental to the conservatism of the English-speaking countries. It 
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is therefore important to discuss Aristotle's views on hierarchy. 
Although Aristotle has given us several systems of gradation, the 
one which most fundamentally influenced Western thought pertained to the 
powers of the soul. All living things were considered to have nutritive 
powers. In addition to these powers, animals also possessed the abili-
ties of movement and of sensation. Such cognitive powers as imagination 
and memory were considered outgrowths of the sensitive soul. Finally, 
humans possessed, in addition to all the powers characteristic of plants 
and animals, the faculty of reason. All living things, with the 
exception. of God, were characterized as being imperfect in the sense 
that none fully actualized all the potentialities of all living things. 
Aristotle believed, however, that living things belonged to several dif-
ferent levels of development in accordance with the degree to which they 
actualized all the potentialities displayed by living things. Finally, 
happiness for each living thing was deemed to consist of performing well 
the characteristic function by which it was distinguished from the other 
creatures in the scale of nature.l 
Not all conservatives have, of course, accepted Aristotle's pre-
cise classification of the powers of the soul. Yet, the basic outlook 
which this classification symbolized has become an essential feature of 
the conservative viewpoint. Conservatives today conceive of hierarchy 
in the same functional manner as did Aristotle -- in accordance with 
the powers of the psyche. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency to 
1Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l. 7. l098a. 
view the scale of nature in accordance with the degrees of perfection 
of the creatures involved. Finally, there is the same stress on the 
diversity of means in achieving happiness in accordance with the na-
ture of the individual creature. 
Among the many implications of the concept of hierarchy is that 
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of a rationally ordered universe in which an ascending gradation ordered 
in terms of the superordination and subordination of its inhabitants 
clearly suggests the existence of universal purpose and of a rational 
agent to bring that purpose to fruition. Order implies rationality and 
rationality implies purpose. This viewpoint is quite congruent with the 
acceptance and espousal of religious beliefs and values. Therefore, 
while conservatives undoubtedly have a tendency to be pessimistic about 
human nature, their essential metaphysical viewpoint implies a strong 
confidence in the meaningfulness and ultimate goodness of the cosmos. 
In addition, since hierarchy implies diversity and since such 
diversity is accepted as part of some great overall plan, then diversity 
itself must be good and every effort should be made to encourage it. 
Furthermore, since the universe contains .beings .at various stages of 
perfection, this implies that they are also at various stages of im-
perfection. Implicit in such a view is a theodicy; for evil as well as 
good are thereby necessary to the fulfillment of the universal plan. 
Metaphysical materialism is fundamentally antithetical to the 
general hierarchical viewpoint; for the concept of a universe as consisting 
of matter in motion implies either a tychist or a mechanistic view of 
causation both of which would exclude purpose as an integral feature of 
the cosmos. The inclusion of final causation as an ultimate explanation 
of universal phenomena would clearly imply the existence of factors 
transcending the operations of the physical universe. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that conservative thinkers have generally been quite 
hostile to materialism and the other forms of metaphysical naturalism. 
In this particular~ their attitude has been consistent with their basic 
metaphysical assumptions. 
With regard to education~ a quotation from the writings of Paul 
Elmer More~ a literary critic and associate of Irving Babbitt, should 
give us a vivid comprehension of the viewpoint of the conservative 
intellectual. 
The scheme of the humanist might be described as the disciplining 
of the higher imagination to the end that the student may behold 
in one sublime vision, the whole scale of being in its range from 
the lowest to the highest under the divine decree of order and 
subordination, without losing sight of the immutable veracity 
at the heart of all development which is only the praise and 
surname of virtue.2 
In more commonplace language, More was in effect advocating that 
the student learn to discriminate between the higher and the lower, the 
better and the worse, utilizing the great universal hierarchy as the 
foundation of va 1 ues. As to the 11 praise and surname of virtue," ~1ore 
explained this as being synonomous with the quality of nobility.3 
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In more general terms, an emphasis upon hierarchy would obviously 
lead to a stress upon human differences, with different kinds of training 
offered in accordance with differences in the abilities and interests 
2Paul Elmer ~lore, Aristocray and Justice (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1915), p. 56. 
3Ibid., p. 54. 
of the students involved. Furthermore~ the view of the believers in 
hierarchy that the nature of happiness varies with the faculties and 
functions of the individuals under consideration would apparently 
strengthen the position of those who believe that a considerable amount 
of formal education is not necessary for the happiness of all. 
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Hierarchical views are also conducive to aristocratic conceptions 
of education. Since all creatures are not of equal potentialities, there 
should presumably be a tendency to stress the education of those with 
the greatest manifest potentiality on the ground that to do otherwise 
would result in the neglect of those most able to contribute to civil-
ization. The emphasis upon unequal potentialities is crucial in this 
respect; for one could acknowledge that men are not equal in actuality 
but still maintain that all or most men are equal in potentiality. Such 
an individual could then easily advocate mass education through the col-
lege level with attention focused on the development of students of only 
average manifest academic potentiality. Once one accepts the existence 
of important differences in potentialities between students, one is almost 
certain to advocate selective education with emphasis upon the training 
of the superior. 
The religious implications of the concept of hierarchy should be 
encouraging to those concerned with religious and moral training in the 
schools. Also, the fact that conservatives tend to ground their values 
in certain characteristics of nature would apparently lead to an approach 
wherein the natural sciences would be studied before the student begins 
to study religion and ethics. As has already been observed, an essential 
aim of education \>JOul d be the deve 1 opment of the ability of the students 
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to discriminate between the relative worth of the different constituent 
parts of the universe in terms of their position in the universal hier-
archy. This acknowledgment of differences in intrinsic worth would 
obviously lead to a stress on philosophy, especially on those branches 
which pertain to value -- such as ethics and aesthetics. In addition, 
since hierarchy is a relational concept which implies the existence of 
an integrated universal order, the educator who accepts such a viewpoint 
should tend to emphasize the enhancement of the ability of his students 
to interrelate the facts that they learn. This emphasis would clearly 
imply the utilization of those kinds of tests whereby a criterion of 
student performance· would be the ability to integrate facts into 
coherent and orderly whole. 
The educational counselor who accepts the validity of the concept 
of hierarchy would deem it to be one of his major functions to guide 
students toward finding their proper positions in the human hierarchy 
with regard to vocation, avocations, and recreations. Henc~, such a 
counselor would emphasize the importance of differential psychology 
together with such tools as tests and other forms of measurement in an 
effort to clarify the proper role of the student in relationship to 
society. Furthermore, the counselor would be very unlikely to expound 
universal conceptions of the satisfactory adjustment of students to 
society. Each student would presumably be evaluated in accordance with 
his own distinctive characteristics, to the degree that the counselor 
understands the nature of these characteristics. 
An important consequence of acceptance of the view of the universe 
as an orderly rational system is the advocacy of natural law, a doctrine 
which was of immense importance in the history of Occidental thought. 
In essence, the advocates of natural law ground the rules of moral 
obligation either in the structural and functional characteristics of 
the individuals involved or of the world in \vhich they live. There are 
various conceptions of natural law. In the past, natural law theories 
were propounded which were based on such diverse criteria as human 
reason, the moral sentiments of the individual, the conditions of human 
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survival, and the Darwinian theory of evolution. There is, however, only 
one kind of natural law theory which has in the past appealed to con-
servatives -- the theory by which natural law is grounded on the concept 
of universal metaphysical order. By this theory, the good of each thing 
is conceived of in terms of the fulfillment of its function in the 
universal hierarchy. This theory contrasts sharply with other theories 
by \'lhich natural law is based on the existence of single faculties and 
those which stress natural rights to the neglect of duties.4 
It is today a well recognized fact that the dominant influence in 
the development of metaphysically-based natural theories originated with 
Cicero, although Plato and Aristotle have expounded similar opinions. 
Cicero's views were subsequently enlarged and made much more explicit 
through the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker. As thus 
reinterpreted, these ideas have strongly influenced the thinking of more 
4For a collection of writings on natural law by conservatives, see 
Robert L. Schuettinger, ed., The Conservative Tradition in European 
Thought (New York: Putnam's, 1970), pp. 117-174. 
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recent conservative writers such as Edmund Burke and Leo Strauss. One of 
Cicero•s most important contributions was to popularize the concept of 
nright reason 11 by which he meant reasoning in accordance with natural law 
for the purpose of distinguishing between right and wrong conduct. This 
is an essentially practical ability, although based upon metaphysical 
principles. Through this doctrine, adherents of traditional natural law 
doctrines have implicitly emphasized the importance of reason as the 
means of comprehending what was for them an essentially rational universe. 
From the seventeenth century, metaphysical conceptions of natural 
law, based upon assumptions of the existence and knowability of a 
rationally ordered universe, have been under continuous attack by 
adherents of other views. During the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries, human nature replaced the order of the universe as the 
primary touchstone of natural law doctrines. Either basic human drives 
were stressed as in the writings of Thomas Hobbes or the alleged nature 
of early man as in the writings of John Locke and of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau. Finally, in the nineteenth century, advocates of hedonistic 
utilitarianism and positive law attacked natural law itself. The 
deliquescence of natural law reflected the diminution of belief in 
traditional and mataphysical doctrines which has been a dominant feature 
of recent Hestern intellectual history. Needless to say, conservatives 
have consistently opposed this trend. 
Implicit in the acceptance of natural law based upon a hierarchi-
cal conception of the universe is the existence of a system of values 
v1hen~by the universe is ordered. These values possess ontic status be 
cause they exist independently of the mind of the observer as part of 
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the intrinsic character of the universe. Since such an order is conceived 
of in objective rather than subjective terms, it is generally held to be 
absolute -- that is to say possessed of universal validity independent 
of relative circumstances. Although the precise criteria for the ranking 
of values vary with the individual thinker, such standards as scope, com-
plexity, and effectiveness are accepted quite generally by writers advo-
cating the validity of the hierarchical concept of nature. 
The educational implications of the conservative viewpoint on 
natural law are much the same as those entailed by acceptance of the 
conservative viewpoint on hierarchy since the concept of hierarchy is the 
essential foundation of the conservative interpretation of the nature of 
natural law. Yet the fact that conservatives believe that an entire 
system of moral obligation can be derived from the objective nature of 
the universe would tend to lend great urgency to one of the previously 
noticed educational consequences of conservatism ~- the stress upon 
developing in students a comprehension of the axiological order of the 
universe. One of the primary problems of educational counseling and 
teaching from the conservative perspective pertains to the need to 
develop in students a comprehension of the meaning of their lives in 
relationship to the universal design. This might well transcend in 
importance the other main function of the conservative counselor the 
guidance of students toward their proper places in the human hierarchy. 
Conservatives tend to view men as being weak and imperfect. Men 
are inclined to be dominated by their emotions rather than their reason. 
It is only by the exercise of considerable self-restraint that men are 
able to act constructively. In fact, Burke attributed most of the 
miseries which humans have inflicted upon themselves to such attitudes 
and passions as "pride., ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, 
hypocri cy, ungoverned zea 1 ~' and a 11 the other "disorderly appetites 11 
which trouble the lives of people. 5 Both the selfishness and the 
emotionalism of men must be curbed by the civilizing influences of 
society if they are not to revert to barbarism. 
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In \'lriting of the decline of chivalry, Burke exemplified this atti-
tude in a famous quotation; 
But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions which 
made power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the 
different shades of life and which, by a bland assimilation, 
incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and 
soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering 
empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to 
be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the 
wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the 
understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our 
naked, shivering nature and to raise it to dignity in our own 
estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and 
antiquated fashion.6 
The preceding quotation contains the essence of the fundamental conserv-
ative view of human nature; for Burke viewed human problems from the 
perspective of one who wonders how institutions can restrain men from 
manifesting their intrinsic animality. The answer that Burke gave was 
in terms of appeal to the insights obtained through intuition as ratified 
by reason for he felt that reason alone was insufficient since the stock 
of reason in each man was limited. He especially emphasized the 
SEdmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 162. 
6Ibid., p. 87. 
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importance of the moral imagination, a concept which was to play an 
important role in the thinking of Irving Babbitt and of Paul Elmer More. 
By imagination, Burke meant the power of mentally reproducing the images 
of things and of combining them.? By moral imagination, he evidently 
referred to the power of combining images in terms of moral ideals. In 
other words, it apparently was conceived in terms of the ability to view 
things in ethical perspective. Like many other conservatives, Burke 
considered man a creature whose actions were dominated by his imagination. 
As such, he viewed the mind of man as not simply a tabula rasa at birth 
but rather as an active and creative instrument. In this view, as in so 
much else, Burke presaged the dominant attitudes of conservatives in both 
the nineteenth and the twentieth centures. 
Although conservatives have been slow to recognize it, a strong 
linkage exists between the conservatives'viewpoint and the inheritance 
theory of human development. Specifically, the problem of how much of 
the variability of humans can be attributed to nature as against nurture 
is one that is pregnant with political implications. It has been common 
practice to assert that the factors of heredity and environment are so 
closely intertwined that it is impossible to separate the two. Regard-
less of the problem of the validity of that assertion, writers have 
tended in practice to stress one or the other of these factors. Liberals 
have emphasized environmental causation since at least as far back as the 
7surke had defined imagination in his On 
(New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1937), p. 16. 
traditional definition of the term dating back 
Aristotle. 
the Sublime and Beautiful 
His was, of course, the 
at least to the time of 
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of John Locke. While the conservative position on this matter has 
been less clear, most of the prominent eugenicists have advocated 
essentially conservative views. Certainly, the inheritance theory has 
been more in accord with the conservative view of the rigidity of human 
nature than with the confidence in social reform generally characteristic 
of the social-democratic liberals and the radicals. Furthermore, an 
emphasis upon heredity is more consonant with the aristocratic dimension 
of conservative thought than environmentalism for once the assumption is 
made that most of the important differences between individuals are the 
products of external causes, a basic obstacle is removed from the 
advocacy of equalitarian policies.8 
Although, as we have seen, the aristocratic aspect of conservatism 
is congruent with a stress upon biological factors in explicating the 
causes of human differences, it also leads to an emphasis upon the social 
factor as well in the sense of the orientation of people toward group 
life. The hierarchical ontology implicitly involves a stress upon 
interrelationships. The individual in a hierarchical structure acquires 
his essential significance by standing in a certain relationship to others 
in what is regarded as a single scale of being. Conservatives similarly 
regard society as a single unified organism in which they believe that 
one of the basic problems of the individual is to find his proper place 
in accordance with his general level of being. Hence, when conservatives 
discourse on politics, they are likely to view problems from the per-
spective of society as a whole rather than in terms of the particular 
goods of separate groups within the social nrganism. 
Another important cause of the social emphasis of conservatives 
was the influence of Aristotle's Politics. As previously noted, 
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f\ristotle's writings have exercised considerable influence upon conser-
vative thought. Aristotle believed that humans were gregarious in nature 
and could therefore find their good only as members of communities. The 
state was deemed to be a positive good rather than a necessary evil. It 
was believed to be an outgrowth of the family. As such, it was conceived 
of as existing not simply to provide police protection but more broadly 
for the purpose of contributing to the virtue and well-being of its 
inhabitants. It is therefore not surprising that while individual 
conservatives like Burke may have been advocates of laissez-faire, the 
general tendency of conservatives has been to accept a considerable amount 
of state control. The shock of many Americans in viewing the number of 
controls that British conservatives are willing to accept is thus 
explicable. Most American "conservatives" are, as we have seen, 
classical liberals with a confidence in the self-reliance and self-
sufficiency of people which is conspicuously lacking among authentic 
conservatives. The differences between these two groups regarding the 
extent and desirability of state controls is therefore ultimately reduci-
ble to dissimilar conceptions of human nature. 
Conservatives have been for quite some time disturbed about the 
increasing alienation of individuals from society. Three forms of aT-
ienation have been of special concern: alienation from moral and 
religious values; from cultural values; and from meaningful inter-
personal relationships. The sense of alienation from moral and religious 
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values was widely attributed to the growing skepticism of anything which 
could not be demonstrated within the narrow confines of the laboratory. 
The result has been a lack of sense of direction among large numbers of 
people combined with a concomitant sense of the meaningless nature of 
life. With regard to cultural values, Eric and Mary Josephson have 
expressed the situation concisely and well; 
Although mass society is a political as well as a cultural phenom-
enon, many of its critics, among them Ortega y Gasset and T. S. 
Eliot, have concentrated their attack chiefly against what they 
regard as its vulgar values, its sameness, its threat to "high" 
culture. While one may share their concern about the danger of 
standardized tastes, or about the threat which mass behavior in 
politics or in culture poses for individual expression, there is 
far more to the problem than this - indeed, far more than many 
aristocratically inclined critics of mass society (and of democ-
racy) want to see.9 
The Josephsons then went on to describe the atomization of society from 
meaningful social relationships, but they were quite wrong in their con-
tention that the aristocratically inclined have not been aware of this 
situation as we shall see later.lO The Josephsons were however correct 
in their view that the basis of the aristocratic opposition to mass 
culture was the threat posed by this type of culture to individual 
creativeness. Mass culture appeals fundamentally to a composite average. 
While to a certain extent, it satisfies the tastes of most individuals, 
it does not really satisfy anyone's tastes completely. The tendency of 
9Eric and Mary Josephson, editors, r~an Alone (New York: Dell 
Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 41-42. 
lOsee especially the discussion of R. A. Nisbet in this chapter and 
of Russell Kirk in the next chapter. 
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the mass media has been to routinize culture while reducing its appeal to 
a fairly low common denominator. 
The third type of alienation to arouse conservatives is the 
alienation of the individual from society. The most primary and 
ubiquitous social associations have been the family, the community and 
the church. It has been within these institutions that individuals have 
largely sought the satisfaction of their needs for affection, friendship, 
and a sense of purposefulness. Yet the functions of these institutions 
have been gradually eroded through the expansion of mass large-scale 
institutions, especially that of the state. The transformation of the 
family is an example of this process. The educational functions have 
been largely taken over by the public schools; the vocational functions, 
by factories and offices; the entertainment formerly provided through 
the cooperation of members of the family, by television and other mass 
media. The problem now existing centers on how the family can efficiently 
discharge its functions when these other activities have largely been 
taken away from it. Some of these trends have of course been unavoid-
able but to admit this does not in itself mitigate the deleteriousness of 
many of the consequences. 
The sociologist, Robert A. Nisbet, has probably written more ex-
tensively_ on the social implications of conservatism than any other 
conservative writer. In common with many other conservatives, Nisbet 
believed that one of the gravest dangers confronting Western culture 
has been the emergence of a mass of fundamentally rootless individuals, 
bereft of those social and cultural relationships through which humans 
obtain their sense of community with others and with society as a 
11 v1hole. 
events. 
He attributed this consequence to a long chain of historical 
The strong emphasis upon individualism at the time of the 
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Reformation led to the relative neglect of man•s social nature. Further-
more, the rise of modern capitalism with its implicit stress upon 
competition in preference to cooperation, and upon workers as economic 
commodities to be bought and sold on an open market has greatly exacer-
bated the trend toward the atomization of the individual. Since the out-
break of the French Revolution, the state has added steadily to its powers 
thereby undermining those intermediate associations, such as guilds and 
the charitable associations, through which people have sought companion-
ship and a sense of unity with society as a whole. In common with a 
number of other sociologists, both conservative and non-conservative, 
Nisbet has attributed to the state the primary role in bringing about the 
atomization of society; for the state has in addition to a monopoly of 
force, control over education; supervision over the family; power over 
property; and even some measure of control over personal habits. In fact, 
Nisbet has characterized the fundamental conflict in modern history as 
being not between the state and the individual but between the state and 
the social group. 12 The contrast between Nisbet•s view and classical 
liberalism can be most clearly brought out by considering the following 
llRobert A. Nisbet, Community and Power (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), pp. 198-199. 
121Qid., p. 108. 
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quotation; 
I cannot help thinking that what we need above all else in 
this age is a new philosophy of laissez faire. The old lais-
sez faire failed because it was based on erroneous premises 
regarding human behavior. As a theory it failed because it 
mistook for ineradicable characteristics of individuals quali-
ties that were in fact inseparable from social groups. As a 
policy it failed because its atomistic propositions were in-
evitably unavailing against the reality of enlarging masses 
of insecure individuals. Far from proving a chetk upon the 
growth of the omnicompetent state~ the old laisses faire ac-
tually accelerated this growth. Its indifference to every 
form of community and association left the State as the sole 
area of reform and security. . . . To create the conditions 
within which the autonomous individuals could prosper~ could 
be emancipated from the binding ties of kinship, class, and 
community~ was the objective of the older laissez faire. To 
create conditions within which autonomous groups may prosper 
must beA I believe, the prime objective of the new laissez 
faire.lj 
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The foregoing quotation not only serves as an illustration of a concrete 
application of the conservative philosophy of human nature but also high-
lights the fact that while conservatives generally prefer that the powers 
of the state extend well beyond the narrow confines of law and order 
advocated by laissez-faire liberals~ they believe that state powers ha.ve 
become much too broad in scope. 
The social philosophy of conservatives has been based upon a con-
ception of human nature as lacking in autonomy and self-sufficiency. As 
is well-known, such conservatives as Nisbet and Russell Kirk have viewed 
humans as creatures constantly beset by anxiety. The fundamental human 
needs are considered to be security, status, and meaning. The first two 
categories, and to a lesser extent, the third as well~ relate to needs 
13Ibid., p. 278 
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that must be satisfied in society rather than in individual isolation. 
Neuroses are not viewed as fundamentally outcomes of early childhood 
experiences nor of conflicts between human emotions and repressions but 
rather much more frequently as the results of disturbed relations 
between the individual and his social environment. To conservatives, 
humans are not adventurous souls ready to cast asunder all the ties 
binding them to their companions but are rather weak beings, constantly 
in need of emotional reassurance. To contemporary neo-conservatives, 
the most pathetic of all human types is the. rootless proletarian, bereft 
of all the familiar ties of religion, class, and community. Marxists 
attribute alienation to largely economic factors; Freudians, to 
repressions; liberals, to social institutions; but to conservatives, the 
fundamental root of contemporary alienation is contained within the 
confines of the emotional nature of man. 
It was partly because they viewed human nature as being weak and 
emotional in character that conservatives from Edmund Burke to Russell 
Kirk have strongly emphasized the value and importance of tradition. In 
the commonly accepted meaning of the term, tradition designates the 
process of transmission from generation to generation of knowledge, 
beliefs, and attitudes as well as the content of that inheritance. To 
conservatives, it has more particularly designated the inherited political, 
moral, religious, and intellectual values of a culture that are the 
products of centuries of collective experience. When the weakness and 
irrationality of the individual is contrasted with the time tested 
experience of the race, conservatives contend that unless the evidence 
is oven<Jhelmingly to the contrary, tradition should prevail. A 
quotation from the writings of Edmund Burke, perhaps the most vigorous 
nen t of tradition, should make this position abundantly clear. expo 
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You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to 
confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings, that instead 
of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very 
considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we 
cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have 
lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we 
cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on 
his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock 
in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to 
avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of 
ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general 
prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom 
which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they 
seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, 
with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice 
and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice with 
its reason, has a motive to give act1on to that reason and an affec-
tion which will give it permanence. 14 
Burke believed that tradition should be based upon the long-term 
experience of the race communicated over countless generations; for the 
ultimate consequences of events seemed to him to be seldom immediately 
apparent. It was this attitude which prevented Burke's defense of tradition 
from becoming an apology for either opportunism or for the passive 
acceptance of whatever short-term traditions there might be which were in 
the ascendent. Burke has confidence that, given sufficient time, all 
traditions would tend to conform with conservative standards. 
The science of constructing a commonwealth or renovating it or 
reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to 
be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can in-
struct us .in that practical science, because the real effects of 
moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first 
instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation, 
and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces 
l4surke, Reflections, pp. 98-99. 
in the beginning. The reverse also happens: and very plausible 
schemes with very pleasing commencements have often shameful and 
lamentable conclusions. In states there are often some obscure 
and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of 
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little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or 
adversity may most essentially depend .. The science of government 
being therefore so practical in itself and intended for such 
practical purposes -- a matter which requires experience and even 
more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, how-
ever sagacious and observing he may be -- it is with infinite 
caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice 
which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common 
purposes of society, or on building it up again without having 
models and patterns of approved unity before his eyes.l5 
In addition to this essentially empirical justification of tradition, 
tradition also inspired respect for authority; for through tradition the 
values of a culture are transmitted to the people. Given the essential 
conservative attitude of the selfish and irrational nature of mankind, 
the upholding of tradition could be considered an important means whereby 
civilization could be protected against the weaknesses of human nature. 
Burke has expressed this point of view very vividly; 
Who would insure a tender and delicate sense of honor to beat al-
most with the first impulses of the heart when no man could know 
what would be the test of honor in a nation continually varying 
the standard of its coin? No part of life would retain its ac-
quisitions. Barbarism with regard to science and literature, un-
skillfulness with regard to art and manufactures, would infallibly 
succeed to the want of a steady education and settled principle; 
and thus the commonwealth itself would, in a few generations, 
crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individ-
uality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven. 16 
Tradition is, after all, the means whereby the religious, moral and 
cultural values of mankind, accumulated through millenia of effort and 
15Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
16Ibid., p. 109. 
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experience, are communicated from generation to generation. To advo-
cate and emphasize the value and importance of past experience is ul-
timately to stress the importance of history and at the same time to 
evince skepticism in the ability of human reason, unaided by experience 
to effectively order human affairs. Thus, while conservatives stress 
the importance of metaphysical principles, in the application of these 
principles, they also believe in the importance of experience because 
they have an acute consciousness of human 1 imitations. 
The educational implications of the conservative conception of 
human nature are on the whole congruent with the implications of the 
conservative conception of the universe. The emphasis upon heredity 
would, for example, lead to the same concentration upon the education of 
the gifted and the same stress upon different kinds of curricula in 
accordance with differences in the intrinsic natures of students. 
Selective education, at least beyond the level of instruction needed for 
minimal vocational functioning in our complex society, would be a 
logical consequence of the stress on the importance of the innate genetic 
potentialities of students; for if students do not possess the needed 
potentialities, efforts to significantly elevate their abilities through 
education would in the end prove fruitless and would presumably detract 
from attention to the gifted. 
The conservative belief in the emotional and selfish nature of man-
kind clearly implies an educational approach characterized by a strong 
emphasis upon discipline and obedience to authority. It would hardly be 
~lise to leave students to their own devices if they were not to be 
trusted. Furthermore, if one believes that men are essentially 
irrational, it would seem to follow that the curriculum that one would 
find acceptable would consist of required rather than elective courses, 
' 
' both because of a lack of confidence in the ability of individuals to 
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make rational choices and of a desire to expose them to material w~ich 
would presumably give them the needed guidance in order to enhance the 
rational elements of their natures. In addition, the freedom to teach 
students whatever one desires would hardly be promoted by adherence to 
an essentially irrationalist psychology. Consistent conservatives might 
well be reluctant to teach anything which might undermine the morality 
of their students except possibly where student bodies are highly select; 
the confidence that the students themselves would be able to correct any 
wrong impressions which the material might convey would very.likely be 
absent. 
Yet the conservative conception of education is not quite as 
teacher-centered as the foregoing might indicate. As we have seen 
earlier, the conservative Niew of the student as a learner is one of an 
active and creative individual. This viewpoint is clearly implicit not 
only in the conservative stress on the moral imagination but also in the 
emphasis upon the innate pattern of abilities which each individual 
student is believed to possess by virtue of his heredity. From the 
conservative viewpoint, the teacher must uphold authority and at the same 
time guide students because of his presumably superior competence. In 
addition, he should adjust his educational procedure to take account of 
the ~niqueness of each pupil. Therefore, the c~nservative conception of 
education would be neither of an active nor of a passive nature but 
rather would properly be interactive in character. There would ideally 
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constant interchange bet\'ieen educators and their charges .17 
If, as conservatives believe, men are dominated by an anxiety for 
companionship and status among their associates, it would seem to follow 
that school counselors of conservative views would be anxious to provide 
students with the means to satisfy these emotional needs. The means 
would presumably include extra-curricular social activities involving 
students of compatible tastes and interests. In addition, the importance 
of man's emotional nature implies attention to the aesthetic as well as 
the strictly academic subjects; for it cannot be denied that one of the 
several aims of aesthetic endeavor pertains to the feelings of both the 
artist and the audience. The importance of training the feelings is 
clearly implicit upon a recognition of the paramount importance of the 
emotional aspect of human nature. 
The advocacy of tradition as a means of overcoming some of the 
imperfections of human nature also involves important educational entail-
ments. One of the arguments offered by conservatives in the past was, as 
we have seen, that long-term traditions represent the distilled \'lisdom of 
countless generations. It would appear to follow that traditionalist 
educators would tend to emphasize the teaching of those works which have 
survived the test of time. In addition, such subjects as history and 
literature, which consist in large part of content which reflects past 
experience, would be stressed. These fields would presumably be taught 
17This conclusion was reached on the basis of the logical entail-
ments of conservative thought. We shall see later whether the thought 
of individual conservative writers will enable us to substantiate this 
generalization. 
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in such a manner as to convey the moral and intellectual values which are 
products of past experience; for another of the major arguments used by 
conservatives to justify traditionalism was that tradition was a superior 
means for the transmission of these values. Imitation has certainly been 
a major means whereby traditions have been transmitted. It is therefore 
to be expected that in their teaching conservatives would utilize the 
lives of great personages as well as the great classics as models for imi-
tation, although conservatives would presumably adapt this technique to 
the nature of the children involved. 
The conservative approach to man and the universe has in the past 
been primarily an ontological approach, based upon an essentially 
hierarchical conception of being. The fundamental method was to seek the 
rational principles which determine the nature of being. Although con-
servatives have utilized experience as an important auxiliary determinant, 
their basic approach has been primarily metaphysical. In this connection, 
the conservative distrust of human nature has been based as much on the 
irrationality as on the selfishness of mankind. This attitude is the key 
to much of conservative educational theory; for many of the character-
istics mentioned in this chapter as educational consequences of conserv-
atism are actually means rather than ends. These consequences include the 
emphasis upon discipline, selectivity, interaction, human differences, 
imitation, and other such features. The foregoing are essentially 
methods of increasing the efficiency of instruction. The fundamental 
end of conservatism in view of the hierarchical metaphysics basic to 
conservative thought is the training of potential leadership through the 
nurture of their reasoning abilities so that they might discern the 
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rational design of the universe. By this means, it is hoped that they 
can acquire the ability to discriminate between the noble and the petty, 
the refined and the vulgar, the right and the wrong, the sacred and the 
profane, the intelligent and the stupid. To put it somewhat differently, 
education from the conservative point of view is essentially a matter of 
understanding the nature of the universal hierarchy for the purpose of 
realizing the axiological significance thereof. Education would there-
fore be ultimately instruction in value discrimination in accordance with 
the concept of a universal value hierarchy. 
In this chapter, the fundamental assumptions of conservative edu-
cational theory have been discussed together with their educational en-
tailments. In the following three chapters, historical evidence will 
be examined to determine the actual educational effects of the acceptance 
of the conservative viewpoint. If some of the consequences that have 
been named in this chapter are not supported by evidence from the writers 
that we will discuss, this would not, of course, necessarily imply that 
the inferences made are incorrect but that quite possibly these entail-
ments may be real but unrecognized. If, on the other hand, these writers 
do provide us with evidence for the characteristics named, this material 
should make us more certain of the generalizations made. In addition, 
unforeseen consequences may also become apparent. 
In the next three chapters, neo-conservative writers on education 
will be divided into three schools: those who have combined humanism 
with traditionalism; those humanists who while favorable to tradition-
alism have not made it a major element in their systems; and finally 
those who have a basically religious approach to educational problems. 
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As examples of these three schools of thought, T. S. Eliot and Russell 
Kirk will represent the first school; Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock, 
the second; and Bernard Iddings Bell, the third. We will begin with 
traditional humanism because, although Babbitt's neo-humanism may have 
been the first of the neo-conservative movements to appear, traditional 
humanism is the closest neo-conservative approximation to the original 
form of modern conservatism -·- the Burkean conservatism of the eighteenth 
century. 
CHAPTER III 
TRADITIONALIST HUMANISM 
Classical humanism has historically been an important influence on 
the development of Western education .. As we shall see later, a high 
proportion of neo-conservative writers still apply humanistic standards 
in expressing their views on educational and cultural issues. It is 
therefore important to define what is meant by humanism as a doctrine or 
viewpoint. This will be accomplished by focusing on those character-
istics which the various classical humanistic movements of the past had 
in common. 
The ultimate aim of the classical humanists was the improvement of 
the individual. person. 1 Instead of attempting to elevate men collective-
ly, the humanists preferred to work on an individual basis .. In general, 
humanists did not believe that men were completely perfectible but they 
had confidence in the improvability of mankind. 
The means that humanists advocated for attaining this goal of im-
proving the individual were predicated upon the value of harmony. By 
harmony, they had reference to the ideal of the perfect articulation and 
integration of parts to produce an agreeable whole. This involved a 
combination of symmetry, balance, and proportion. As such, it was funda-
mentally an aesthetic ideal. Humanists have therefore stressed the value 
lpaul 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, Vol. 2 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 30. 
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of the study of literature and the fine arts for, among other reasons, 
the development of a sense of harmony. More broaqly, they have aimed at 
the development of the versatile individual in whom the various academic 
and personal excellences would be blended into a decorous and harmonious 
whole. 2 
Historically, the humanistic viewpoint was developed in ancient 
Greece. Such ancient Greek and Roman writers as Plato, Aristotle, 
!socrates, Cicero, and Quintilian laid the foundations of the movement. 
Humanism was also an important intellectual influence during the Italian 
Renaissance. In addition, classical humanism influenced the development 
·of the traditional liberal arts education of Europe. Contemporary 
humanism can be divided into two schools: one which is elitist in 
character; the other, more democratic in orientation. 3 The more 
democratic school is exemplified in the writings of Mark Van Doren, 
Gilbert Highet, and Jacques Barzun. This school of thought is obviously 
not conservative in any discriminating sense of the term because of the 
absence of the fundamental aristocratic dimension of conservatism. It 
is therefore aristocratic or elitist humanism that will command our at-
tention. 
Those neo-conservatives who have a humanistic approach to educa-
tion can be divided into two groups. One group has combined humanism 
with the espousal of the value and importance of cultural traditionalism. 
The second group, while favorable to traditionalism, has not given it the 
same degree of attention as the first group. The members of the second 
2rbid., p. 41. 
3Clarence J. Karier, Man, Society, and Education (Glenview Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1967), p. 207. 
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group have preferred to state their position in more modernistic terms. 
The most influential neo-conservative writers on education to adhere to 
the first view of cultural traditionalism were T.S. Eliot and Russell 
Kirk; to the second or more modern view, Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock. 
This chapter will analyze the views ·of the cultural traditional neo-
conservatives. The following chapter will deal with the more modernist 
group. 
The approach of the traditionalistic humanists was partially socio-
cultural and partially aesthetic since they were concerned with preserv-
ing the unique values of their culture and society -- especially with 
regard to the traditional way of life of the people. This was combined 
with the aesthetic emphasis characteristic of humanism which implies the 
importance of culture in another sense of the term -- aesthetic and intel-
lectual cultivation. A prime example of this combination is T. S. Eliot. 
The Work ofT. S. Eliot 
Eliot has probably been one of the more influential poets of the 
twentieth century. His influence as a social and cultural critic has al-
so been considerable. It is his role as a critic that will be of prime 
concern to us for the influence that he has exerted on neo-conservatives 
stemmed primarily from his role as a critic of the times. 
Eliot was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 26, 1888, the 
scion of a prominent and cultured family. His grandfather, a Unitarian 
minister, was the founder and later chancellor of the George Washington 
University of St. Louis. T. S. Eliot's father was the president of a 
brick manufacturing company and a patron of the arts. The poet's mother, 
Charlotte Champe Stearns Eliot, was a writer and poetess herself. It 
can be assumed that T. S. Elior had, as a child, the inestimable 
advantage of growing up in a highly cultivated household. 
Eliot received a traditional classical education in the prepara-
51 
tory department of Washington University and later at Milton Academy, 
affiliated at that time with Harvard University. He entered Harvard in 
]906 where his studies consisted primarily of courses in literature and 
philosophy. Eliot received the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1909 and the 
Master of Arts degree in English literature from Harvard in 1910. Before 
returning to Harvard for further study, Eliot spent a delightful year in 
Paris, studying French literature and philosophy. In 1911, Eliot began 
his work toward the Ph.D. degree. Partially under the influence of one 
of his Harvard professors, Irving Babbitt, Eliot enrolled in Indic 
studies but later switched to philosophy. The poet did not complete the 
requirements for the doctorate since other concerns overshadowed his 
academic plans. He did complete his dissertation which pertained to a 
conservatively-inclined philosopher, F. H. Bradley. Eliot planned to 
present his dissertation to his committee but, at the time that his 
thesis was completed, he was living in England and missed the boat back 
to the United States. One cannot help wondering why he did not board 
another ship. In any case, it was evident that by this time some very 
fundamental changes had occurred in Eliot•s way of life. 
In 1914, Eliot went to England to study philosophy at Oxford, pre-
sumably in connection with his dissertation on F. H. Bradley. He 
evidently decided to remain in England. In 1915, he married Vivienne 
Haigh-Wood of London and became a schoolteacher. Eliot first taught at 
High 1~ycombe and later at Highgate Junior School in London. He found 
I 
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teaching to be very strenuous and especially disliked the task of main-
taining discipline. He left teaching for a position in the Foreign and 
Colonial Department at Lloyd's Bank while working during evenings and 
weekends on his poetry. In 1925, Eliot met Geoffrey Faber who was 
interested in hiring a writer with a reputation who could attract young 
writers to work for Faber's publishing company. Eliot eventually became 
a director of Faber and Faber and utilized his position to encourage 
individuals with strong poetic talents. In 1948, Eliot was awarded the 
Nobel prize in literature. In 1957, long afte~ the death of his first 
wife, Eliot married his secretary, Valerie Fletcher. He found the 
happiness in his second marriage which had eluded him during his first 
marriage. Eliot died in London on January 4, 1965. As is well-known 
Eliot announced his conversion from the Unitarian to the Anglo-Catholic 
faith in 1928. At the same time, he proclaimed himself a classicist in 
literature and a royalist in politics. 
Eliot was primarily a philosophical poet. His two most influential 
poems were probably The Waste Land (1922) and Ash Wednesday (1930). The 
earlier poem dealt with the spiritual aridity of the twentieth century; 
the later poem with the Christian answer to the problems of the age. 
Both of these poems were highly abstract and symbolic in nature and 
helped to stimulate revolutionary changes in twentieth-century poetry. 
During the last half of his life, Eliot developed a considerable 
concern regarding sociological and cultural problems. His most 
influential work in this area was Notes Towards the Definition· of Culture 
(1949) which examined the meanings of the term "culture" and the conditions 
needed for cultural creativity. Only slightly less influential was 
~Idea of a Christian Society (1940) in which he dealt with ~'lhat he 
53 
l ·eved to be the desirable structure and aims of a society based upon be 1 . 
Christian values. Although other works will be used in examining Eliot's 
social and cultural thought, these two works probably contain a greater 
amount of relevant material than any of the other publications of Eliot; 
50 that our analysis will be based largely on these works. 
While we can speculate on the nature of the influences upon Eliot, 
it is certainly safer to rely on Eliot's own testimony as to the individ-
uals who influenced him in the writing of these two important works. In 
the writing of the Notes, Eliot has indicated that he was influenced pri-
marily by the writings of Canon V. A. Demant, Mr. Christopher Dawson, 
Professor Karl Mannheim, and Mr. Dwight McDonald. 5 Canon Demant and 
Christopher Dawson were well-known writers on the social implications of 
religious thought. Karl Mannheim was of course the famous sociologist 
whose views on elite and class were of particular importance to Eliot. 
Dwight McDonald is known primarily as a critic of mass culture. Among 
those who influenced Eliot with regard to the views expressed in The 
Idea of a Christian Society were Canon Demant, Dawson, Middleton Murry,, 
and Jacques Maritain. 6 Both Murry and Maritain \'/ere vigorous advocates 
of social reconstruction based upon Christian principles. In general, 
most of the writers who influenced Eliot as a social and cultural critic 
r:: • ~T. S. El1ot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1949), preface. 
6T. S. Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Society (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1940), pp. 3-4. 
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re either Roman Catholic, Anglican, or secularist writers with aristo-we . . 
cratic tendencies. Curiously, Eliot did not mention his former teacher, 
Irving Babbitt, with whom he shared many opinions. 
The central concept of Eliot's entire social theory is "culture" 
which is considerably broader in scope than the political context of 
much existing social theory. Culture is also a more fundamental concept 
than 11 society" which is based upon culture rather than the reverse. It 
is therefore of considerable importance to inquire into Eliot's meaning 
and use of the term "culture." 
To begin with, Eliot veered back and forth between two general 
meanings of culture. ·One meaning pertained to the general way of life 
of a people. The following is an example of this usage: 
Taking now the point of view of identification, the reader must 
remind himself, as the author has constantly to do, of how much 
is here embraced by the term culture. It includes all the char-
acteristic activities and interests of a people: Derby Day, 
Henley Regetta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the 
dog races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleydale cheese, 
boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nine-
teenth century Gothic churches and the music of Elgar. The reader 
can make his own list.? 
In addition, Eliot also sometimes employed culture to mean what has 
generally become known as cultivation. In the following quotation, 
he gave a detailed account of this type of culture. 
There are several kinds of attainment which we may have in mind in 
different contexts. We may be thinking of refinement of manners --
or urbanity and civility: if so, we shall think first of a social 
class, and of the superior individual as representative of the 
best of that class. We may be thinking of learning and a close 
acquaintance with the accumulated wisdom of the past: if so our 
man is the scholar. We may be thinking of philosophy in the widest 
sense -- an interest in and some ability to manipulate abstract 
7Notes, p. 104. 
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ideas: if so, we may mean the intellectual (recognizing the fact 
that this term is now used very loosely, to comprehend many 
persons not conspicuous for strength of intellect). Or we may 
be thinking of the arts: if so, we mean the artist and the amateur 
or dilettante. But what we seldom have in mind is all of these 
things at the same time.8 
Eliot reconciled these two meanings of the term culture as a general 
way of life and as cultivation by viewing them as different aspects of 
one phenomenon. Cultivation referred to the culture of the individual and, 
to some extent, of the group or class. However, the culture of the 
individual and the culture of the class both reflect to a considerable 
extent the general way of life or, in other words, the culture of the 
whole society. In fact, cultivation refers to aspects of the whole 
culture. Realizing this, Eliot criticized Matthew Arnold for giving 
attention in Culture and Anarchy to the individual and class aspects of 
of culture to the utter neglect of the societal aspect. In this respect, 
Eliot exhibited the emphasis on the group which has been characteristic 
of conservative thinkers in contrast to the stress on the individual of 
the classical liberals. 
In addition to defining the meaning of culture, Eliot was also 
interested in the problem of what conditions would be essential for 
maximum cultural creativity. He believed that there were at least three 
such conditions: the existence of social classes, cultural regionalism, 
and a balance between unity and diversity in religion.9 Before the writer 
explains each of these conditions in detail, it should be emphasized 
that all of the conditions which Eliot named were based upon the assump-
tion that balance is of the utmost value in encouraging intellectual 
Brbi1., pp. 94-95. 9Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
! 
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and aesthetic achievement. By balance, Eliot had in mind combinations of 
unity with diversity and of harmony with dissonance. The following 
discussion of these conditions is designed to explain Eliot•s view. 
To Eliot, each social class represented a distinct way of life. 
In fact, he considered the chief function of each class to be that of 
passing its culture, strengthened and revitalized, to future generations. 
The primary agency for transmitting this social class heritage was the 
family which Eliot thought more important than the school in transmitting 
culture as a whole. An especially vital function of the family was its 
transmission of a standard of civility and manners.lO 
When intellectuals such as Karl Mannheim advocated the dominance 
of elites who possessed outstanding abilities, Eliot believed that they 
overlooked the equally vital role of social classes since the cultural 
heritage consisted of much more than facts and techniques. Instead, 
Eliot favored a combination of elites and social classes, which were to 
be internally arranged in a hierarchical pattern. In describing this 
hierarchy, Eliot wrote: 
What I have advanced is not a 11 defense of ari stocracy 11 - an empha-
sis upon the importance of one organ of society. Rather it is a 
plea on behalf of a form of society in which there will be, from 
11
top 11 to 11 bottom," a continuous gradation of cultural levels: it 
is important to remember that we should not consider the upper 
levels as possessing more culture than the lower, but as 
representing a more conscious culture and a greater specialization 
of culture. I incline to believe that no true democracy can 
maintain itself unless it maintains these different levels of 
culture. 11 
Eliot believed that a people should be neither too united nor too 
lOJbid., p. 115. 
lllbid., p. 121. 
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divided if culture is to flourish. Either extreme could lead to tyranny. 
On the one hand, a graded social hierarchy is desirable. On the other 
hand, members of different classes should possess a community of common 
culture which would enable them to mix freely. In other words, classes 
should exist but should not become rigidly stratified into castes. 12 
Eliot also favored the encouragement and preservation of local 
regional cultures since he believed that cultural diversity enriches 
the cultures of the world. On the one hand, cultures need to attract 
each other to affect one another; on the other hand, a certain degree 
of repulsion is also needed for particular cultures to survive. An 
example of what he desired is the 11 satellite culture. 11 He felt that this 
was well exemplified by the cultures of the Irish, the Scots, and the 
Welsh which he regarded as satellites of the allegedly more dominant 
English culture. As satellites, these cultures have greatly enriched 
English culture and, by the same token, have played a greater role in the 
world than would have been true had they preserved their cultural 
independence. By using the English language, Irish, Welsh, and Scottish 
writers have reached a larger audience than if they had written in the 
languages which once were their native vernaculars. The range of thought 
and feeling represented in English literature has been greatly enlarged 
not only because these vlriters used English, but a 1 so because many of 
these writers have chosen to express and reflect the distinctive charac-
teristics of their native cultures. To reduce all the cultures of Great 
Britain to one would, in Eliot's view, have restricted the range of 
12rbid., p. 123. 
58 
h . t 13 1 ;terarY ac 1 evemen . 
The same combination of unity and diversity was characteristic of 
Eliot's position on the relationship of religion -to culture. He believed 
that those religions were most culturally stimulating which were capable 
of winning acceptance by people of widely diverse cultures. Such 
religions provided a pattern of common belief which stimulated cultural 
interchanges between peoples. On the other side, religious diversity was 
needed to avoid petrification which would, depEnding on the natures of the 
peoples affected, lead to either torpor or chaos. In f~~t, he feared 
that a reunion of Christian churches might result in a general lowering 
of the cultural level through the disappearance of much religious 
diversity. 14 
A constant struggle between the centripetal and the centrifugal 
forces of religious unity and diversity was deemed by Eliot to be highly 
desirable for without such a struggle, no balance could be maintained. 
Christendom should, he felt, be one but, within it, there should be an 
endless conflict of ideas; for truth is clarified and enlarged by 
intellectual struggle. 15 
Eliot's emphasis upon variety and diversity was, as we have seen, 
consistent with the general direction of conservative thought. 16 He had, 
however, a confidence in the eventual triumph of truth through discussion 
and struggle which far exceeded what has been usual among conservatives. 
13rbid., pp. 128-129. 
14rbid., pp. 144-146. 
1 5r b; d. , p. 1 57. 
16see page 24 of this study. 
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The conservative view of men as being irrational by nature would tend to 
mitigate such confidence., Evidently, Eliot's view of human nature was 
somewhat more hopeful than the views of his philosophical allies. 
Eliot's emphasis upon diversity obviously implied the cultivation 
and encouragement of cultural diversities in the schools. Freedom of 
discussion was also clearly implied; for rigorous censorship tends to 
undermine diversity by restricting the range of individual exposure to 
diverse views. The emphasis upon the encouragement and retention of a 
class differentiated society also entail~d a multi-track system of 
education with different types of education available to suit individuals 
of correspondingly varied social backgrounds; for the existence of 
different social classes clearly implies a difference in functions which 
entails a need for different kinds of training to fulfill those functions. 
To Eliot, social issues were clearly subordinate to cultural 
questions. When discussing different types of society, he distinguished 
between them on the basis of the cultural ideals which they exemplified. 
He believed that there existed three significant kinds of society in the 
contemporary world. The Christian society was characterized as the type 
of society where behavior was regulated in accordance with Christian 
principles. 17 The pagan society was described in terms antithetical to 
Christian ideals. While Eliot was not very specific concerning the 
attitudes inculcated by pagan societies, he cited Fascist countries as 
examples of paganism. 18 
l7Eliot, The Idea of a Christian Societx, p. 10. 
1Brbid., p. 15. 
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The third type of society was the one in which Eliot believed him-
self to be living -- the negative society. This type of society has not 
been guided by any ideal -- unless one could consider liberalism to be 
an ideal. He considered liberalism to be a movement defined by its 
starting point more than by ends. Eliot believed liberalism to consti-
tute a trend away from rather than towards something definite.l9 What 
he possibly meant was that liberalism was essentially ~he emphasis upon 
freedom, which should not be considered an end but only a means to an 
end. Eliot did not attempt to explain his assertion at all; but the 
interpretation we have given seems to be the only meaningful one. 
Eliot felt that the inefficiency of liberal society would lead to 
its eventual disappearance and replacement by a society that would be 
either Christian or pagan. Eliot commented on the malaise of liberalism: 
By destroying traditional social habits of the people, by 
dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual 
constituents, by licensing the opinions of the most foolish, by 
substituting instruction for education, by encouraging cleverness 
rather than wisdom, the upstart rather than the qualified, by 
fostering a notion of getting~ to which the alternative is a 
hope.less apathy, Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is 
its own negation: the artificial, mechanised, or brutalized 
control which is a desperate remedy for its chaos.20 
As is evident, Eliot viewed liberalism as a movement characterized by 
equalitarianism, an excessive emphasis upon freedom, and a hopeless ab-
sence of standards. Unless replaced by a Christian society, liberalism 
could only lead to tyranny. In presenting his views about the Christian 
society, Eliot was not concerned either with the means of bringing it 
19rbid., p. 12 
20Ibid., p. 12. 
into existence nor about defending it. He wanted primarily to show how 
it vwuld differ from the negative, liberal society in which he lived.21 
Of special concern to him was its 11 idea 11 or ends. 
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The aims of a Christian society \tould be the virtue and well-being 
of the people and the attainment of beatitude for those who would be 
capable of it. 22 A Christian society would consist of two basic elements: 
the masses and the elite 11 Community of Christians. 11 The Community of 
Christians would consist of those clergy and laity who possess suffi-
cient spiritual and intellectual development to understand Christian 
doctrines and to live consciously by them. 23 As for the masses, their 
adherence to Christianity would be largely behavioral and would be ex-
pressed both in their behavior towards their neighbors and in customary 
religious observances. Eliot believed that the masses had only a mini-
mal capacity for reflecting on the objects of faith. Instead of attempt-
ing to inculcate an understanding among them of the most abstruse con-
cerns of theology, it was far more important to convey to them a reali-
zation of how far their lives fell short of the Christian ideal.24 This 
position clearly implied that beyond a certain minimal level of attain-
ment formal education should be selective in applicability. If the 
differences in intellectual understanding were, as Eliot apparently as-
sumed, largely due to differences in innate potentialities, there was 
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 27. 
23lli1·' p. 34. 
24Ibid., p. 23. 
Tittle use in attempting to train individuals beyond the limits of their 
abi.lities. 
Eliot believed that a nation's educational system was far more 
important than its government. In attempting to delineate the outline 
of his Christian society, Eliot devoted some attention to schooling as a 
means of bringing about the conditions needed for the smooth functioning 
of that society. The primary aim of education in such a society would 
be to train people. to think in Christian categories. Eliot considered 
such Christian· thought to be more important than the encouragement of the 
outv1ard manifestations of Christian piety which was not necessarily a 
reliable indicator of the possession of Christian faith. The beliefs of 
the rulers of a nation were, to Eliot, of 1ess significance than the 
beliefs of the population over which they ruled since the practical 
necessities of political life necessitated their conformity to the ideals 
of the citizenry of their country.25 
Eliot believed it to be essential that there exist a certain cul-
tural uniformity based upon agreement concerning what everyone should 
know. This uniformity was considered necessary to provide cultural 
continuity and to promote communication. In a Christian society, the 
content of education would in large part be determined by Christian 
principles. In the United States, according to Eliot, there was such 
pervasive permissiveness that one could not assume that any two under-
graduates had read the same books or taken the same courses unless they 
had attended the same school and had studied with the same teacher at 
-.): 
25 Ibid., p. 22. 
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the same time. To Eliot, education differed from instruction in that 
there was some principle of selection of the knowledge which any educa-
ted person should possess. In a negative society, the ideal of wisdom 
was displaced by uncontrolled experimentation and permissiveness.26 In 
his opposition to the elective system of education, Eliot typified con-
servative opinion. The conservative assumption of the existence of a 
natural hierarchy of value clearly implies the existence of a hierarchy 
of subjects which embody these values. It follows that the selection of 
subjects to be studied should be based on this hierarchy rather than on 
the personal desires of the students involved. Eliot did not make clear 
his reasons for opposing the elective system, but his stand is consistent 
with his general educational position. 
As to his views concerning education in the democratic, secularist 
society in which he found himself, Eliot took a different approach; for 
he was confronted by a different set of questions than when he concerned 
himself with the structuring of a Christian society. On the whole, Eliot 
found himself in sympathy with C. E. M. Joad's statement of the purposes 
of education.27 Joad believed that education should prepare people to 
earn a livelihood, to become good citizens, and to develop and use their 
26Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
27Joad was a British philosopher and a contemporary of Eliot. He 
is known today for his conversion from religious skepticism to religious 
traditionalism which occurred during his old age. See Eliot's discussion 
of Joad's educational ideas in Eliot's To Criticize the Critic and Other 
Essays (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1965), pp. 69-70. 
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abilities. Although generally sympathetic to Joad's educational views, 
Eliot would have preferred the implementation of somewhat different 
objectives. To Eliot, one of the most important purposes of education 
was 11 to preserve the class and to select the elite." 28 While Eliot did 
not specify a particular program of preservation and selection, it is 
possible to extrapolate on these matters from his general philosophy. 
Education was to be a means whereby the cultures of the various classes 
would be transmitted to future generations. It would also be a means of 
selecting the intellectual elite. In an article on T. S. Eliot's views 
on education, Robert M. Hutchins expressed the opinion that the existence 
of class and elite were irrelevant to human improvement because members 
of social classes could be both wicked and stupid while members of the 
elite could be wicked but apparently not stupid. 29 For his position to 
possess much cogency, Hutchins would have to show why men would not be 
more wicked or more stupid without classes or elites; for to argue con-
vincingly against the existence or encouragement of classes and elites, 
one would have to prove that they do at least as much harm as good. To 
say that classes and elites have not attained perfection is not equiva-
lent to a denial that they do some good. Eliot did not maintain that 
classes and elites would make men perfect. In fact, Eliot wanted to 
improve classes and elites by appropriate educational reforms. He would 
probably view Hutchin's strictures as indicative of the need of improving 
the education of members of social classes and elites -- not for ignoring 
. 
these groups. 
28Eliot, Notes, p. 177. 
29R.M. Hutchins, "T. S. Eliot on Education,t' f1easure l (Hinter, 
1950), 3. 
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In any case, Eliot wished to diminish the occurrence of both 
wickedness and stupidity. In addition to the function assigned to educa-
tion with respect to class and elite, Eliot believed in the importance of 
schooling as an agency both for cultural continuity and the development 
of the moral and intellectual faculties of mankind. In fact, he con-
sidered cultural continuity to be a major factor in the elevation of 
those faculties. The subjects which Eliot believed to be of special 
value in fostering cultural continuity were history and foreign lan-
guages.30 Among the languages, Eliot believed that Latin and Greek were 
of special importance; for much of the Western Christian heritage was 
originally communicated through these languages.31 In essence, Eliot 
sought to justify traditional humanistic education. 
Like most other conservative writers on education, Eliot believed 
that general education was more important than vocational training. 
Before one can become a good citizen, one must learn how to be a good 
man.32 Learning should be primarily for the purpose of acquiring wisdom. 
Other considerations should be secondary.33 Even when pursuing other 
purposes, it was vital that students concentrated on the strictly 
academic subjects. To become a good citizen, for example, Eliot 
30Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 119. 
31T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Horld, 1960), p. 459. 
32Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 85. 
33Eliot, Notes, p. 175. 
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recommended the study of history, economics, and government. History was 
to be studied not primarily as a foundation for the acquisition of 
familiarity with the technical aspects of government but rather as a means 
of developing critical thinking and ethical consciousness.34 
Eliot was especially concerned with what he regarded as the._headlong 
rush to educate everyone. He believed that mass education would inevi-
tably lead to the lowering of academic standards and to the abandoning of 
those subjects which transmitted the essence of culture. 35 Presumably, 
the latter consequence would result from the pressure to simplify educa-
tion to enable the masses to understand what they are asked to study. 
Eliot believed that to educate above the level of the student's abilities 
would be disastrous by both creating discontent and mental strain.36 In 
answer to Eliot, Hutchins denied that men could have too much education; 
for if wisdom is a major aim of education, who could question the 
position that men should have as much wisdom as possible? 37 The obvious 
reply from Eliot's point of view would be that if a man is not capable of 
absorbing with some understanding the educational material meted out to 
him, than he would be getting too much education for his abilities. 
Ultimately, this difference in viewpoint between Eliot and Hutchins was 
34Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, p. 89. 
3SEliot, Notes, p. 185. 
36Ibid., p. 176. 
37Hutchins, 11 T. S. Eliot on Education, 11 p. 2. 
arently based upon a strong difference of opinion pertaining to the app 
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educational potentialities of the masses. This difference might possibly 
be based upon differences in judgment concerning the relative efficacy of 
environment as against heredity. Unfortunately, Hutchins was not very 
explicit in stating his views so that it is difficult to untangle his 
assumptions. Also, Eliot might have been somewhat more explicit as well. 
Eliot devoted considerable attention in his educational writings to 
the "equality of education" argument which he believed was based upon 
three erroneous assumptions: (1) superiority is always superiority of 
intellect; (2) there is an infallible method of detecting intellect; (3) 
it is possible to devise a system that could infallibly nourish intellect. 
From these false assumptions, there has arisen the ideal of an education-
al system that would sort out everyone according to his intellect. 38 
Eliot's usage of the concept of equality of opportunity was more 
applicable to British than to American conditions. During the twentieth 
century, especially since World War II, there has been a concerted effort 
to replace Britain's class system of education by a meritocracy. This 
replacement has been done in the name of "equality of opportunity." In 
the United States during the late nineteenth century and continuing into 
the early part of the btenti eth century, equa 1 i ty of opportunity had the 
same connotations as the present British usage. It commonly meant the 
opportunity of the poor and disadvantaged individual to rise in the social 
and occupational hierarchy through a combination of abilit,x,, ene_r_gy, hard 
work, and good moral conduct. The stress was at that time upon 
opportunity rather than upon equality, although no such concerted effort 
38Eliot, Notes, pp. 177-179. 
made to put it into effect as in present-day Britain. Today, the was 
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l·n the United States is upon equality including the utilization of stress 
racial and ethnic quota systems and the relaxing of educational standards. 
This would probably have alarmed Eliot more than the British usage; for 
an equalitarian education is obviously more antithetical to conservative 
ideals than a meritocracy. The essential conservative stress upon 
hierarchy is in direct opposition to the current American trend. The 
difference in attitudes toward opportunity is one of many possible illus-
trations of the fact that despite the alleged socialism of the British 
economic system, its educational system is more conservative than the 
American counterpart. 
Although Eliot thought that the exceptional individual should have 
the opportunity to rise in the social scale, the aim of sorting out every-
one in accordance with his or her abilities was unattainable and would 
disorganize society by the substitution of elites of intellect for classes. 
He believed that tests were not necessarily accurate indicators of the 
most important abilities. Rigid conformity to the educational system 
might actually be the real criterion of selection instead of intellectual 
ability. The education of everyone capable of receiving a higher educa-
tion must, he thought, lead inevitably to a lowering of academic 
standards through the concomitant overcrowding of the schools. Mass 
education would also enlarge the powers of the state since it would 
acquire control over the means of selection which control would ultimately 
lead to making the ends of the state the most important consideration in 
higher education. Eliot believed that education could function best when 
I 
existed some balance between privilege and opportunity.39 there 
Eliot's fear of overcrowding as a consequence of providing higher 
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education for all those capable of receiving it was apparently based upon 
the assumption that admission standards would be sufficiently generous so 
that massive enrollment would be an inevitable outcome. This does not, 
however, necessarily follow .. Standards might be set at a sufficiently 
high level to avoid that outcome. Perhaps, Eliot thought that political 
pressures would militate against raising standards, but the truth of this 
assumption would depend on the degree of political supervision over the 
agencies that would regulate academic admissions standards. In any case, 
the level at which individuals are deemed to be capable of profiting from 
a university education is to some degree relative to the standards of 
judgment so that some leeway is possible. 
To understand the full significance of Eliot's viewpoints, it is 
important to view his entire philosophy from a broad perspective. He 
was, as we have seen, reacting primarily against two contemporary trends. 
One of these was the decline of Christian influences together with the 
concomitant rise of the negative society, bereft of dedication either to 
religious faith or to moral standards. The other was the pressure to 
lower academic standards. He believed that the latter trend was the re-
sult of both pressure from the educational equalitarians and from the 
advocates of an educational meritocracy. 
Eliot's reaction to these trends was largely the consequence of his 
belief in the importance of cultural creativity and of religious belief. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
39rbid., pp. 177-178. See also Eliot, To Criticize the Critic, 
p. 103. 
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f l t that the negative society would undermine cultural activity by ~ e . 
destroying the traditional social habits of the people and by undermining 
the class structure of society. He was a 1 so fearful of the consequence of 
mass education-- especially, the pressure .to lower academic standards 
and to neglect those subjects which he considered most important for 
cultural creativity. He also believed that the negative society was a 
symptom of growing religious and moral skepticism which, if not arrested, 
would lead to the growth of an aggresively pagan society. 
Eliot's educational concerns were directly related to his general 
socio-cultural viewpoint. One of the major aims of education~ as con-
ceived by Eliot was cultural transmission; for he believed that cultural 
creativeness would decline if the various cultures of the world were to 
lose their individuality. Another of his aims, wisdom, pertained to the 
transmission of the insights of the past. This aim could likewise be 
considered as a kind of cultural transmission; for Eliot conceived of 
culture in such a way as to unite the anthropological and aesthetic senses 
of the term. The intellectual and aesthetic cultivation of the intelli-
gentsia was, to him, only a more conscious form of the basic culture of 
society. In addition, he was concerned with education as an instrument 
for training in citizenship and for class and elite recruitment. The last 
function was an expression of his basically aristocratic orientation. In 
general, Eliot's views can be characterized as expressions of a combination 
of cultural and religious concerns: 
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The Views of Russell Kirk 
One of the most famous figures in the neo-conservative movement is 
Russell W. Kirk, who has written many well-known works on conservatism 
and was one of the founders of both Modern Age and the National Review, 
pe-rhaps the two most influential magazines published in the United States 
which are devoted to matters of interest to conservatives. Professor 
Kirk is a graduate of Michigan State University (1940). He subsequently 
received theM. A. degree from Duke University (1941) and the doctorate 
from St. Andrews University in Scotland (1952). From 1946 until 1953, he 
taught history of civilization at Michigan State. From 1957 to 1969, he 
was Research Professor of Politi~s at C. W. Post College. During the same 
period, he also was University Professor at Long Island University. He 
writes and lectures extensively and makes his home, as befits a true con-
servative, at the domicile of his ancestors, Mecosta, Michigan. To judge 
by the academic posts that he has occupied, Kirk's chief academic in-
terests are apparently history and political science. 
His best known works are probably The Conservative Mind (1953), 
A Program for Conservatives (1954), Academic Freedom (1955), and Eliot 
and His Age (1971). The Conservative Mind is a history of Anglo-
American writings on conservatism from Burke to Santayana which, in the 
revised edition, was extended to include the writings ofT. S. Eliot. 40 
40The propriety of including Santayana as a conservative is highly 
questionable. Santayana did not adhere to the hierarchical metaphysics 
characteristic of conservatives, but exhibited instead strong material-istic tendencies. 
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In A Program for Conservatives, Kirk sought to show how conservative 
principles can be applied to the social, educational, and political 
problems which concern us. The title, Academic Freedom, is self-explan-
atory. Eliot and His Age is devoted to the 1 i fe of T. S. Eliot and to 
the people and ideas which influenced Eliot. As a writer, Kirk is un-
doubtedly an accomplished literary artist, although quite neglectful of 
the systematic and sustained argumentation characteristic of the skilled 
philosopher. As is well-known, Kirk derived the essentials of his con-
servative viewpoint largely from the writings of Edmund Burke. 41 
In what is perhaps the most explicit statement of Kirk's general 
philosophy, A Program for Conservatives, Kirk has named what he consid-
ered to be the ten most crucial problems which should concern the people 
of the United States. As will soon be evident, these are long term 
problems, not evanescent in character, and were stated in Burkean terms. 
In viewing these questions, we can obtain a clear understanding of the 
nature of the Burkean approach to contemporary American problems .. 
The problem of the heart is one of these. Specifically, Kirk meant 
the question of how to enable the will to again act in accordance with 
ethical and spiritual precepts.42 By 11 Spiritual, 11 he was evidently 
referring to religion; for his prescription involved both the restoration 
of belief in intrinsic moral values and in religious faith. The basic 
reason for the existence of the problem of the heart was deemed to be the 
decline of tradition. The fundamental criterion and source of values was 
4lsee Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1953), p. 6. 
42Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1962). pp. 16, 80. 
1 
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d d to be the universal order of nature, established by a means co11s i ere 
"more than human. u43 Kirk had in effect grounded rightness of wi 11 on 
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the natural law doctrine of :'right reason .. -- obedience to the values 
derived from a nature conceived to be rationally ordered and therefore 
understandable by reason. In essence, this view implied the subordination 
of will to reason. 
Kirk identified the spread of boredom among the masses as another 
problem. The causes for this problem were multiple. The decline of 
religion undermined the faith of the people in meaningful ends and pur-
poses. This problem was exacerbated by industralization which led to a 
wide-spread intoxication with machinery and to an insatiable desire for 
sensations. Add to these factors the undermining of individual and 
family responsibilities by the steady extension of the powers of the 
state, and the individual was thus condemned to an empty and rudderless 
existence. 44 
Kirk exhibited little confidence in the ability of the masses to 
find satisfactory substitutes for religious faith and a sense of indivi-
dual responsibility. His remedies were closely tied in with the causes 
stipulated. He believed that religion must be revived and that indivi-
dual self-reliance must be restored if existence was to recover its sig-
nificance. Through religion, the individual would acquire the sense of 
purpose needed to make life meaningful, while by the experience obtained 
through the exercise of individual responsibility, additional meaning 
~;auld be procured. 45 To Kirk, the primary exemplification of boredom 
was the rootless man, dispossessed of both traditional supports and 
--· 
44Ibid., pp. 105-107. 45rbid., pp. 12o-121. 
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enduring convictions. 
Kirk clearly linked boredom to the related problem of the decline 
of the community spirit which referred to the loss of the feeling of 
identity with the groups to which one belongs. The communal spirit was 
deemed to be highly desirable both for the sense of personal security and 
comradeship which it produced among individuals, and because of the 
relatively unselfish striving for the common good which was a consequent. 
causes for the decline of communal spirit were, according to Kirk, the 
gradual subversion of the autonomy of local groups through the diffusion 
of the powers of the state and the modern overvaluation of the importance 
of economic factors in contributing to human contentment. Kirk 
recommended the revival of autonomous groups and institutions. He 
especially insisted upon encouraging private schooling for he felt that 
public education was becoming much too dominant, thereby undermining the 
variety and independence of the schools.46 
Several implicit assumptions supported Kirk•s position. An obvious 
one was that humans as social animals find their happiness in groups. 
For communal loyalties to be meaningful, they must focus on local groups 
rather than on some abstract concept such as "humanity .. or 11 World peace." 
Kirk was obviously very much aware of the limitations of human nature, 
not the least of which was the strong need for emotional security. 
When we turn to Kirk•s.discussion of the problem of social justice, 
we are confronted by a question of a somewhat different character. As 
far as Kirk was concerned, the model for social justice was a hierar-
chical society in which each individual would be found in the place 
46Ibid., pp. 155-161-162. 
best suited .to his intrinsic nature. The chief obstacle to social 
justice was believed to be rooted in the widespread resentment of 
excellence which Kirk considered a meance to both culture and society.47 
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Thus, when dea 1 i ng with the concept of soci a 1 justice,_ Kirk was concerned 
primarily with differentiation in contrast to the stress on identity 
implicit in his concept of community._ To Kirk, the ideal society must 
possess the right balance between identity and differentiation. In their 
proper contexts, both factors were deemed to be important. 
Kirk's concept of social justice can be contrasted with the view 
that equates social justice with equality .. The contrasts in the views 
of social justice can be stated in terms of divergent conceptions of 
human nature and of human welfare. For the conservative, men are innately 
unequal. For the equalitarian, men should be considered equal in at 
least the most important aspects of their nature. For the conservative, 
the uplift of the most able is most important for progress; but for the 
equalitarian, it-is the uplift of the masses. The conservative educator 
is therefore strongly inclined to concentrate on developing the talents 
of his most gifted students; the more equalitarian, on raising the 
average level of his class. 
To Kirk, the fundamental cause of the pervasiveness of the resent-
ment against excellence was the increasing dominance of the mass mind 
and the consequent pandering of the purveyors of culture to mediocrity. 
He also indicted the universities for subordinating liberal learning to 
the aims of utility and of sociability. To achieve social justice, in 
47Ibid., p. 175. 
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Kirk's sense of the term, there must, he thought, be an elevation of the 
standards of achievement.48 Kirk's prescription seems, to this writer, 
to be grossly inadequate. If resentment against excellence is to be 
reduced, a respect for excellence must be created. This would involve an 
inculcation of a sense of qualitative excellence through an emphasis upon 
developing the tastes- of young people, both in the schools and in their 
homes. 
The problem of wants is closely related to that of social justice. 
Specifically, the problem is how to enable people to want the right 
things from the standpoint of justice. The excessive stress on material 
wants to the neglect of spiritual needs implicitly involves the problems 
of excellence and of the inversion of values. By spiritual values, Kirk 
meant moral values and the ideal of qualitative excellence. His remedies 
included a revival of such traditional goods as justice, mercy, honor, 
charity, and fine craftsmanship. Decentralized industry was believed to 
be an important means of stimulating more people to engage in creative 
and responsible activity.49 
The next problem to engage Kirk's attention~ that of order, is just 
barely distinguishable from that of social justice, for both pertain to 
the concept of hierarchy. Social justice, as conceived by Kirk, pertained 
to the attainment of an ideal condition in which each individual would 
ccupy the place proper to his nature. Order, as such, referred to the 
harmony and balance which were believed to be consequences of the 
48Ibid., pp. 175-176, 180. 
49Ibid., pp. 17, 194, 201-202, 219. 
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attainment of social justice. Kirk believed that the harmonious arrange-
ment of funtions and ideals would guard justice. He did not directly 
explain the connection between harmony and justice, but he presumably 
meant that the spirit of harmony would produce the tranquility which would 
limit the development and exercise of envy. The decay of order was 
attributed to the decline of the spirit of community which was essential 
to developing social harmony since identification with the social good 
presumably lessens individual presumption. 50 The cure was obviously 
implicit in the cause -- the revival of community by application of the 
suggestions previously made. 51 
The decline in social order \-Jas, according to Kirk, paralleled by 
a similar decline in the sense of order between the various subjects 
offered in the curricula of educational institutions -- especially those 
concerned with higher education. According to Kirk, most university 
administrators have accepted the view that all studies were of equal 
value. For example, a class in fly-casting might be considered as equal 
in value to one in Greek. A consequences has been a shift in emphasis 
from the thorough mastery of a few subjects to a superficial acquaintance 
with many. Kirk•s own rating of the fields of study will be discussed 
after an analysis of his general views on education. 52 
Kirk viewed the problem of power in terms of the restraint of 
might by 11 right reason. 11 As a concept, power had, to Kirk, negative 
50The speculation on how community contributes to order is my own 
based upon inferences from Kirk•s line of thinking. 
51Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, pp. 229-233. 
52rbi_Q_., p. 229. 
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implications; for it denoted the absence of restrictions on arbitrary 
human actions, and his primary concern was with limiting power out of 
solicitude for the preservation of traditional moral values. He also 
justified the restriction of power by pointing to the rise of the dic-
tators and the two world wars as political and military consequences of 
the arbitrary human actions of the past. The remedy prescribed was to 
limit and decentralize power, although one might well wonder how the 
holders of power could be persuaded to part with some of that precious 
commodity. 53 
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Perhaps-part of the answer can be found in Kirk•s discussion of the 
next problem which pertained to loyalty. The decline of loyalty to the 
nation and to the family was attributed to a combination of factors such 
as the decline of faith in religious and moral values, the general neglect 
of liberal education, the rise of the "gutter" press (Kirk did not explain 
what he meant by that), and the rise of equalitarianism. Our chief con-
cern in this regard is with Kirk•s strictures on schools and the press 
since newspapers are obviously educational agencies. The decline of lib-
eral education helped to undermine loyalty since with it came a neglect 
of history, especially the history of one•s own country. Concurrently, 
the literature enshrining loyalty to family and nation, such as moralistic 
writings and biographies of respected national figures, was also neg-
lected. Regarding the press, Kirk may have had reference to the 
critical attitudes of many journalists tm·1ard traditional American values. 
53Ibid., pp. 17, 251, 255-256. 
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In any case, his use of the term "gutter" indicates a strong emotional 
reaction. Kirk•s suggestions for the revival of loyalty included the 
increased teaching and study of history and a greater stress upon 
religious values. Furthermore, Kirk would prefer to see a nation of 
people characterized by civility of manners, a political system where 
justice is fairly administered, and safe conditions so that citizens are 
secure against criminals. It is difficult to love a nation whose people 
are not lovable. Therefore, the need to elevate the manners of the 
people can be as pressing as the need to obtain inspiration from the 
American past. 54 
One of the primary problems mentioned by Kirk pertained to the need 
for the revival of tradition. The need was justified on several grounds. 
Like Burke, Kirk maintained that the principal source of our social 
wisdom was the experience of the race as forged through triumph and 
tragedy over thousands of years. Tradition was deemed to be far superior 
to the wisdom that any one human being could accumulate on his own; for 
it involved the accumulated experiences of untold numbers of people in 
diverse situations, confronting a fantastic range of problems. Further-
more, our moral values have traditional roots, and Kirk was convinced 
that these values could be much more effectively communicated through 
such traditional institutions as the family and the church than through 
formal classroom instruction. Although traditions were deemed to be in 
need of periodic revisions, Kirk warned that these revisions should not 
54on his viei<JS concerning loyalty, see ibid., pp. 17, 282, 290. 
be undertaken heedlessly or too boldly. The presumption must always be 
in favor of tradition unless the case to the contrary is overwhelming. 
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Implicit in this position is a distrust of the sole or predominant 
reliance upon abstract reason in the apprehension and solution of human 
problems. Educationally, this distrust of the exclusive reliance on 
reason would encourage the non-intellectual aspects of human nature--
such as the aesthetic and the experimental -- not to r.eplace the intellec-
tual but to add to it. It also implies an emphasis upon those fields of 
study which can serve as vehicles for tradition -- such as religion, 
history, and literature. To Kirk, the methods of the more abstract and 
intellectualized studies were not universally applicable. For him, there 
was no universal model of general applicability. Epistemology was in 
truth a multifaceted study.55 
Lastly, we come to the problem of the mind, the problem most 
closely related to educational concerns. Kirk viewed this problem in 
terms of redeeming intellectual life from the 11 sterility and uniformity 
of the mass-age. 1156 We can discern his meaning by examining the charges 
which he leveled against current educational and cultural practices that 
neglected manners and morals in favor of an unmitigated sensuality and 
emphasized mediocrity at the expense of the naturally talented in 
academic and cultural areas. Kirk•s opposition to the stressing of 
mediocrity rested upon his contention that only the few were capable of 
absorbing the liberal arts with full comprehension and that future social 
55on tradition, see Kirk ibid., pp. 298-299; 303-305. 
56Ibid., p. 16. 
progress would depend largely on the development of leadership. In 
specific reference to education, Kirk saw the current pressure to lower 
academic standards as an instance of the confusion of quantity with 
quality. 
As a remedy, Kirk proposed that ethical sensibility be cultivated 
81 
by the study and imitation of the lives of great individuals and by 
examples of elevated human character depicted in the writings of such 
authors as Plutarch, Dante, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Burke, and Ruskin, so 
that the student could acquire a sense of moral and intellectual excel-
lence. The values attained would in turn be based upon the hierarchical 
order which Kirk believed to prevail throughout the universe. 57 In 
addition, Kirk stressed a liberal education, with high standards of 
selective excellence applied to all who sought to undertake such a program. 
To Kirk, the essential basis for the existence of schools was to attain 
and disseminate the truth -- not to mollify the community. Anything 
which might interfere with this goal was to be condemned. 58 
The basic aim of the dissemination of truth, as Kirk conceived of 
it, can best be given in Kirk's own words. 
By the spirit of a gentleman, Burke and Newman did not mean simply 
the deportment of superior rank. They meant, rather, that eleva-
tion of mind and temper, that generosity and courage of mind, which 
are the property of every person whose intelligence and character 
have been humanely disciplined. They meant that liberal education 
57rbid., pp. 59-61. 
58Russe11 Kirk, Academic Freedom (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 
1955), pp. 11-12. 
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and that habit of acting upon principles which rise superior to 
immediate advantage and private interest, which distinguish the 
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free man from the servile man .... Lacking this, Burke says,.all the 
schooling in the world is of no avai1.59 
To Kirk, a humane education therefore had primarily a moral sig-
nificance. In fact, he conceived of humanitas as a whole in terms of 
ethical discipline. The virtues which he identified are primarily 
aristocratic virtues -- those that have been traditionally associated 
with the nobility. 
In considering educational questions, Kirk has devoted considerable 
attention to the meaning of academic freedom. He adopted W. T. Couch's 
definition of academic freedom as the protection of teachers from any 
hazards that would prevent teachers from fulfilling their obligation to 
pursue the truth. 60 The pursuit of truth involved the freedom of both 
teachers and students to express their views but excluded attempts to 
indoctrinate students. Kirk did not define indoctrination, but presuma-
bly he meant the systematic attempt to convert students to a particular 
ideology regardless of the truth of particular statements made in pursuing 
that objective. It would have been of considerable aid in understanding 
how he differentiated between freedom of expression and indoctrination 
had he explained his meaning of 11 indoctrination. 11 
To Kirk, academic freedom pertained both to the finding and to the 
limited dissemination of the truth. Kirk's adherence to freedom was 
sharp1y mitigated by his lack of confidence in the old liberal view that 
59Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, pp. 58-59. 
60Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 1. 
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truth would eventually prevail in competition with falsehood on the open 
He believed that this vie~v had been based on the "foolish" con-market. 
viction of the goodness and the rationality of men. In fact, Kirk be-
lieved that the ordinary citizen was often unable to distinguish between 
what was beneficial ·and what was harmful. 61 Kirk •s adherence to freedom 
was therefore limited and qualified. For example, he felt that commu-
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nists should be tolerated for the time being because they did not consti- . I 
tute a major threat, and because more harm would be done by censorship 
than by permitting them to freely express their views. He added, however, 
that changing circumstances could alter his stand on the matter.62 He 
did advocate the censorship of pornography because he believed that 
·pornographic literature undermined the tastes and morals of the communi-
ty. 63 In subscribing to these views, Kirk \'tas being quite consistent 
with his general conservative position on human nature. Since he favored 
curbing freedom in general, it may be very likely that his view of 
academic freedom was similarly limited. 
It is important that we consider the general significance of his 
selection and treatment of the problems confronting conservatives. First, 
his choices of problems are interesting. The questions he asked were all 
of a long-term character -- not ephemeral problems such as those which 
61Russe11 Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1956), pp. 105, 109, 114. 
62Ibid., pp. 123-124. 
63Ibid., pp. 127-128. 
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usually interest journalists. Furthermore, the problems chosen were not 
basicallY of a financial or economic character but were rather questions 
which pertained to the human needs for emotional security, responsible 
activity, and acceptance of a set of cogent values. To Kirk, man was a 
creature driven primarily by the needs of the spirit-- not by economic 
needs nor by biological urges. In agreement with Sigmund Freud, Kirk 
depicted man as weak, but unlike Freud, Kirk has. viewed human problems in 
a spiritual rather than a physical context. Furthermore, Kirk consid-
ered human nature to be an amalgam of good and evil, although he empha-
sized aspects of human nature which some people would regard as signs 
of evil but which he preferred to view as signs of weakness. To Freud, 
man was unequivocally evil in the sense that he conceived of man as 
guided primarily by selfish emotional needs. In Kirk's opinion, humans 
were governed more by their appetites than by their reason but he ex-
hibited more confidence in their improvability than had Freud. Through 
guidance and the cultivation of a sense of emotional security, Kirk be-
lieved that men might obtain the strengths so conspicuously lacking in 
their nature.64 
Of the ten problems specified by Kirk, every one with the excep-
tions of social justice, order, and tradition was directly based upon 
and was an expression of the need for moral and religious values to 
provide the needed guidance. Indirectly, even the three problems ex-
cepted were linked to this basic need. Two of these problems, social 
justice and order, were based upon the need for a clearly defined hier-
archy in which each individual would find his proper place. Can it be 
64Kirk, A Program for Conservatives, p. 191. 
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denied that a just hierarchy must be based on a system of ordered values? 
Furthermore, the other problem excepted, tradition, pertained to what was 
in essence a means for the inculcation of values. 
The causes named by Kirk for the problems confronting mankind can be 
reduced to four: the rise of equalitarianism, ·the decline of belief in 
moral and religious values, the extension of the power of the state, and 
industrialization. From a broader perspective, equalitarianism could 
be considered a manifestation of an implicit denial of the reality of 
objective values, at least with regard to the qualities of human beings. 
If such values exist, humans must differ in their approximation to those 
values; for the existence of values implies the existence of disvalues. 
Otherwise, we could not be aware that these values exist. If all men are 
equal, this implies that valuational judgments pertaining to them cannot 
be valid, beyond our own purely subjective preferences. This viewpoint, 
if valid, would also weaken the case for the existence of objective values 
in general. The power of the state might well be viewed as a consequence 
of the decline of the integrity of statesmen; the deleterious effects of 
industrialization might well be considered one of the contributing causes 
of the decline of values, with the stress on sen~ations, characteristic 
of industrialized countries, blurring the efficacy of values. 
Kirk•s suggested remedies can likewise be reduced to a few essential 
ones -- the revival of faith in religious and moral values, the elevation 
of the standards of human achievement, and a greater reliance upon 
individual initiative in contrast to the present emphasis upon the state. 
The emphasis upon the individual would be expressed not only in greater 
personal responsibility but also in the encourc.gement of local groups and 
I' 
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private institutions. On the \<Jhole, he was not very specific as to how 
to implement these remedies. Perhaps this vagueness was intentional, but 
at the very least a systematic discussion of the precise values which he 
had in mind would have been helpful. Nevertheless, Kirk's vie\'1point is 
clear in its general purport; an emphasis upon the principle of 
objectively ordered moral and intellectual values, apprehended primarily 
through traditional usage. 
Kirk's views on social problems were certainly consistent with his 
general metaphysical position. Though Kirk's metaphysical views were 
given only in fragments, it is clear that he believed in the existence 
of an orderly universe based upon divine foundations. He thereby 
implicitly assumed the existence of a dichotomy between nature and con-
vention, with the former conceived of as universal order and the latter 
conceived of in terms of violation of that natural order. 65 
To Kirk, the major purpose of education was, as we have seen, 
ethical in character. This purpose was to be achieved through the 
inculcation of understanding of the moral and intellectual order of the 
universe as set forth primarily in the great literary classics of the 
past. Such an education would presumably be based upon the coherence 
theory of truth since Kirk believed in the existence of an ordered inter-
related universe. The student would presumably be expected to show the 
logical coherence and consistency of facts in relationship to one 
another; for order implies coherence and consistency. With regard to 
the organization of the curriculum, it would seem to follow that this 
would be based upon a prescriptive rather than an elective ordering of 
choices; for Kirk believed in the existence of objective values, over 
65Ibid., pp. 41-42, 59; Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 4. 
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and beyond the personal preferences of the students involved. By applica-
tion of these values, the curriculum would be determined. 66 
Before stipulating the specific subjects to be comprised in the 
curriculum, we should give some attention to the illative sense, a con-
cept \·Jhich Kirk borrowed from the \vritings of John Henry Cardinal Newman~ 
The illative sense was described as the product of the interaction of 
intuition, instinct, imagination, and experience as sifted by critical 
reasoning. This sense, when properly exercised, contributed insights 
into first principles and into the ultimate foundations of authority. 
Kirk valued the illative sense even more highly than reason; for through 
its use, one could attain insight, a means of apprehension which he be-
lieved to exceed in depth the products of reason alone. This view obvi-
ously impli~d a stress upon those subjects through which insight could 
be obtained such as the arts, literature, and the drama. History could 
likewise provide the student with insightful experiences, especially when 
events are viewed in relationship to the general principles determining 
human conduct and their consequences. With regard to methods, imitation 
was of importance; for many insights cannot be adequately communicated 
through formal instruction.67 
Kirk recommended that on the primary and secondary levels of 
education, students should concentrate on learning the techniques by 
which knowledge is acquired and by which the mind is prepared to reason 
66The content of this paragraph was based upon direct inferences 
from Kirk's writing rather than explicit formulations by Kirk himself. 
67Kirk, The Conservative Mind, pp. 249-250. 
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logically. Although some attention would be given to content subjects, 
the emphasis would be on the acquisition of skills. When students reach 
the university level, he felt that they should concentrate upon the study 
of the liberal arts; for the education of the whole man was considered to t 
be of greater importance than the training of the specialist. Overall, 
Kirk was intensely interested in the imposition of higher standards of 
academic performance on all levels of academic instruction; for hP. 
believed that educators have tended to emphasize mediocrity and 
inferiority at the expense of superiority. 68 
Typical of the reactions of the critics of Kirk's views were those 
found in the comments of Gordon K. Lewis of Brandeis University and C. 
Wright Mills of Columbia University. Both writers questioned the 
practicality of Kirk's suggestions. Lewis maintained that the difficulties 
inherent in attempting to bring a viable conservatism into existence in a 
non-traditional society like that of the United States would be virtually 
insurmountable. Besides, to Lewis, arguments based upon tradition seemed 
to be mere disguises for privilege.69 Mills believed that conservatism 
was irrelevant to American problems; for the United States had no 
aristocracy. He doubted whether one could be created.70 He maintained 
68Kirk, Academic Freedom, p. 181. 
69Gordon K. Lewis, 11 The Hetaphysics of Conservatism, .. The Western 
Political Quarterly 6 (December, 1953), pp. 737, 741. 
70c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), p. 329. 
that the American elite lacked the cultivation and the moral elevation 
of a true aristocracy. According to Mills, the dominant value of the 
American elite was predatory successJl 
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Both Lewis and Mills repudiated conservatism on practical grounds, 
although Lewis also had strong doubts concerning conservative principles. 
As we have noted, to Lewis, conservatism was an apology for privilege 
whereas Mills saw several points of tension between the conservatives 
and the actual elite of the United States. It is evident that for Kirk 
to procure a sympathetic response from the American-intelligentsia, he 
would at the very least have to specify in detail just how conservative 
ideals would be put into operation in a largely non-traditional society. 
With the exceptions of a few vague indications, he has not done this. 
He might well protest that he was concerned more with theory than with 
practice and that therefore these objections are irrelevant. This 
argument does not, however, change the fact that he is much more likely 
to see his ideals effectuated if he would deign to enter the arena of 
prudence and practice. 
Eliot and Kirk: A Comparison 
Both Eliot and Kirk have reacted to the same fundamental his-
torical trends: the decline in religious faith and in moral standards 
combined with the existence of strong pressures to lower academic and 
cultural standards. In seeking to counter these trends, both Eliot and 
Kirk implicitly accepted a conception of personality development based 
upon the importance of the interaction of the individual with society. 
Neither writer accepted the classical liberal faith in the autonomy of 
71Ibid. 
the individual. The individual must look to society as the source of 
his standards of behavior as well as the chief course of whatever 
emotional satisfactions that the individual would ever attain. 
In seeking to counter what they viewed as the deleterious trends 
characteristic of their times, Eliot and Kirk utilized somewhat differ-
ent approaches. Eliot stressed the basic anthropological concept, cul-
ture, while Kirk emphasized the basic sociological concept, society. 
Eliot wanted to know what conditons would be conducive to cultural con-
tinuity and creativity. He also wanted to uncover the aims and some of 
the characteristics of a Christian culture which he conceived as a 
society guided by Christian ideals. Kirk was intent upon dealing with 
the major ills which plague contemporary society. He defined most of 
these ills in terms of the alienation of the individual from society. 
Eliot and Kirk were both, however, in agreement in stressing the 
importance of human collectivities rather than the isolated individual. 
Both Eliot and Kirk espoused traditionalism. In both cases, the 
traditions emphasized were primarily related to the culture and the 
social institutions of the group. Eliot justified tradition primarily 
in terms of cultural creativity; Kirk, in terms of wisdom and the in-
culcation of values. Both writers believed in the importance of 
cultural continuity as a function of education. Both writers also 
believed in the importance of education as an instrument for the in-
culcation of moral values. They emphasized the special value of human-
istic studies in the inculcation of both cultural and moral values. 
Both Eliot and Kirk adhered to humanism, but they expressed their 
adherence in somewhat different ways. Eliot stressed the humanistic 
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;deal of balance and applied it chiefly to cultural concerns. He also 
stressed literary culture which stress was quite consistent with his aes-
thetic emphasis. Kirk also stressed the importance of literature, but in 
addition accorded an important place to intuitive insight as a function 
of literary studies, as evidenced by his vigorous advocacy of the exis-
tence and importance of Newman's illative sense. As a poet, Eliot un-
doubtedly recognized the importance of insight but scarcely alluded to it 
in his writings on cultural and social issues. 
Both writers were concerned about the trend of educators to con-
centrate on the education of students of mediocre ability. Eliot and 
Kirk opposed this trend because of their belief in the limited poten-
tialities of these students. Neither writer favored an easing of aca-
demic standards to bring higher education within the range of more 
students. They were both implicitly interested primarily in achievements 
rather than in the gratification of desires. Anything that might tend to 
reduce educational achievements would be liable to arouse their dis-
approval. 
The conservative school counselor, imbued with the ideals of Eliot 
and Kirk, would encourage students to acquire a set of moral and religious 
values so that they could achieve a sense of emotional security and so 
that they might be better able to solve their own personal problems. He 
would also give special attention to the problem of providing adequate 
social integration for his charges. Finally, he would seek to guide the 
students along varied educational and vocational paths in accordance with 
their interests and abilities. 
We will next turn to another branch of neo-conservatism, the 
positive humanists. A contrast between them and their more tradition-
alistic colleagues should be of some interest. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POSITIVE Hut1ANISM 
Among influential neo-conservative thinkers, several have espoused 
humanistic doctrines without a corresponding emphasis upon traditionalism. 
In general, these writers have favored tradition and have encouraged it 
whenever and wherever they believed that people could still be signifi-
cantly influenced by it ..... ·They have, however, preferred to rely on other 
means of improving society; apparently on the assumption that Western 
civilization has proceeded too far in the direction of the repudiation 
of _tradition to make any large-scale reversal of the trend possible. 
The positive humanists have been concerned with the problem of 
finding a satisfactory means of transmitting the values generally associ-
ated with tradition which would possess the cogency that was once 
associated with the various cultural traditions of the world. This 
writer has borrowed the term, positive, from the writings of Irving 
Babbitt who utilized it to designate the reliance upon critical reason-
ing which has generally characterized the representatives of this school 
of thought. 1 The most influential neo-conservative writers on education 
. 
who have utilized the positive humanist approach have been Irving 
Babbitt and G. H. Bantock. In fact, there can be little doubt that 
Babbitt has been one of the most influential neo-conservative writers 
on social and cultural issues in general. 
1 Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Ne'.'t York: ~leridian 
Books, 1953), p. 5. 
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The Views of Irvinq Babbitt 
Irving Babbitt has occupied an enigmatic place in American thought. 
Ont the one hand, he has urged what has amounted to a return to the tradi-
tional American puritan ethic; on the other hand, he has vigorously op-
posed those American traits which have commonly been considered to be 
outcrnoes of the acceptance of the puritan outlook, i.e., the emphasis 
upon commercial success and business values. In his attitudes toward 
religion, Babbitt also exhibited conflicting tendencies. He was sympa-
thetic with religious goals but skeptical of the knowability of absolutes. 
To exaoine these various positions, we will consider both Babbitt's life 
and viewpoint. In a sense, Babbitt was both a traditionalist and a revo-
lutionary -- albeit an aristocratic right-wing revolutionary. Hhat he 
rebelled against were certain characteristics of American culture. 
Babbitt was anything but a conformist although the biographical material 
can give us only a few hints as to the origins of that non-conformity. 
Babbitt was born in the summer of 1865 in the middle-western city 
of Dayton, Ohio, the son of Dr. Edwin Dwight Babbitt and Augusta Darling 
Babbitt. At the time of his son 1 s birth, Dr. Babbitt was a partner in a 
business school. The elder Babbitt associated with friends of 
decidedly radical views. Irving later came to detest these friends of 
his father. One cannot help wondering whether Babbitt's subsequent 
hostility t01vard vocational education and commercialism might not have 
had its roots within his family. Mrs. Babbitt died when Irving was 
eleven years of age. His father subsequently remarried and moved to 
Cincinnati where Irving and a younger sister were raised.2 
At the age of twenty, Irving entered Harvard University where, 
with the exception of one year at the University of Paris, he spent his 
entire university student career. At the University of Paris, he 
studied Sanskrit and Pali with the distinguished Indic scholar, Sylvain 
Levi. Pali was the language in which the early Buddhist sacred writings 
were written. In his general viewpoint, Babbitt was to be strongly 
influenced by Buddhist thought, especially the emphasis upon the Middle 
Path between asceticism and indulgence and by the Buddhist espousal of 
the doctrine of non-attachment to material goods. 
After teaching in several colleges, Babbitt settled down to a 
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permanent position at Harvard University. He eventually became a 
professor. of French and comparative literature and held that position 
until his death in 1933. Babbitt's most famous works include Literature 
and the American College (1908) which examines problems of American 
education; Rousseau and Romanticism (1919) which is essentially a work of 
literary criticism, and Democracy and Leadership (1924) which is a work 
on political theory. The same basic themes can be found in all his major 
works. A group of distinguished associates and disciples including Paul 
Elmer More, Norman Foerster, Stuart P. Sherman, and W. C. Brownell have 
diligently propagated the views that Babbitt espoused. 3 These people, 
known collectively as the neo-humanists, exercised an important influence 
2see the account given by Dora Gabbitt in Frederick manchester and 
Odell Shepherd, eds. Irving Babbitt: Man and Teacher (New York: 
Putnam•s, 1941), pp. ix and x. The entire books 1s a gold mine of informa-
tion on Irving Babbitt. 
3Perhaps the most influential work produced by members of this· 
group was Paul Elmer More's Aristocracy and Justice (1915). 
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upon American thought during the first half of the twentieth century. 
With regard to the intellectual influences which affected Babbitt, 
we can obtain an intimation of what these were by recalling that the four 
personages whom Babbitt named as espousing the wisdom of the ages were 
Aristotle, Confucius, Buddha, and Christ. 4 Of these great sages, it is 
highly probable that Aristotle exercised the greatest influence upon 
Babbitt since Aristotelian ideas closely resembled his own views. 
Babbitt adopted such Aristotelian views as the conception of morality as 
the disciplining of the passions and appetites by reason as well as 
Aristotle's conceptions of the golden mean and of contemplation. In 
fact, these Aristotelian views were central to Babbitt's entire 
philosophical approach. 
Historically, Babbitt's philosophy represented a reaction against 
certain widespread American characteristics which were important during 
the early twentieth century and in some respects are even more signifi-
cant today. He be)ieved that the American people suffered from a lack 
of standards in some instances and, in other instances, from the con-
fusion and inversion of standards. Babbitt attributed this situation to 
the American repudiation of tradition. Babbitt viewed tradition as 
valuable since it was a means of transmitting certain vital intellectual 
and moral values. 5 
The American aversion to traditionalism led to certain moral con-
sequences which Babbitt thought to be highly undesirable. These 
4Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 163. 
51Qid.' pp. 240-241. 
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consequences included the general spread of luxury, self-indulgence, and 
the increasing selfishness and avarice of special interest groups. He 
especially denounced the American adulation of the business community. 
This adulation was much more widespread before than after the Great 
Depression but is obviously still evident. To Babbitt, commercial avarice 
and cupidity undermined both intellectual and moral values.6 The neg-
ative attitude of Babbitt and many other conservative thinkers might well 
surprise most Americans, many of whom have regarded conservatives as being 
especially favorable to commercial values but, as we have seen earlier, 
this widespread view was the result of confusing classical liberalism with 
conservatism. 
Babbitt believed that the prevailing emphasis on commercial success 
had deleteriously affected American colleges. The tendency toward an 
aristocracy of money must, he felt, be counteracted by the development of 
an elite of wisdom and character. Yet college administrators seemed to be 
more interested in developing a leadership dedicated only to service and 
power. 7 He was also alarmed about the lack of selectivity of students in 
American colleges in comparison to their European counterparts. 8 He 
believed that this could only detract from developing what he felt the 
democracies needed most of all -- a superior quality of leadership. 
6Jbid., pp. 19, 272. 
?Irving Babbitt, Literature and the American College (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1956), p. 71. 
srbid., pp. 53, 71. 
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The America in \'lhich Babbitt lived was already beginning to repudiate 
the puritanical traditions of its past in favor of an increasing permis-
siveness. He felt that this nation was in dire need of standards or 
criteria of action if its ethical and intellectual integrity was to be 
salvaged. Since traditions no longer had the force that they·once 
commanded, he believed that standards must be arrived at critically and on 
the basis of human experience. His concern to establish such standards 
was the fundamental motivation for his writing. His writings were ad-
dressed primarily to those who have broken with traditional forms but felt 
themselves still very much in need of standards. 9 Babbitt believed that 
the Classical and the Christian traditions were our only visible sources 
of standards; but in view of the predominant skepticism of the twentieth 
century, he reluctantly felt that these standards must be arrived at 
critically to be convincing today. 10 
Babbitt considered the infinite to be beyond the grasp of man. 
The realms of being and becoming are so inextricably mixed that humans 
could not isolate one from the other. 11 However, he implicitly recog-
nized the existence of the Absolute even though he denied that we could 
know its nature. His mataphysics, skeptical as it was, necessitated an 
9Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 34. 
lOrrving Babbitt, Criticism in America: Its Function and Status 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924), p. 164. 
11Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1932), pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
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emphasis upon psychological rather than ontological factors, if his quest 
for standards was to be fulfilled. 
The most important distinction that we should consider in arriving 
at a clear understanding of Babbitt's philosophy is that between the 
natural self of man, which he defined in terms of impulse, and the human 
self, which consists of those factors which act to control impulsiveness. 
These factors were described in terms of separate mental faculties which 
were clearly indicative of Babbitt's acceptance, in at least a muted form, 
of faculty psychology. 12 Babbitt believed that to arrive at a condition 
of effective self-control, the individual should be directed by the "higher 
imagination" which is the faculty whereby one seizes likenesses and forms 
conceptions. This faculty is in contrast to the "lower imagination" which 
is synonomous with sense perception. By means of the higher imagination, 
the individual can view his experiences against a backdrop of ethical 
values. These impressions are then tested critically through the utiliza-
tion of analytical reason. The combination of the higher imagination and 
reason was collectively termed "insight11 --a form of cognition which 
Babbitt rated as superior to unaided reason just as the latter was rated 
superior to the automatic operations of the instinctive faculty. 13 By the 
12rrving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, pp. 26-27, 51; 
Democracy and Leadership, pp. 11, 14. 
13For the nature of the higher imagination see Babbitt, Democracy 
and Leadership, p. 10; on the nature of insight see Babbitt, Rousseau and 
Romanticism, p. 47. 
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employment of insight, values are discriminated through reference to those 
constants of human history and experience which have proven themselves by 
their consequences. 14 The "higher will" then imposes limits on one's 
desires so that the insights attained can be acted upon. In contrast to 
the higher will, the lower will acts in accordance with desires and 
;mpulses.l5 The violation of these insights must, Babbitt maintained, 
eventually bring on retribution. 
A basic assumption underlying his voluntaristic emphasis was that man 
possesses freedom of will. Otherwise, Babbitt's strictures concerning the 
importance of self-control would be meaningless. An important implication 
of his stress on personal insight into experience as the criterion for 
evaluation was an emphasis upon the study of history and literature, with 
special attention to the normative aspects of those subjects. According 
to this view, history is the record of the collective experience of the 
human species and literature consists of the imaginative reconstruction 
of that experience. Finally, Babbitt's faculty psychology entails a 
stress upon the training and discipline of one's faculties. Before we can 
verify these implications, we should inquire into the nature of the values 
which Babbitt believed that experience discloses. 
Babbitt believed that the virtues of.moderation, decency, and common 
sense worked best. 16 Fundamentally, these virtues were all characterized 
by Babbitt as manifestations of \vhat he regarded as the supreme humanistic 
14sabbitt, On Being Creativ~, p. xxxviii. 
15Ib"d . 
__ 1_., p. XlX. 
l6Ib"d 
_1_.' p. xxx. 
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virtue, decorum-- the disciplining of impulses to the proportions dis-
cerned by the ethical imagination.l7 These proportions would be obtained 
in turn by reflection upon past human experiences. 
In political affairs, the supreme virtue was considered to be justice 
which Babbitt defined in terms of rendering to each individual what was 
due him in accordance with the amount and the quality of his endeavor. 18 
This is essentially a proportionate or relational concept of justice 
which is based on the assumption that men contribute unequally to the 
welfare of society. In addition, an implied assumption seems to be 
present that equality is undesirable or unattainable. To Babbitt, it 
seemed obvious that justice could not be attained until people learn to 
act in accordance with standards for determining how things should be 
apportioned. Humility was therefore considered to be the root of justice 
and all other virtues; for humility, as Babbitt employed the term, con-
sisted of the willingness to look up to and to imits;~te standards. In this 
regard, he had great respect for religious creeds and religious institu-
tions. To Babbitt, the chief virtue of the churches was the peace that. 
they instilled in their congregations through teaching the submission to a 
higher win. 19 ·Thus, Babbitt, an ardent skeptic, approached the Christian 
conception of Grace. As to the end of moral behavior, Babbitt posited no 
l7sabbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 162. 
l8sabbitt, Democracy and Leadership, pp. 196-197. 
19rbid., pp. 163, 257-258. 
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supernaturalistic goal since this would be inconsistent with his epistemo-
logical skepticism. He posited instead the limited goal of temporal 
happiness. Unfortunately, he did not define happiness. Since he held 
that happiness could only be obtained by the disciplining of the impulses, 
we can assume that he referred to the Aristotelian conception of happiness: 
a sense of satisfaction obtained by doing one's work well. As is well-
known, Aristotle meant by doing one's work well activity of the soul· in 
accordance with moral andjntellectual virtue which in the case of man 
pertained to the activity of reason. Hence, happiness for human beings 
would consist ultimately of living in accordance with reason. To live in 
this way, it is essential that feelings and impulses be kept under control. 
In Babbitt's opinion, primitivism, the arch-enemy of humanism, was 
especially exemplified by the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau. 20 . Babbitt 
equated primitivism with spontaneity which he considered to be the anti-
thesis of discipline.2l Babbitt's attitude toward spontaneity is 
exemplified by his classification of the-forms of knowledge which were 
distinguished in terms of the psychological faculties involved. Babbitt 
rated instinct, which pertained to impulse and feeling, below reason which 
was deemed to be primarily an analytical faculty. Both instinct and 
reason were rated below insight which pertained to the immediate apprehen-
sion of reality. This apprehension was attributed to the imagination which 
ideally worked in collaboration with reason, the latter faculty being 
20whether Rousseau actually was a primitivist has of course been 
disputed. 
21Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 44. 
employed to scrutinize the apprehensions obtained. Since Babbitt con-
sidered the imagination to be the faculty which governs mankind, he 
believed it to be vitally important that the imagination agree with 
reason rather than with the expansive desires. He believed that the 
latter situation caused most of the evil existing in the world.22 In 
spite of his disclaimers, it can be argued that Babbitt was really a 
disguided rationalist. For reason should, according to Babbitt, act as 
the final judge regarding the truth of our ethical perceptions. To 
Babbitt, instinct was associated with primitivism, and reason without 
imagination was linked to a pedantic rationalism. For educational 
theorists, one of the most important implications of Babbitt•s general 
position was his anxiety to avoid confusing the planes of being. He 
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was especially concerned about the primitivists• confu~ion of instinct 
with insight which had, Babbitt thought, resulted in their most grievous 
errors, such as the equation of beauty with lust and of awe with wonder. 
As we shall see later, Babbitt was vitally concerned with developing the 
powers of discrimination of college students so that they could avoid this 
confusion. 
For Babbitt, the primitivistic dichotomy between the individuals• 
natural goodness and the repressiveness of society was erroneous. Like 
Aristotle, Babbitt believed that the individual reaches his perfection in 
society. Because of his skepticism concerning the natural goodness and 
wisdom of the individual, he condemned the child-centered curriculum so 
eagerly propounded by the educational naturalists and their allies. He 
22Jbid., p. 145; Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 10. 
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maintained that instead of being guided by youthful whims, the educational 
process should be directed toward the super-personal goals of wisdom and 
character--wisdom, in the sense of standards of moral and intellectual 
value; character as expressed in the will to act in accordance with those 
standards.23 In common with the Buddhists, Babbitt believed that human 
nature was not so much depraved as lazy. Give the individual the power to 
determine the nature of the curriculum, and then see how many elect the 
least demanding courses.24 In his opinion, no satisfactory substitute 
existed for the imposition of the disciplinary activity of the higher will 
upon the recalcitrant desires of youth. 
Babbitt was most concerned with collegiate instruction. It was at 
the level that, he felt, the essential effort should be undertaken to 
develop the discriminatory powers of the individual student. In contrast, 
the function of the lower schools was to transmit knowledge and the 
graduate school was to be devoted to productive scholarship. 25 Hence, 
Babbitt would certainly have been hostile toward the recurring suggestion 
that the American college be abolished by integrating the first two years 
with the high school and the last two years with the graduate school. To 
Babbitt, the college had a unique function which transcended in importance 
the services of both the secondary school and the university. In such a 
perspective, the abolition of the college would obviously be a major 
tragedy. 
To Babbitt, the college had to be selective in its admissions 
23Babbitt, Literature and the American College, p. 46. 
24rbi~., pp. 35-36. 25rbid., p. 69. 
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policies if it were to perform properly its function. The expertise of 
relating ideas well is rare, and wastefulness would be the consequence of 
attempting to educate individuals of insufficient potential. Implicit in 
this position is the assumption that the cultivation of leadership is of 
greater importance than the uplift of the masses. Where the interests of 
the two conflict, those of the individuals who exhibit the greatest 
pote~tiality must be held paramount. To Babbitt, the development of 
superior leadership was of crucial importance; for upon this process de-
pended the future welfare of society. When considering the aims of the 
college, Babbitt was quite explicit: 
Even though the whole world seem (sic) bent on living the quantita-
tive life, the college should remember that its business is to make 
of the graduates men of quality in the real and not the conventional 
meaning of the term. In this way it will do its share toward 
creating that aristocracy of character and intelligence that is 
needed in a community like ours to take the place of an aristocracy 
of birth, and to counteract the tendency toward an aristocracy of 
money. A great deal is said nowadays about the democratic spirit 
that should pervade our colleges. This is true if it means that the 
college should be in profound sympathy with what is best in democ-
racy. It is false if it means, as it often does, that the college 
should level down and suit itself to the point of view of the 
average individual .... But from the standpoint of the college one 
thoroughly cultivated person should be more to the purpose than a 
hundred persons who are only partly cultivated.26 
Regarding his views on the college curriculum, it is important to 
emphasize that Babbitt rejected the elective system that was so enthusi-
astically championed by Charles Eliot, President of Harvard University 
where Babbitt taught. To Babbitt, the notion that all subjects are of 
26Ibid., p. 71. 
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equal value was anathema. Furthermore, unlike his superior at Harvard, 
Babbitt had little confidence in the ability of late adolescents to make 
judicious choices. Instead, as we have previously noted, he felt that the 
native human indolence of the teen-ager would assert itself in the selec-
tion of courses to the detriment of academic standards. 27 In this respect, 
Babbitt consistently applied his general views on human nature to an 
important educational issue. Yet, on this as on so many other issues, 
Babbitt was exceedingly vague. He neglected to specify in detail the 
studies that he would require. We can, however, obtain a few indications 
by examining his arguments for the teaching of the Greek and Roman classics. 
Perhaps the most important justification given by Babbitt for the 
study of the classics was that ancient Greco-Roman literature represented 
the most perfect fusion of reason with imagination and therefore appealed 
to what is the most universal and eternal in human nature.28 What he 
meant by this remark can be grasped by reference to his general philosoph-
ical position. Babbitt desired the fusion of reason with imagination for 
the purpose of discerning the ethical universals and their influence upon 
human nature. As was previously observed, this viewpoint leads implicitly 
to a stress upon the study of history and literature with special emphasis 
upon the general normative principles inferred therefrom. To Babbitt, the 
primary criterion for the selection of courses of study was their value in 
bringing to students a knowledge of those constants of human experience 
Which have proven to be of the greatest worth as guideposts of human 
conduct. Therefore, the teacher imbued with the ideals of Babbitt would 
stress the importance of general ideas and would treat historical events 
---------------------------------------------------------------
27Ibi~., pp. 35-36, 47. 28Ibi~., pp. 120-121. 
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and great works of literature in relationship to normative principles. 
It might occasion some surprise to find that another justification 
given by Babbitt for the study of classical literature was that it exhibited 
greater objectivity than modern writings; for Babbitt's prescriptions 
appear to sanction subjectivity. 29 Yet, when Babbitt's value theory is 
fullY comprehended, this justification no longer seems to be inconsistent 
with other statements made by Babbitt for he felt that ethical standards 
should be arrived at by a dispassionate and critical consideration of human 
experience. The important consideration pertaining to academic objectivity 
was the means whereby the teacher reached his conclusions, not whether a 
partisan view was presented to his class, for Babbitt implicitly sanctioned 
the latter. 
To Babbitt, modern literature was marred by the indulgence of its 
practitioners in 11 sentimental and romantic revery rather than in a resolute 
and manly grappling with the plain facts of existence ... 30 In contrast, 
classical literature was valued for its ethical insights, supposedly 
arrived at by the cooperation of the higher reason with the imagination.3l 
What Babbitt meant by the 11 higher reason 11 was the analytical facu1ty which 
acted upon the imagination. It is quite evident that to Babbitt the axio-
logical aspects of education were paramount. 
Of nearly equal importance among Babbitt's motivations for emphazing 
classical literature was the disciplinary value derived from mastering the 
precise meanings of the words of the ancients. This process promotes the 
29Jbid.' p. 116. 
30 Ibid. 
3lrbid. 
I I 
I 
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habit of serious intellectual effort while the drill in style obtained 
from translating classical writings was felt to be a superior means of 
mastering English. 32 This stress upon discipline and drill is congruent 
with Babbitt's basic psychology which was based upon the assumption of the 
existence of distinct faculties which had implicitly to be trained to 
function well. Therefore, Babbitt emphasized the value of the classics 
for the skills which they engendered as well as for the ethical insights 
which they conveyed. 
Finally, by viewing contemporary events in the perspective of the 
distant past, the individual could become more sensitive to the dangers of 
the present. In particular, the fatuous optimism which still pervaded 
America during most of the duration of Babbitt's life might thereby be 
corrected. 33 By the stress upon the value of the study of the classics in 
viewing the present, Babbitt probably had in mind that phase of Roman 
history \'/hen the Roman republic was being transformed into the tyranny of 
the Caesars. It is common knowledge that conservative writers have been 
concerned about a possible reoccurence of this trend through such tenden-
cies as the mounting disrespect for law and the spread of socialism. 
Liberals and radicals have on the whole been much more sanguine about the 
future. The differences which exist on this issue stem from basically 
different assumptions concerning the flexibility of human nature. 
Babbitt characterized his general position by contrasting it with 
the two chief antithetical viewpoints: those of the "philologists" and 
32Ibid., pp. 108, 163. 
33Jbid.' p. 114. 
of the "dilettantes." The former delight in the minute accumulation of 
facts with little or no concern for their significance. The latter 
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stress the thrill obtained through cultivating aesthetic sensations and 
sanction a kind of emotional indolence. Babbitt believed that the phi-
lologists constituted the most serious menace because they dominated the 
departments of history and literature in American colleges. In contrast 
to both these groups, he mentioned the "humanists" whom he characterized 
as the advocates of disciplining students in the intell_igent utilization 
of ideas -- especially, of the relationships between literary concepts and 
normative values.34 As an example, he esteemed the French doctorate as 
the embodiment of humanistic ideals in contrast to the American doctorate 
which, according to Babbitt, fundamentally-embodied philological values.35 
Only by the adoption of standards on a par with the French doctorate or 
the Oxford first-class honors degree could American higher education have 
a constructive impact upon contemporary problems. 
Babbitt was fundamentally a very repetitious writer, dealing with 
the same themes in book after book with minor differences in expansiveness 
and in sequence. His writing is studded with brilliant insights but is 
htghly unsystematic in character. In particular, he had the annoying hab-
it of making assertions without expanding upon them, either by careful 
formulation of definitions or by sustained step by step argumentation. 
34rbid., pp. 85, 88-89. 
35Ibid., p. 90. 
~ese practices have resulted in a Widespread misunderstanding of his 
basic thesis. This misunderstanding has been most unfortunate; for he 
had focused on one of the most Important problems confronting American 
education today -- the need to develop and Inculcate standards of moral 
and Intellectual evaluation. He has also realized that If standards are 
to be living realities, there must be discipline and selectivity in ac-
cordance wl th these standards. ~lhether hIs prescrl p t Ions are adequate 
is another question; but his ability to focus on the centra] problem and 
to free himself from the effects of the indoctrination which Americans 
generally undergo from their early youth make him, In the opinion of this 
writer, a highly significant figure even though his writings may not be 
models of systematic scholarship. 
no 
In his general educational position, Irving Babbitt was more than 
anything else a humanist. For him the fundamental goal of education was 
to develop among students the ability to discriminate among moral and 
Intellectual values In terms of their varying degrees of excellence and 
to thereby achieve a sense of harmony and proportion. His concern was 
even more with the ethical than with the Intellectual although his 
standards for judging the ethical were both aesthetic and rational. His 
stress upon harmony and proportion was fundamentally aesthetIc wh 11 e the 
role that he assigned to reason as the final arbitrator of the Insights 
established by the ethical Imagination mark Babbitt as a rationalist, 
even though he considered himself to be primarily a voluntarist. 
Babbitt's view of man as primarily guided by the imagination is 
very significant; for it Indicates that he believed that human knowledge 
originates, either primarily or exclusively, from sense perception. As 
111 
earlier noted, he defined imagination as sense perception (the lower 
imagination) or as the faculty which stores and relates sense perceptions 
(the higher imagination). This is an educationally significant position; 
for it implies that the classroom teacher should begin instruction with 
concrete materials, even when he is dealing with abstract concepts. 
Babbitt's emphasis upon literature in the teaching of normative concepts 
is easily explainable from this viewpoint as providing the needed concrete 
exemplifications to form a basis for value judgments. In contrast~ the 
teacher who believes that normative judgments are based primarily upon 
innate ideas, would be more likely to convey th~ nature of normative 
judgments in the form of abstract principles. One would thus be more 
likely to teach normative judgments directly rather than through liter-
ature. 
In his emphasis upon literature and the imagination as well as in 
his stress upon harmony and proportion, Babbitt was most definitely a 
humanist. He was also humanistic in his emphasis upon the development of 
the individual rather than the group. The major problem here is how to 
reconcile this position with the fact that like most other conservatives 
Babbitt considered the individual to be fundamentally a social creature 
and not an autonomous entity. Although, as far as this writer is aware, 
Babbitt has not dealt with this problem, it can be resolved easily on the 
basis of Babbitt's general philosophical position and that of Aristotle, 
the fundamental source upon whom Babbitt apparently relied in the formula-
tion of his viewpoint. t1an is a social animal in that he requires society 
in order to reach his perfection. However, the fundamental problems which 
interfere with the happiness of the individual are primarily individual 
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rather than social in character. The individual must first accept a 
standard of values and then abide by them before he can contribute mean-
ingfully to the solution of social problems. In essence, Babbitt's 
criterion of individual excellence pertained to the individuals' willing-
ness to view things in ethical perspective and to act on the basis of the 
insights obtained. To do this intelligently, the individual needed to 
acquire the competency of discriminating between values with facility and 
dexterity. After he accomplished this task, he could then worry about his 
own adjustment to society and about the improvement of society. 
Although Babbitt viewed tradition favorably, he felt, as we have 
seen, that Americans had moved too far from their traditional roots to 
resort to tradition on any but the most limited basis. Instead, he 
preferred to rely upon the development of an elite characterized by the 
understanding and application of standards of critical judgment. He 
believed that such an elite could provide the reliable value standards 
that had once been provided through tradition. 
The general reaction to the ideas of Babbitt and his colleagues 
mirrored the prevalent climate of opinion among the intellectuals of the 
period between the two world wars. Although Babbitt had been writing for 
several decades previously, his work was not subjected to widespread 
written criticism until about 1930. Some critics, such as Allan Tate and 
T.S. Eliot were generally sympathetic to his views but they felt that the 
values which Babbitt espoused required a religious orientation to be 
convincing. They were thus questioning the cogency of combining Babbitt's 
ethical humanism with his well-known religious skepticism.36 Other 
critics, such as Edmund Wilson and Malcolm Cowley, reacted against 
Babbitt•s constant emphasis upon the will to refrain from and to control 
the passions. Both Wilson and Cowley found this viewpoint to be lacking 
in warmth and compassion. Cowl€Y, in particular, typified those writers 
who rejected what they felt to be the aristocratic snobbery and priggish 
moralism of Babbitt and his allies.37 
The most frequent reaction of Babbitt•s critics was to reject his 
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philosophy on the ground of Babbitt•s hostility toward scient,ific natu-
ralism. As is well-known, Babbitt had insisted on a sharp separation be-
tween humans and the lower animals on the ground that humans possessed 
the ability to control their impulses. Because of this position, Babbitt 
maintained that the methods of the physical and the biological sciences 
were not fully applicable to human beings. Such famous writers as Lewis 
Mumford, Henry Hazlitt, and C. Hartley Grattan were outspokenly hostile 
toward Babbitt•s separation of humanity from the other aspects of nature. 
Lewis Mumford felt that Babbitt•s emphasis upon 11 the will to refrain 11 was 
really an attempt to protect people from vigilence and responsibility by 
dodging the risks involved in expressing one•s emotions. 38 Hazlitt denied 
36see Tate•s remarks in C. Hartley Grattan, ed., The Critique of 
Humanism (New York: Brewer and l1arren, 1930), p. 150. See also Eliot•s 
remarks in Norman Foerster, ed., Humanism and America (New York: Farrar 
and Rinehart, 1930), pp. 105-113. 
37Edmund Wilson•s reaction is given on page 46, and Malcolm Cowley•s 
reaction on pages 73-75 of Grattan, The Critique of Humanism. 
38 Ibid., p. 346. 
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that the ability to control one•s impulses was something peculiarly human. 
He also denied that humans could separate themselves absolutely from other 
creatures in their ordinary habits of life. Hazlitt maintained that a 
man cannot be even a humanist unless he has recently done something so 
bestial as eating a mea1. 39 Grattan denied the cogency of Babbitt's 
separation of humans from other forms of animal life on the ground that 
the mind, presumably the basis of human acts, was a biological organ.40 
Grattan had evidently confused the mind with the brain. The brain is 
certainly a biological organ but the mind, insofar as it differs from 
the brain, is obviously not a biological organ. To make his argument 
convincing, Grattan would have to prove that the mind and the brain are 
synonymous. Beyond making an assertion of their equivalency, Grattan has 
not even attempted to prove this point. In any case, it is evident that 
naturalism dominated the thinking of most of Babbitt's critics. It is al-
so evident that few of them presented reasoned arguments against Babbitt's 
views. Reactions, such as those of Wilson and Cowley, seem to this writer 
to be at least as emotional as intellectual. To say that Babbitt was cold 
or snobbish really amounts to mere name--calling unless the namers specify 
precisely what they mean, give evidence to substantiate their charges, and 
show why such traits are undesirable. 
Roman Catholic writers and scholars were one group that came to 
Babbitt's defense. The ideas of Babbitt that had antagonized so many 
intellectuals elicited a sympathetic response among many Roman Catholics 
\vho were attracted by Babbitt 1 s condemnation of naturalism and his belief 
39Jbid., pp. 97-100. 
40Ibid., p. 23. 
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in absolute moral standards.41 There were some strong affinities that 
existed between some of Babbitt's views and those of the Thomists. 
Babbitt shared the same Aristotelian heritage as did St. Thomas. How-
ever, Babbitt was apparently more influenced by Buddhism and by religious 
skepticism than by Christianity. In spite of the wide divergence between 
Babbitt and the Thomists on religious beliefs, striking similarities can 
be found in the dimension of values such as the common emphasis of both 
on temperance and humility. However, Thomists ultimately grounded values 
on supernatural foundations while Babbitt utilized a basically positiv-
istic approach. 
The marked tendency of educational writers to distinguish between 
Babbitt and contemporary neo-conservatives has no basis in fact. Babbitt 
was reacting against the same fundamental tendencies which have alarmed 
contemporary conservative intellectuals: the undermining of traditional 
standards and the spread of equalitarianism. The educational and social 
reforms advocated by Babbitt would also generally have the assent of 
present-day conservatives. The period in which Babbitt wrote was not 
really very different from the present period of history. The basic 
problems, such as the spread of moral and religio~s skepticism and of 
equalitarianism, are today much the same as they were fifty years ago but 
with the important difference that today they are much more pressing. 
The problems that Irving Babbitt concerned himself with are still very 
much with us. 
41For a more extended discussion of the reaction of Roman Catholic 
intellectuals to Babbitt's views see Louis J. A. Mercier, The Challenge 
of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 177-183. 
The Views of G. H. Bantock 
Like Babbitt, the British educational philosopher, G. H. Bantock 
exemplifies the same basic combination of the humanist with so-called 
upositiVe 11 ideas. As will be indicated later, there were some basic 
differences between the views expressed by Bantock and Babbitt. 
A faculty member of the University of Leicester in England, G. H. 
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Bantock was originally trained in philosophy and literature. He has 
attributed his close attention to the intricacies of language to his 
training in those disciplines.42 A prolific writer on educational 
problems, his best known works include Freedom and Authority in Education 
(1955), Education in an Industrial Society (1963), Education and Values 
(1965), and Education, Culture, and the Emotions (1967). 
The particular historical trends which most influenced G. H. Bantock 
were similar to those which have had an impact on other neo-conservative 
writers. He believed that the most serious educational and social problem 
was the need for an authority that would give meaning to life. He main-
tained that since World War I there has been a concerted effort to sub-
stitute individual desires for objective moral values. The latter were 
transmitted by tradition while the movement to undermine these values was 
-basically a reaction against the war. 43 While we might quarrel with 
Bantock's chronology and rationale for the existence of this trend, there 
is little doubt that such a tendency exists and that it became especially 
widespread after World War I. 
42G. H. Bantock, Education in an Industrial Society (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1963), p. 11. 
43G. H. Bantock, Freedom and Authority in Education (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1955), pp. 184-185. 
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Bantock was also alarmed by the spread of both meritocracy and equal-
itarianism. As we pointed out previously, the trend toward meritocracy, 
or the policy of providing responsible positions and advanced schooling 
solely on the basis of evidences of competency, has been much more wide-
spread in Great Britain than in the United States where educational equal-
itarianism has had a greater impact. Bantock objected to meritocracy 
since it led to the apotheosis of the narrow specialist type and to the 
consequent decline of the broadly educated and highly cultivated gentle-
man.44 This has led directly to the lowering of the tone of society and 
to the decline of noblesse oblige.45 
Alongside the trend to meritocracy and often confused with it has 
been the tendency toward educational equalitarianism. Universal literacy 
was, Babbitt believed, one of the basic causes of equalitarianism since 
it created an enormous mass culture. The consumers and students in a mass 
society include a large proportion with little intellectual ability and 
interest. The combined pressure of the intellectually unqualified has 
tended to lower cultural skills. 46 The spread of progressive education, 
the comprehensive secondary school, and other related movements have, 
Bantock believed, shifted the emphasis in education from the encourage-
ment and fostering of excellence to the encouragement of mediocrity. 
Bantock had thereby implicitly taken the position that the education of 
the academically talented was more important than the education of the 
relatively untalented. He had also implied that the intellectual uplift 
44santock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 66-67. 
45~iJ!., p. 84. 46Ibid., p. 77. 
of the masses to a level where they would appreciate and contribute to 
high culture was either impossible or could be_accomplished only by an 
enormous expenditure of ~ffort. 
In his reaction against these trends, Bantock was influenced 
strongly by the writings of Cardinal Newman, Matthew Arnold, D. H. 
Lawrence, and especially, T. S. Eliot.47 He has written brief studies 
of Cardinal Newman and of Matthew Arnold. He especially praised 
cardinal Newman for his emphasis on the importance of objective values 
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and Matthew Arnold for his attack on the degeneration of standards caused 
by the impact of mechanistic and materialistic philosophies.48 The means 
whereby Bantock was influenced by the two twentieth century aesthetes, 
Lawrence and Eliot, can be gleaned from the comments of Bantock himself. 
For example, Bantock praised Lawrence's emphasis on affective education 
and emphasized the same aspect himself. Bantock also praised and was 
influenced by Eliot's emphasis upon education as a cultural rather than 
a political phenomenon.49 In his general methodology, Bantock was also 
influenced by two British literary critics, I. A. Richards and F. R. 
Leavis, from whom he learned to be suspicious of abstractions divorced 
from the concrete realities of 11 the human situation.u50 In general, the 
47santock pointed out these influences in a letter to the writer 
dated August 7th, 1974. 
48santock, Freedom and Authority, pp. 86-88, 130. 
49santock, Freedom and Authority, p. 143. See also G. H. Bantock, 
T. S. Eliot and Education (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 64. 
50This information was obtained from Bantock's letter to the writer 
previously mentioned. 
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sources cited by Bantock consisted chiefly of British conservatives with 
a great concern for educational and cultural quality. Most of these 
writers were critical of both the philosophical and common forms of 
materialism. 
In identifying the aims of education, Bantock used a basically 
cultural approach. He began by defining the nature of culture which he 
conceived of as the social, emotional, and intellectual 11 Structures 11 
inherited from the past. These structures, transmitted in the forms of 
conventions, patterns, and models, function to enhance the opportunities 
for expression and to make explicit what is permissible so as to inhibit 
11 exhausting hankerings and time-absorbing aspirations. 1151 Bantock's 
terminology is significant; for it indicates his desire to order both 
academic learning and affective experiences so that students could learn 
to perceive the underlying patterns. The emphasis upon patterns indicates 
that Bantock probably accepted a coherence theory of truth; for the 
essence of this theory is consistency which implies an integration of 
parts with one another (pattern). 
In the most general terms, Bantock defined the School as an agency 
whose primary function was cognitive in character. The test of the 
excellence of the school was considered to be the degree to which it 
increased the knowledge and understanding of the students. Since he 
viewed feeling as an avenue of cognition, his attention to emotional 
education was not in conflict with his primary concern. 52 To Bantock, 
51G. H. Bantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 13-14. 
52santock, Education and Values, p. 37. 
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the school \<Jas essentially a cultural institution whose primary function 
was to release thought and thus facilitate individual expression. In 
the performance of these functions the school has to impose constraints 
upon individual freedom. These constraints were however justified as 
necessary if the school was to perform efficiently the specific tasks of 
imparting understandings, developing important skills, and cultivating 
"some refined modes of feeling. 1153 
To demarcate the functions of the school more clearly, it is essen-
tial to discuss Bantock's opposition to those who have sought to over-
extend the area of academic endeavor. He especially resented the efforts 
of educators who sought to include mental hygiene among the functions of 
the teacher since he believed that teachers are generally incompetent to 
practice psychological therapy. Furthermore, mental therapists are 
primarily concerned with the pathological while teachers should be more 
concerned with the problems of children in the real world. Even more 
disturbing to Bantock was the tendency toward permissiveness which has 
resulted from confusing the roles of the teacher and the therapist. Like 
Eliot and other conservative writers, Bantock believed that tension is a 
positive and desirable state in maximizing achievement. Therapists are 
concerned with the problem of reducing tension, but, when teachers attempt 
to do the same thing by reducing academic requirements, the consequence 
is to lower the quality of scholastic endeavor. He admitted, however, 
that equalitarian and anti-authoritarian factors have also undermined 
53 Bantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, p. 15. 
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standards. 54 
Some American college professors have invoked the mental health of 
the student as a justification for avoiding the awarding of low grades to 
students who would otherwise have received them. The usual explanation 
given is that students would suffer unnecessarily from the receipt of 
low grades. 55 On Bantock's principles, this argument would be fallacious 
since not only are most educators unqualified to render such judgments, 
but they also undermine an important incentive to achievement and actually 
contribute to the current erosion of academic standards. The difference 
between Bantock and those that have disagreed with his position can to a 
large extent be attributed to differing views as to what motivates most 
students to achieve academically. Furthermore, to Bantock and other 
conservatives, achievement is more important than contentment. In fact, 
achievement often brings contentment. 
Bantock did not, however, repudiate the utilization of emotions in 
the classroom. Quite the contrary! He wanted a greater emphasis upon 
emotional education but definitely not in the manner of the Rousseauistic 
naturalists. What Bantock wanted as not spontaneous self-expression but 
rather "a mode of structuring, a means.to order, an elaboration and a 
54see Bantock's discussion on mental therapy in ibid., pp. 34-35. 
55The writer of this study based this characterization on discus-
sions with college faculty members when he was on the admissions and 
standards committee of a college. 
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making'' with the emphasis placed upon the product rather than the self. 56 
To comprehend just exactly what Bantock meant, it is important to 
understand his conception of the nature of the emotions; for he viewed 
them not just as passive states but rather as active acts of conscience. 
To Bantock, emotions were outward expressions of one's assessments of situ-
ations. There, therefore existed both correct and incorrect responses to 
a situation .. Bantock merged the emotional with the cognitive and by so 
doing implied that emotional problems could, at least to some degree, be 
dealt with academically?? 
The teacher's role in the education of the emotions was to instruct 
students to discriminate between the various kinds of emotion. 58 The 
teacher would do this partly by example through refraining from indulging 
in coarse or vulgar emotions. Furthermore, students would learn to dis-
criminate between different kinds of feeling by the study of literature 
and the fine arts. In fact, Bantock felt that literature and the arts 
are more important than the sciences since they are concerned with values 
and passions -- matters ~hich are more basic than those which pertain to 
the sciences. He recommended that some acquaintanceship with literature 
and the arts be required of all educated men but that the only scientific 
knowledge that educated laymen really needed pertained to the scientific 
method.59 
56santock, Education and Values, p. 22. 
57santock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, pp. 72-73. 
5Slbid., pp. 82-83. 
59Bantock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 174-175. 
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Bantock•s attitudes toward the emotions are very significant in 
exemplifying the essential contrast between educational conservatives and 
Rousseauistic naturalists on the scope of formal schooling. To assert 
as many writers have, that conservatives favor an exclusively academic 
type of schooling while their opponents place greater stress upon non-
intellectual factors is to overstate the difference that actually exists 
on this matter. Every conservative thinker that we have dealt with in 
this study has been concerned not only with formal academic education but 
also with the broader implications and functions of the educational 
process. Conservatives do obviously stress academic education to a 
greater extent than do either the adherents of the naturalistic wing or 
the experimentalist wing of the progressive movement. However, affective 
education also concerns them. The true contrast is between an emphasis 
upon a highly structured academic situati-on and one in which spontaneity 
is emphasized. As a group, conservatives have no wish either to extirpate 
or to ignore emotions. Their concern is with disciplining and ordering 
emotions to the values discerned by the intellect. They are quite willing 
to deal with emotional problems but only to the degree that these problems 
can be handled cognitively. They have no wish to broaden the scope of 
formal education to include therapeutic functions of the kind which are 
normally performed by psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric social 
workers. Some progressives believe that greater spontaneity would be 
highly desirable in education. Conservatives emphatically disagree with 
this view. They look upon the stress on spontaneity as tending toward 
permissiveness. As a group, they feel that there is far too much permis-
siveness in education already for the good of either the student or the 
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large1~ community of which he is a member. 
In common with many other conservatives, Bantock has expressed 
strong disapproval of the child-centered concept of learning. He believed 
that this concept rests upon the assumption of the natural goodness of 
man when left to develop uncontaminated by society. He criticized this 
view on tv1o grounds: that isolation of the individual from social pres-
sures is not possible and that children are not competent to make the 
important decisions needed to determine the methods and content of 
academic instruction. In determining what to teach children, their powers 
and potential should be considered, but most children are not fully aware 
of what potentialities they do possess, nor do they have a clear idea of 
how these powers can be utilized by society. The individual child should 
be nurtured to broaden the range of his experience and to quiet his 
rebellious nature. In Bantock's view, interest should not be an 
important consideration. A task in which a child might not be interested 
might prove to be very interesting once the child begins to do it. The 
teacher should definitely be the expert and the guide. Nevertheless, the 
powers and potentialities of the individual child should be taken into 
account so that in substance Bantock was urging not a one-sided teacher 
centered system but rather interaction between teacher and students.60 
Bantock felt that the educational progressives have been so 
zealous in promoting the happiness of children that they have overlooked 
the value and importance of academic learning. In contrast, Bantock has 
expressed a preference for achievement over immediate happiness.6l 
60For Bantock's views on this subject, see his works, Education, 
~ ture, and the Emotions, p. 138, and Freedom and ;'\uthori ty, p. 120. 
6lsantock, Education, Culture, and the Emotions, p. 139. 
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In the end, he confidently believed that achievement will prove to be more 
satisfying than immediate gratification. 62 Like Aristotle, Bantock be-
lieved that reason is the supreme characteristic of man and that life lived 
in rational terms is necessary for the best life.63 To the charge that 
control over children would undermine their freedom, he opposed a positive 
·conception of freedom as the following quotation clearly indicates: 
Just, then, as social freedom springs out of the acceptance of 
the moral law, so the freedom to pe~form various skills and to 
make sense of the world around us so that we can move about it, 
springs from the acceptance of and submission to the authority 
inherent in the various bodies of human learning. And it is a 
fact of human experience that the 11 Subjects 11 within which, in 
the course of time, we learn to move with the greatest assur-
ance and freedom are not necessarily those which we are at first 
most 'interested' by or 11 enjoy ... 64 
Bantock, therefore, viewed freedom not simply as the absence of controls 
but rather as the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks. For this, 
restraint is required rather than permissiveness. In addition, the fore-
going quotation is also indicative of Bantock's acceptance of the tradi-
tional subject-matter boundaries in preference to the more integrated 
approaches advocated by the educati ona 1 progressives. ··Elsewhere, he 
defended subject-matter de1imiations as imposed by the nature of the 
material although he did not enlarge very much on this bare assertion.65 
62 Ibid., p. 140. 
63santock, Education and Values, pp. 98-99. 
64Ibid., p. 100. 
65Bantock, Freedom and Authority, p. 198. 
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Although Bantock tended to emphasize the cognitive functions of 
ducation even when dealing with affective approaches, he did not feel 
e . 
that a single set of educational aims should be applied throughout the 
educational system. He believed that the level of intelligence and the 
degree of motivation varies too much to render a single set of educa-
tional aims practical. 66 Apparently, he assumed that efforts to change 
intellectual and motivational levels to any significant degree \'muld be 
doomed to failure. Presumably, this doubt was based on both the influ-
ences of heredity and early home upbringing. 67 The educator must, there-
fore, study the nature of his students and adjust his teaching according-
ly. The utopian hopes of some educational thinkers would evidently seem 
to those inspired by Bantock's ideas to be visionary and impractical. 
Unlike such other conservatives as Irving Babbitt and T. S. Eliot, 
Bantock devoted special attention to the education of the less gifted. 
Other conservatives had, by not prescribing any special academic program 
for the less academically inclined, tacitly assumed that beyond the level 
of basic literacy, the needs of these children could best be met by 
practical experience. As a group, conservatives most definitely favored 
selective admissions policies on the higher, and, in some instances, even 
the secondary level of education. Bantock certainly agreed with his 
fellow conservatives that access to the universities and to academic 
curricula in general should be restricted to the academically gifted and 
66santock, Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 119-120; 185-186. 
67 In his book, T. S. Eliot and Education, Bantock was quite explicit 
on the importance of early cultural upbringing. See page 111 thereof. 
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motivated. On the other hand, he believed that classroom teaching could 
be meaningful for the less gifted provided that ample provision is made 
for taking into account the intellectual characteristics of these chil-
dren. In general, this approach seems quite different from that of the 
educational equalitarians who are now especially influential in American 
education. The latter believe that the masses have the capacity for under-
standing and profiting from an academic type of education and that their 
' 
relatively poor performance is due either to poor teaching, deficient 
early cultural upbring·ing, or discrimination. Therefore, they have 
developed various different kinds of plans to equalize educational oppor-
tunity through providing special attention for the "culturally deprived." 
It is common knowledge among educators that children have shown some 
improvement as a result of special teaching, but there is considerable 
doubt concerning the permanence of the changes made. 68 The conservative 
contention in this regard is that the effort, time, and money expended 
would have produced greater and more lasting dividends if greater atten-
tion had been given to the academically promising. In essence, this 
difference in attitude is based upon a striking difference of opinion 
pertaining to the relative flexibility of human nature. 
Bantock believed that efforts made to transform the less gifted into 
intellectuals were doomed to failure; for the non-academic child lives in 
a different world from his more scholarly counterpart. Th~ crux of the 
68see the claims made by Carl Bereiter and Siegfried Engelmann, 
~hing Disadvantaged Children in the Preschool (Englevmod Cliffs, Nev>J 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), passim and by George Dennison, The Lives 
.2f...S:_b_·1_J_dren (New York: Random ROuse;-1969), passim. Using diametrically 
0PPosite approaches, the authors of both these works claimed considerable 
success. 
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difference pertains to the degree of ability and understanding manifested 
in the utilization of abstract concepts and the written word. From the 
point of view of Bantock, the less able child was believed to be living 
in a predominantly oral world. The interests of this child were believed 
to lie in matters relating to his local environment and the marvelous. 
\~hen the child reads,_ it is for the story and not for either self-improve-
ment or explanation. 
The kind of education suitable for this type of child should differ 
fundamentally from that of the academically gifted child. On the 
secondary level, the education of the less able forty percent, excluding 
the "sub-normal, .. must be centered on the practical and the concrete if 
it is to be meaningful. Such academic-subjects as foreign languages, 
formal history, and geography should be dropped from the course of study 
that this type of child should pursue. In addition, the amount of time 
devoted to mathematics would be diminished. English would be taught as 
well as good citizenship but the latter would be learned by cooperative 
activity rather than through formal instruction. l~hat history and 
geography that Bantock would retain would be incidental to the teaching 
of other subjects. 
The non-academic child would learn art by proceeding from the study 
of "pop" culture to more academic matters. The study of music might · 
begin with calypso; of the visual arts, with the study of films. The 
chief purpose of teaching art and music to the non-academic children 
would be to enable them to employ their leisure constructively. 
A large portion of the time spent by these children in school would 
be devoted to vocational purposes. The boys would learn such tasks as 
Plumbing, paper-hanging, boot mending, and gardening while the girls 
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uld study dietetics, mothercraft, cooking, needlework, and kindred wo . 
subjects. In other words, Bantock felt that the school should prepare 
these children for the vocations that they would be most likely to pursue 
. ll·fe. 69 later 1 n 
In general, Bantock had recommended that many of the practices 
.. 
associated with progressive and vocational education be applied to the 
needs of the less gifted children. Where he differed with John Dewey was 
in the latter•s insistence that an essentially practical type of educa-
tion be given to children on all levels of ability. Bantock was highly 
critical of Dewey•s emphasis on the practical; for one•s immediate needs 
tend to be fleeting, and Dewey had apparently forgotten that the detec-
tion of a problem is dependent on anterior assumptions which are often 
non-empirical in character. 70 Bantock did not therefore prefer practical 
education but felt compelled to advocate it for the less gifted because 
of the educational limitations of the latter. 
With regard to children on the high-average level of academic 
development, Bantock recommended the pursuance of a technical education 
although some general education courses would also be included. The 
latter would pertain essentially to literature and the arts.?l Students, 
on the higher levels of academic ability, would attend training colleges 
69For Bantock•s views on the education of the less gifted, see his 
Education in an Industrial Society, pp. 212, 216-220. 
?Osee Bantock•s views on De~IJey in ibid., pp. 37, 47-48. 
71 Ibid. ~ p. 199. 
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if they lack motivation while those who possess both motivation and 
ability would be prepared for entrance into the universities. The train-
ing colleges would differ from the universities in that the former would 
devote themselves exclusively to teaching without the research function 
of the university.72 
In essence, Bantock advocated ~ class system of education but one 
which was not based on the class affiliations of the families of the 
students but rather on the academic capabilities and the motivations of 
the individuals involved. Yet, he was not really advocating a pure 
meritocracy; for elsewhere in his writings one finds that he deplored the 
rise to power of individuals of high intelligence without cultivated 
manners and refined morals. 73 In any case, he recommended, in substance, 
that the schools serve as agencies of selection for the various occupa-
tional levels of society. This position clearly implies the prime 
importance of academic ability as the selective factor. Those who possess 
the requisite amount of this ability would qualify for the most pres-
tigious positions. Others would be prepared for less demanding positions 
based on their relative performance on various measures of academic 
ability and motivation. One might well wonder whether these other occupa-
tions do not demand special talents as well for the efficient performance 
of duties. An academic incompetent is not necessarily mechanically 
competent. 
72Ibid., pp. 185-186. 73Jbid., pp. 180, 195. 
Babbitt and Ba~tock Compared 
Both Babbitt and Bantock \'Jere reacting pr_imarily in opposition both 
to the decline of traditional authority and the permeation of contemporary 
culture by equalitarianism. Of the two, Babbitt showed a hostility 
toward business values which Bantock failed to exhibit. This contrast 
may reflect differences between the British and American social climates; 
for business values have generally been more widely influential in the 
United States than in the United Kingdom. 
Both of the protagonists of positive humanism believed that 
traditional values could be restored through an educational system in 
which the most important aim would be to teach students to discriminate 
between values. Bantock emphasized in particular the discrimination 
between the passions in terms of the values which they exemplified. 
As humanists, both Babbitt and Bantock emphasized literature and the 
importance of imaginative insight. In addition, Babbitt stressed the 
worth of harmony and proportion as social ideals. Both men recognized 
the value of tension. Bantock openly espoused this characteristic as a 
value while it was an implicit assumption of Babbitt's stress on volunta-
ristic discipline. Both writers were definitely achievement oriented~ 
The striking similarities which existed between Babbitt and Bantock 
clearly indicate how artificial is the separation by educational writers 
of Babbitt's nee-humanists from the neo-conservatives of today. 
CHAPTER V 
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM . 
An important variant of neo-conservatism can be designated as 
"religious traditionalism11 ltJhich is characterized by the view that the 
fundamental problems of contemporary education are primarily axiological 
and can only be solved by a belief in God and dedication to religion.l 
While neo-conservative thinkers have generally recognized the value and 
importance of religion, they have not given it the centrality of position 
that it occupies in the thinking of the religious traditionalists. For 
the latter, religious concerns are primary while the aesthetic emphases 
of the humanists occupies a merely secondary position. A writer closely 
identified with the predominantly religious strain of neo-conservative 
thought was Canon Bernard Iddings Bell (1886-1958). 
An American adherent of High Church Episcopalianism, Canon Bell was 
ordained a priest in the Episcopal Church in 1910. After serving in a 
variety of clerical capacities, he became president of St. Stephens 
College at the age of thirty-four. He served in this position for 
fourteen years. When St. Stephens was absorbed into Columbia University, 
111 Religious traditionalism" is my term for this movement. The term 
vias chosen because adherents of this position be 1 i eve in the primary 
importance of returning to the religious traditions of the past as a 
remedy for the ills of contemporary society. 
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he severed his connection with the college out of disagreement with the 
liberal educational ideas prevalent at Columbia. From 1930 to 1933, he 
did serve however as a professor of religion at Columbia University. He 
later acted as counselor to Episcopal students at the University of 
Chicago. Subsequently, he was afflicted with blindness but continued to 
lead a productive existence as a canon attached to the Episcopal Cathe-
dral of Chicago. During his most productive years, he wrote a consider-
able number of works on religion and also two books of interest to educa-
tors. Crisis in Education (1949) pertains to educational problems not 
only concerning the school but also the home· and the church. In Crowd 
Culture (1952), Canon Bell concerned himself with both educational and 
religious problems.2 
The primary problem identified by Canon Bell in his educational 
writings was the immature and emotionally impulsive nature of the 
American people. To a far greater extent than other peoples and than 
Americans of an earlier time, the people of the United States suffered 
from an inversion of values. The primary interest of most Americans. was 
to make money to provide themselves with pleasure and entertainment. 
Pleasure consisted of enjoying the use of a large and ornate house, a 
motorcar, expensive clothes, and other material possessions. Entertain-
ment included reading literary "trash" which described acts of brutality 
2since the details of Canon Bell's life are not generally known, 
the reader is referred to the introduction by Russell Kirk to the 
paperback edition of Bernard Iddings Bell, Crowd Culture (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1956), pp. xi -xvi. 
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and iust as well as listening to or viewing similar material on radio and 
television. The average American, suffering from religious impoverish-
ment, had long ago lost the concomitant sense of moral dedication which 
could give life meaning. 3 
If the average American is to obtain happiness, Bell believed that 
work rather than pleasure must become the center of attention. When 
pleasure is long pursued, it becomes boring. Unless Americans learn the 
joys of work, they wi 11 "remain petulant children, dangerous, predatory ."4 
Work should not be considered an unpleasant burden but rather as an 
opportunity for creativeness and service to others. Every man is made to 
give others understanding, tolerance, and clemency. Only through con-
structive work and moral dedication can men find peace. 5 
According to Bell, that which distinguishes the. gentleman from the 
common man is not money since not all gentlemen are rich nor are all 
common men poor. What the gentleman has which the common man lacks is a 
liberal education. By "liberal education, 11 Bell meant an education 
through which students could learn to discriminate between values and to 
identify the true ends of living. According to Bell, the common man has 
received an essentially utilitarian and vocational type of education. As 
a direct consequent, the common man has shown himself to be incapable of 
ruling himself or society. Yet, in spite of his evident incapacity to 
3on the nature of the American people, see Bernard Iddings Bell, 
Crisis in Education (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949), pp. 12-24. 
4rbid., p. 23. 5rbid., pp. 22-23. 
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rule, the common man has been given the authority and prerogatives which 
once belonged to the gentleman. 6 Is it any wonder that the common man is 
immature? While lacking the wisdom that he might have procured through a 
liberal education, the common man has responsibilities far exceeding his 
accomplishments. 
If the causes of this inversion of values were believed to be 
educational, the remedies were also believed to be educational. Bell 
believed that the major emphasis should be placed on reforming elementary 
education since, by the time children reached high school, their charac-
ters have already been shaped. To accomplish the task of educating the 
child, the resources not only of the school but also of the home and the 
church as well should be enlisted. Children should be taught decent 
manners, the value of craftsmanship, some knowledge of the basic wisdom 
of the species, religion, and skill in handling the tools of education. 
Manners were considered important because a courtesy was deemed essential 
to the safety and welfare of civilization. Manners should be taught 
primarily in the home but with the assistance of both the church and the 
school. Craftsmanship was essenUa.l. to happiness; for to be happy humans 
must take pride in their work. Craftsmanship would also be taught 
primarily in the home. Wisdom was needed to enable people to conduct 
their lives intelligently. Religion was considered to be the essential 
foundation of morality as well as indispensible if people are to face up 
to the frustrations of life. Finally, children should learn how to use 
the educational tools of reading, writing, listening, and speaking if 
there is to be a competent interchange of ideas. 7 
6~id.' pp. 25-26. 7Tb•d 
_1_1_.' pp. 31-35. 
136 
In general, Bell viewed American problems in fundamentally axiolo-
gical terms. Americans were emotionally and intellectually immature be-
cause they suffered from an inversion of values. The fundamental task of 
American education was to be a combination of the inculcation of values 
and of the ability to discriminate between values. The most important 
function of education was to be the moral one. By this function, Bell 
meant that through education the individual should learn how to live with 
himself which knowledge involved learning how to live with others 
(manners). To learn these things, it was considered necessary that the 
individual be trained in the nature and application of values. As we 
shall see later, Bell believed religion to be the indispensible founda-
tion of morality so that ultimately religion was of central importance in 
Bell's educational philosophy.B 
The most important traits needed by the student to fulfill his role 
in Bell's educational plan was intelligence. The term "intelligence" was 
derived from the words inter (between) and legere (to choose). Intelli-
gence properly pertained to the ability to discriminate or to differen-
tiate between the permanent and the transitory, the good and the bad, the 
valuable and the worthless, the beautiful and the ugly. Intelligence was 
therefore applicable to intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and prudential 
judgments. 
The possession of high intelligence would not necessarily make the 
possessor rich, popular, or happy. On the contrary, he might be hated 
BFor Bell 1 s definitions of morals and manners, see ibid., p. 83; 
with regard to the role of religion, see jbid., pp. 227-2-zs.-
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and envied by others. Yet intelligence was essential if proper choices 
were to be made to enable our civilization to be 11 Safe and free. 119 
While Bell considered intelligence to be basically an innate 
ability, he believed that education was needed for the full development 
of this power. While everyone should be taught to discriminate values to 
the fullest extent to which he or she is capable, it would be unreason-
able to expect much from most people. Instead, ~ducators should stress 
the training and selection of the few who exhibited superior reasoning 
abilities. From this superior group would come the nation's leaders. 
According to Be11•s conception of intelligence, the elite would be 
identified by the possession of a consideraule degree of analytical and 
synthetical reasoning abilities -- especially with regard to the ability 
. 
to understand the natures of values and concepts and to discriminate 
between them. By exposure to a judicious curriculum, characterized by a 
focus on the liberal arts, the humanities and religion, those who have 
the potentialities would presumably be enabled to develop to the point 
where they would be able to give sapient guidance to the nation. This 
goal of national service was far more valuable than the treasuring of 
learning for its own sake which Bell regarded as the dominant goal of 
American higher education. Bell emphasized ideas rather than facts; 
reasoning rather than memory.lO 
Bell believed that the most serious deficiency in American life 
was the absence of any generally accepted ethical standard. American 
9Ibid., p. 62. 
lOon the nature and purpose of intelligence, see ibid., pp. 59-67. 
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society lacked a generally accepted definition of the nature and 
purpose of man. Although some theorists might seek to arrive at such a 
definition by appealing to the will of the majority, Bell rejected this 
approach as contributing to blind conformity and mediocrity. He also 
rejected the uncritical acceptance of the traditions of the past as 
deadly to critical and creative thinking. On the other hand, the re-
jection of the whole of tradition would lead to foolish behavior. If 
people are to find meaning in life, they must look to what is beyond man 
which means that 11 religion is involved, primarily involved, inseparably 
involved in education.ll 
To Bell, the essence of religion consisted of contact with and 
adoration of God.12 Without the foundation of belief in God, morality 
is liable to degenerate into mere expediency and finally into blind 
obedience to those who use force.l3 Belief in God is of central impor-
tance to moral education. To a considerable extent, moral education is 
coterminous with religious education. 
Bell's view of the nature of religious education was largely based 
upon Alfred North Whitehead's interpretation of the historical develop-
ment of the higher religions. According to Bell's account of Whitehead's 
views, the various religions had originated as rituals which were designed 
to stimulate emotions that were deemed to be beneficial to the group. 
Later, people sought to explain rituals in terms of stories. As wor-
shippers continued to perform rituals and to expound the stories linked 
to their observances, faith was born. When faith was formalized into 
words, a creed was created. Finally the creed was correlated with other 
11 Ibid., p. 228. 
13Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
12 I' . d 
_QJ_.' pp. 127-128. 
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facets of human experience. 14 
Religious instruction should likewise begin with ritual since ab-
stract concepts are too difficult for comprehension by the very young and 
even by most adults. As soon as the child is old enough, he should learn 
the stories associated with his religious tradition. When the child 
reaches the period between ten and fifteen years of age, the ritual 
should be transformed from a formal into a vital element of his life. By 
then, the stories would become more significant by being interpreted in 
the light of the child's growing fund of experience. By insight, the 
child would become aware of interrelationships between ideas and things 
that he previously considered separately. Thus faith would emerge. When 
this stage had been attained, the creed associated with the faith of 
the child would become meaningful to him.15 
In the teaching of religion as in the teaching of morals and 
manners, the home should be the primary locus of learning although there 
vwuld also exist ancillary activities in both church and school. ~Jhile 
considering it neither possible nor necessary to teach the beliefs of any 
particular denomination in the public schools, Bell believed the respect 
for the Absolute and some knowledge of the various faiths should be 
14Ibid., pp. 128-130. This reference should be contrasted with the 
original account by Alfred North Hhitehead, Religion in the t1aking (New 
York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 18, 23. According to Bell, the four stages 
of religious development of ~~hitehead were ritual, myth, belief, and 
rationalization. In this characterization, Bell was in error. Whitehead's 
stages were ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalization. · 
15Bell, Crisis in Education, pp. 130-135. 
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imparted in the classroom. With regard to moral instruction, it would 
be based on "supernatural demands and rest on supernatural sanctions." 16 
It is significant that Bell's views on religious education made 
the psychological nature of the child an important consideration. The 
particular mode of progression recommended was from the concrete to the 
abstract in accordance with the child's growth in experience. With 
regard to his views concerning human nature, Bell did not believe that 
people were infinitely flexible. Educational content must be congruent 
with the native abilities of those being educated. The child should not 
be introduced to the abstract concepts associated with the various 
religious creeds until his abilities have matured sufficiently so that 
he would be able to grasp these concepts. As we have seen, Bell doubted 
whether most adults would be able to grasp such concepts. Seemingly 
implicit in this position was the view that heredity was more important 
than environment in explaining human differences. A staunch environ-
mentalist might well be expected to exhibit confidence that the ability 
to grasp abstractions could be developed under the proper environmental 
conditions. 
With regard to the various stages of formal education, Bell be-
lieved that too much time was being spent in schooling children. He felt 
it to be both unreasonable and wasteful to engage so many people for such 
a long time in formal preparation for life. Instead of the conventional 
eight years of elementary education, Bell recommended a program of six 
years which would encompass all that was being customarily covered in 
eight years. Elementary education would be follm'led by four years of 
l61bid., p. 145. See also j_bi~., pp. 35, 83. 
secondary schooling and then three years of college. Graduate or pro-
fessional training would consume four additional years of study.l? 
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Bell 1 s apparent assumption that an equal amount of education is 
necessary for competent performance in all .the professions is somewhat 
surprising considering the wide variation which exists in the kind of 
abilities required for excellence in the various professions. An even 
more important question is: how would Bell guard against the use of his 
recommendation for reduction in the length of formal education by educa-
tional administrators to lower academic standards to expand enrollments? 
For the answer to this question, Bell•s views on the content of education 
at the various levels of instruction will be examined. 
Although some attention should be given to content, Bell felt that 
the primary function of elementary education should be to cultivate the 
basic educational skills that developed the competency to read, write, 
speak, listen, compute, and handle. The purpose of elementary education 
was to give youngsters the tools needed for mental growth. This was 
expressed graphically by Bell in the following quotation: 
Most Americans cannot read anything more difficult than a pictu.re 
paper or a pulp magazine; they cannot write a letter and make 
their meaning plain; they rarely speak except in cliches; they 
are unable to follow an argument put in the simplest words, to 
understand what a speaker is driving at. What chance have people 
to mature when there is no competent interchange of ideas? Our 
lower schools may be ever so good at conducting classes in 11 Citizen-
ship" and "nature study," though there are those who doubt it when 
they look at the product; but their main business is and will 
remain teaching boys and girls how to read, write, speak, listen, 
figure, and handle things. Unless the lower schools can do a far 
better job of work on these basic necessities, there will be less 
and less growing up among Americans.l8 
17rb·iQ., pp. 205-209. lBrbid., pp. 32-33. 
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At the high school level, Bell recommended that there should be 
additional teaching of the basic educational skills but on a more 
advanced level than in elementary school. Specifically, he suggested a 
revival of the trivium and the quadrivium for the purpose of inculcating 
habits of 11 sound thinking 11 among the students. 19 In addition to training 
in the basic skills and the liberal arts, vocational training would be 
taught in tandem with the liberal arts. 20 In view of his concept of 
intelligence and his thoughts on the kind of elite that would be best for 
the nation, it is obvious that Bell held education in the liberal arts in 
higher esteem than vocational education. 
Bell believed that the primary responsibility for the weaknesses of 
American education rested with the secondary schools. They have failed 
to provide their students with the basic skills needed for intellectual 
achievement. Because of the vast numbers of the academically incompetent 
that yearly enter the secondary schools of the nation, it apparently was 
decided to lower academic standards to make things easy for the students. 
The consequence has been a neglect of drill in the basic academic skills. 
The typical college entrant in the United States was therefore character-
~zed as 11 mostly an untried young cub 11 while his counterparts in England 
and on the European continent were fully prepared for college instruc-
tion.2l 
To Bell, the pressure to extend the alleged benefits of mass educa-
tion to the college level was exceedingly unwise. At the time when he 
wrote Crisis in Education, the colleges were burgeoning with students as 
19_Ibic!_., pp. 70-71. 20_Lq_is!_.' p. 52. 
21Jcid., p. 47; Bell, Crm·1d Cultur~ p. 36. 
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a result of the enactment of the 11 G. I. Bill of Rights ... Bell was fear-
ful of the educational consequences of the enactment of this bill. To 
expand the facilities of the colleges to accommodate a flood of new 
students would entail an increase in the numbers of faculty and other 
college personnel far beyond the competently trained supply. Furthermore, 
concentrating on providing education and facilities for huge masses of 
students constituted a grave danger that the colleges and universities 
would neglect the individual student -- especially the student of supe-
rior academic potential who was precisely the kind of student that Bell 
thought the colleges should make the center of their attention. 22 His 
opposition to mass college education was however much broader in scope 
than his reaction to one congressional bill. As we have seen previously, 
Bell believed that the chief purpose of higher education should be the 
training of an elite of ratiocinative intelligence. To admit a mass of 
poorly prepared students would defeat the main purpose of college and 
would create an irresistible pressure to lower academic standards and to 
simplify instruction. To produce a worthy intellectual elite, it was 
essential that the members of this elite be recruited from those of 
superior innate intelligence and that those aspiring to membership in the 
elite be required to survive a challenging program of academic studies. 23 
Bell thought that in college everything should be studied which 
would throw light on man and his behavior. He specifically mentioned the 
social sciences, psychology, literature, history, the fine arts, and 
philosophy. Through the study of these disciplines, it was hoped that the 
22Ball, Crisis in Education, pp. 4-5, 65. 
23Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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student would learn the causes of human failure and would learn to emulate 
those human successes \'JOrthy of emulation. In essence, Bell valued these 
disciplines for their value in encouraging students to lead moral and 
successful lives. Bell's conception of success pertained obviously to 
happiness rather than money or fame. For him education therefore, had 
essent~ally practical aims but not in the crass materialistic sense of 
"practical. 1124 
Religion should also be studied on the college level so that the 
student might come to know and adore the Infinite and thereby acquire 
humility. Bell felt that the student of superior native endowment and 
education was especially prone to develop the undesirable traits of pride, 
insolence, and effrontery. Such an 1 individual might have the intellec-
tual qualifications for leadership, but his deficiencies of character 
would be so serious as to render him positively harmful in any leadership 
role that he might undertake. To guard against this, it is important 
that the student learn to look up to what is immeasurably superior to 
him. 25 
To illustrate what he felt to be important in higher education, 
Bell recalled that in 1903, when he entered the University of Chicago, 
he attended an orientation session for incoming freshmen at which the 
president of the university, Dr. William Rainey Harper, spoke. As Bell 
recalled it, Dr. Harper said: 
24rbid., p. 21. 
25Ibid., p. 72. 
Young gentlemen, you have come here in hope of furthering your 
ed~cation. If you are to do this it would be well for you to 
have some idea of what an educated human being is. Then you will 
know what to aim at here, what this institution exists to assist 
you to become. An educated man is a man who by the time he is 
twenty-five years old has a clear theory, formed in the light of 
human experience down the ages of what constitutes a satisfying 
life,_ a significant life, and who by the age of thirty has a 
moral philosophy consonant with racial experience. If a man 
reaches these ages without having arrived at such a theory, such 
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a philosophy, then no matter how many facts he has learned or how 
many processes he has mastered, that man is an ignoramus and a 
fool, unhappy, probably dangerous. That is all. Good afternoon.26 
Bell 1 s conception of higher education embraced study in the liberal 
arts, the humanities, and religion. In his view, vocational education had 
no place in the college and the university with the exception of profes-
sional study. The fact that he prescribed the same selection of studies 
for all college students clearly implies that he did not favor reliance 
upon the elective method of course selection, at least with regard to 
higher education. 
In contrast to Bell•s emphasis upon skill instruction in the lower 
schools, he stressed content quite heavily in his conception of the 
desirable college curriculum. College courses were not, however, to be 
taught primarily for their factual content but rather for their value in 
helping people to lead happier and more worthy lives. To accomplish this 
aim, it was necessary to discriminate wisely between values and to know 
the true ends of life. This view of the purposes of higher education was 
both moral and intellectual in nature since it involved both the under-
standing of value concepts and their application to human conduct. 
Bell believed that the chief enemy of education was the state. 
26Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
i, 
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This menace took the form of an attack on academic freedom to produce 
conformity so that whatever class happens to control the state shall be 
kept firmly in power. In the United States, this class was characterized 
as consisting of 11 the managerial manipulators for the upper bourgeoisie 11 
and might well include in the future the leaders of organized labor.27 
Bell believed that the power of the state over education was due to 
the fact that the state was the sole taxing agency. This power has 
resulted in the situation where the state had become the dominant finan-
cial entity in education. State control could only expand the tyranny of 
centralized power. It was folly to think it possible for men to wield 
great power without tyranny as the ultimate consequence.28 
The general significance of Bernard Iddings Bell as an exponent of 
neo-conservatism can be viewed from the uniqueness of his approach to 
contemporary educational problems. Unlike other neo-conservative writers~ 
he did not proceed from a feeling of dissatisfaction with the undermining 
of certain cherished values such as selectivity or traditionalism but 
rather from the outcomes of such undermining -- the producti~n of a pop-
ulation characterized by immaturity and discontent. The remedy for this 
situation lay in an education wherein the stress would be on the dis-
crimination of purposes and values. Such an educational system would 
produce an elite capable of guiding others to a meaningful existence. 
In view of the fact that Bell emphasized moral and especially 
religious concerns, he could hardly be correctly described as a humanist. 
The aesthetic and literary aspects of education did not have in his 
27rbid., p. 181. 
28Ibicl., pp. 187, 191. 
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philosophy the dominating importance that they had for the genuine hu-
manists. Yet, in spite of this fact, education was to Bell as to the 
. . 
most intense humanists that we have surveyed, primarily a matter of taste. 
But the tastes that he wished to cultivate were based fundamentally on 
religious rather than aesthetic foundations. 
In the end, he believed that people should strive for happiness. 
Although he neglected to explain precisely his conception of the nature 
of happiness, it is plain from the way he used the term that he had in 
mind the sense of satisfaction which is a consequence of a life that has 
been lived in accordance with moral and ultimately religious values. In 
the end, man must find his salvation in religion or not at all. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE THEORY OF EDUCATION 
Chapter II, 11 Foundations of Neo-Conservatism, .. was devoted to an 
analysis of the basic philosophical foundations of neo-conservatism and 
to its educational implications. Chapter VI will examine the general 
characteristics of neo-conservative educational thought and will compare 
them with the inferences made in chapter II. The conclusions should be 
of some significance since they are based on the ideas of the neo-conserv-
ative writers whose works were analyzed earlier; for such theorists as 
T. S. Eliot, Irving Babbitt, and Russell Kirk have been among the most 
influential of all the writers who have been active proponents of neo-
conservatism. 
Specifically, the present chapter will be devoted to bringing 
together and relating the findings that we have made with regard to indi-
vidual neo-conservative writers on education with the purpose of giving 
the general educational characteristics and implications of the neo-
conservative movement. We will begin with a summary of our findings 
pertaining to the historical influences upon neo-conservative educational 
thought. This analysis will be followed by a consideration of the nature 
of neo-conservative values as such. We will then consider in order the 
aims and content of education; methods of instruction and learning theory; 
and the agencies that should be involved in education -- all of these 
topics to be viewed from the perspective of the neo-conservative stand-
point. A comparison will then be made with the inferences given in the 
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second chapter and then certain general conclusions will be reached. In 
essence, this chapter will be devoted to a summary and integration of the 
material presented in all the foregoing chapters of this study related to 
educational thought. 
Neo-conservative educational thought has derived many of its 
characteristics from-the historical period in which it flourished. The 
contemporary period, which in its essential intellectual characteristics 
began shortly after the end of World War I, represents an advanced stage 
in the decline of belief in traditional moral and cultural standards. 
Without exception, the neo-conservative writers, whose works were dis-
cussed earlier, have viewed the problems of the contemporary era as 
fundamentally axiological in nature. These writers have protested against 
what they have considered to be a condition that has arisen from a combina-
tion of a lack of standards in some areas of endeavor and an inversion of 
standards in other areas. Two trends have been particularly disturbing 
to neo-conservatives: the decline of belief in objective moral standards 
and the spread of cultural and educational equalitarianism. From the neo-
conservative perspective, the rejection of objective moral standards was 
a symptom of the decline of standards; equalitarianism was a result of the 
inversion of standards. To restore a climate of intellectual and moral 
integrity, neo-conservatives called for the reversal of these trends. 
The primary means for reversing these trends was considered to be educa-
tional. 
Contrary to popular opinion, the writing of Edmund Burke was not 
the primary source of inspiration for the views of the neo-conservative 
writers under consideration. Of the writers surveyed, we have sufficient 
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data to reach conclusions on the sources of inspiration of all of them 
with the single exception of Bernard Iddings Bell. These writers include 
the three most frequently mentioned neo-conservative writers in American 
and British literature on conservatism -- Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk. Of 
the writers surveyed, only Russe 11 Kirk 1 ooked to Edmund Burke as the 
chief inspiration for his work. The influences upon the other writers, 
including Babbitt, Bantock, and Eliot, were so varied as to discourage 
any meaningful general1zations beyond the bare fact that these influences 
were chiefly conservative in nature. While neo-conservative writers on 
education generally agreed with the views of Edmund Burke, they apparent-
ly did not derive their views directly from his writings. 
A more fruitful means of ascertaining the historical influences 
upon the neo-conservatives would be to compare the views of the neo-
conservatives with the various preceding schools of educational thought. 
From this historical persp.ective, contemporary conservative educational 
thought has clearly been predominantly humanistic in nature.l With the 
exception of Bell, all the writers whose works have been analyzed have 
exhibited the aesthetic emphasis characteristic of humanism. Babbitt, 
Bantock, Eliot, and Kirk shared a common emphasis upon the study of 
Titerature. Babbitt, Bantock, and Kirk also believed in the superior 
efficacy of insight-- an ability which was based to a considerable ex-
tent upon imagination which was a faculty commonly stressed by the 
lfor the sense in which we are using the term "humanism" see pages 
48-49 of this study. 
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humanists. Since T. S. Eliot was an imaginative poet, it is probable that 
he, too, believed in the importance of insight even though he was not very 
explicit on this topic in his educational writings. In addition, both 
Babbitt and Eliot stressed the aesthetic ideals of harmony and proportion. 
Babbitt, Eliot, and Kirk also exhibited a common emphasis upon the impor-
tance of ancient Greco-Roman literature. 
In general, neo-conservative educational thought can be considered 
an outgrowth of a tradition which began with the aesthetic aspects of the 
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and was continued and further devel-
oped through the work of such individuals as Isocrates, Cicero. 
Quintilian, John of Salisbury, and numerous personalities of the Renais-
sance. In addition, several neo-conservative writers, especially Eliot 
and Bell, were also strongly influenced by Christian ideals. In histor-
ical perspective, neo-conservatism, at least in its educational aspects, 
can be considered as a reaction against contemporary nihilism and equal-
itarianism and as a re-emphasis upon the humanistic and sometimes the 
Christian ideals of the past. On the whole, neo-conservatism represents 
an elitist type of humanism. 
The particular values which neo-conservatives have stressed were 
moral, intellectual, and religious in character. Economic values and 
those values which are generally associated with physical comfort and 
well-being were generally ignored. A strong achievement orientation was 
common to the thought of the neo-conservatives. As a group, the neo-
conservatives were quite willing to sacrifice a considerable degree of 
psychological freedom in favor of the discipline and of the restraints 
which they believed necessary for individual achievement. The ideals of 
craftsmanship and cultural achievement were strongly emphasized in the 
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writings of Babbitt, Bantock, Bell, Eliot, and Kirk. In general, the 
neo-conservatives espoused an ethical perfectionism in which spiritual or 
non-material, non-physical aspects of excellence were strongly emphasized. 
This perfectionism was presented in terms of the development of the 
individual rather than the uplift of society as a whole. The various 
values emphasized by the neo-conservatives can be linked together through 
the implicit ideal of the highly cultivated gentleman characterized by 
the qualities of discretion, restraint, intelligence, refinement, and 
good taste. This ideal is in accord with the basic humanistic virtues of 
harmony and proportion; for restraint and discretion are obviously con-
ducive to harmony, and good taste involves the ability to perceive what 
is proportionate and harmonious. 
The fundamental aim of education,. as perceived by the neo-conserv-
atives, was deemed to be the development of an elite characterized by the 
ability to discriminate between ideas and between values in terms both 
of the nature and relative worth of the concepts and values involved. 
This elite would be distinguished by the possession of a high degree of 
analytical and synthetical reasoning powers. To be able to grasp the 
nature and interrelationships of general concepts, it is obvious that one 
must be able to analyze and combine ideas intelligently. Therefore, the 
emphasis would be on those subjects, such as the humanities and the social 
sciences, which relate to general ideas and values. 
To a certain extent, admission to an academic education would be 
based on a person's intellectual abilities. As a group, the neo-conserv-
atives believed that the ratiocinative potentialities of the vast 
majority of people were very limited. For this reason, the neo-conserv-
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atives advocated selective education on the college and university levels. 
They generally felt that mass higher education would result inevitably in 
the lowering of educational standards since colleges would be forced to 
simplify instruction and expand their facilities far beyond the limits 
that could be considered qualitatively desirable. These consequences 
would tend to deflect the colleges from developing an intelligent and 
discriminating student body which might help to form the basis of a 
cultivated elite. 
To understand what is at issue pertaining to the conservative 
advocacy of selectivity in education, it is helpful to survey the argu-
ments that have been employed by the advocates of mass higher education. 
These arguments have generally been based on grounds of either individual 
excellence or of good citizenship. On individual grounds, mass college 
education has been justified as enabling people to improve their 
abilities, to enhance their occupational efficiency and to lead happier 
lives. On political grounds, mass education has been defended as being 
essential to enable the electorate to exercise the duties of citizenship 
intelligently. 2 For example, the President•s Commission on Higher Educa-
tion, 1947-1948, used both the individual and political arguments to 
recommend that American college courses be made less verbal and less 
intellectual in order to bring them within the range of more people. 3 To 
2for the arguments in favor of mass higher education see Gail 
Kennedy, ed., Education for Democracy (Boston: Heath, 1952), pp. 78-80. 
3The Kennedy anthology contains, among other selections, the report 
of the President•s Commission. For pertinent passages, see ibid., pp. 8, 
13. 
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a conservative, this recommendation is a clear illustration of how the 
advocacy of mass education can lead to a demand for the lowering of 
standards. Of course, it is doubtful that the members of the President's 
ommission would concur with the view that their recommendation would lead 
to a lowering of standards. 
The essential crux of the controversy between the advocates of 
selective education and those of mass college education deals with the 
ability of the masses of people to benefit from higher education. The 
benefits cited by the proponents of mass higher education could not, for 
the most part, be obtained by students unless they possessed the ability 
to understand and utilize the knowledge conveyed by their professors. 
The neo-conservatives have evinced a lack of confidence in the ability of 
the majority to grasp the understandings conveyed in colleges and 
universities in their full implications. As we have just seen, the con-
servative criterion of academic competence pertained primarily to the 
ability to analyze and interrelate ideas and values. In other words, 
neo-conservatives regard a good student as one who can comprehend the 
pattern of abstract concepts in relationship to one another. Academic 
achievement is not simply a matter of absorbing information but rather of 
structuring knowledge; for to the neo-conservatives, information is not 
truly knowledge unless it has been integrated with other information into 
a patterned structure so that interrelationships are apparent. Neo-
conservatives have been skeptical of the educational efficacy of attempt-
ing to instruct those individuals who have evinced little interest and 
competence in intellectual areas. This skepticism seems to be based on 
the assumption that heredity or early upbringing have been more important 
than educational and other environmental efforts to alter the academic 
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ompetencies of students. Had the neo-conservatives looked upon education 
as basically a .process of passively absorbing information rather than of 
understanding and structuring it, they might have been more sanguine 
concerning the potentialities of students since the mere learning of 
isolated facts is probably easier than the integration of those facts into 
a meaningful whole. Those opposed to conservative educational views have 
not all necessarily considered education as a matter of learning facts, 
but they have generally stressed the importance of the environment in 
explaining human.differences. 
The advocates and opponents of selective admissions policies in 
higher education disagree on the primary focus of education on the 
college level. The opponents of selective education are concerned with 
the uplifting of the vast majority of students while the proponents of a 
selective policy wish to devote their efforts to those of the greatest 
inte 11 ectua l potential. When the President • s Commission on Higher Educa-
tion recommended that higher education be made less verbal and less 
intellectual, it revealed a propensity to alter the nature of higher 
education to make it available to a greater number of people. 4 It is 
highly probable that some of the members of this group had implicitly 
assumed that the common welfare depended more on raising the average 
level of academic attainment than on the development of highly competent 
leadership. On the other hand, the neo-conservatives assumed that the 
welfare of the nation was more dependent on the development of an elite 
of wisdom and character. One of the reasons for this disagreement rested 
on a difference of opinion concerning the academic potentialities of the 
4I' . d '3 
____Q2_. • p . I • 
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majority of students. Another possible basis for disagreement might have 
been a difference of historical interpretation concerning the role of 
selective leadership in contrast to the power of mass movements in shaping 
the course of history. 
Neo-conservatives have generally emphasized the transmission of the 
wisdom of the past to present and future generations. Implicitly assumed 
in this emphasis on cultural transmission was the existence of certain 
verities which would not alter with historical change. In contrast with 
John Dewey and other pragmatist educators, the neo-conservatives did not 
stress change but rather focused on what they regarded as the eternal 
values. 
Neo-conservatives have agreed on the desirability of transmitting 
the traditional social values. They have generally argued that tradition 
is an efficacious and worthwhile vehicle for the transmission of values 
since it contains the funded wisdom of the past. In contrast to writers 
such as Hutchins and Adler who have advocated only the imparting of the 
wisdom of famous authors and scholars, the neo-conservatives have also 
advocated the transmission of the values of the various folk cultures of 
the world. Certain neo-conservatives, such as T. S. Eliot and Russell 
Kirk, have emphasized the importance of tradition as a remedy for the 
ills of the twentieth century; other neo-conservative writers such as 
Irving Babbitt and G. H. Bantock, have emphasized other remedies in addi-
tion to acknowledging the value of tradition. 
Concerning the content of education, the neo-conservatives have 
all quite clearly stressed the importance of the liberal arts. Neo-
conservatives have especially emphasized the importance of instruction in 
literature which they have valued primarily as the means whereby 
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students learn the nature and use of ethical values. Of the two quali-
ties emphasized by the neo-conservatives, wisdom and virtue, virtue was 
generally considered to be primary. By focusing on literature as the 
major means of moral instruction, the neo-conservatives implicitly relied 
upon the utilization of concrete situations rather than on abstract 
principles as the preferred method of approach. Their method therefore 
tended to be more inductive than deductive. One exception to the general 
advocacy of the literary method of value instruction was the position of 
Bernard Iddings Bell who espoused a fundamentally religious approach. 
As a group, the neo-conservatives preferred a prescribed curriculum 
to the elective principle of selection. The most common reasons given 
for opposing the elective principle were that young people lacked the 
needed competences to make sensible selections and that studies differed 
from one another in intrinsic value. Conservatives preferred to 
prescribe subjects on a hierarchical basis with those subjects believed 
to embody moral, religious, and intellectual values placed at the summit. 
For the purpose of contrast, the widely known defense of the elective 
principle by Charles W. Eliot, former president of Harvard University, 
can be cited. Eliot was confident that all studies if pursued with vigor 
and efficiency would be of equal value. Motivation was deemed to be an 
important factor in determining how efficiently studies would be pursued. 
Therefore, Eliot felt that students should have the opportunity to select 
the subjects of the greatest interest to them. The mature student was, 
he believed, competent to make wise choices. 
In general, the neo-conservatives did not stress the importance of 
interest as much as Charles Eliot. They felt it to be more important to 
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choose subjects of intrinsic worth than to minister to the desires of the 
students. The neo-conservatives were not so confident of the competency 
of even mature students nor of the purity of their motives in choosing 
subjects. As we have seen, Irving Babbitt exemplified this skepticism 
when he suspected that indolence might prove to be more important than 
interest as a guide to the selection of subjects. The neo-conservative 
attitude toward the elective principle resembled their view of mass higher 
education. On both issues, a strong consciousness of human limitations 
was manifested. 
Regarding the views of neo-conservatives concerning teaching 
methods, instructional procedures are ultimately based upon learning 
theories. We must therefore inquire into the learning theory which under-
lies the neo-conservative view of education. Since none of the neo-con-
servative writers considered in this study was an educational psychologist, 
it is hardly surprising that no one of these writers has given us a 
systematic theory of learning. We do however have certain indications of 
their fundamental attitudes and from these instances should be able to 
extrapolate the outline of a learning theory. 
To this writer, the most striking fact about neo-conservative 
attitudes toward learning is their strong resemblance to Gestalt views of 
learning. 5 Like the Gestalt psychologists, neo-conservative writers have 
viewed learning as primarily an interactive process in which both the 
teacher and the student play important roles. In accordance with the 
5For a general explication of the Gestalt theory of learning see 
Morris L. Bigge, Learning Theories for Teachers (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964), pp. 278-285. 
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conservative principle of respect for authority, neo-conservatives have 
emphasized the role of the teacher as the leader and guide in the class-
room. In addition, neo-conservatives have also stressed the importance of 
considering the abilities of the child. When directing a class, the 
teacher should, therefore, modify his own plans to suit the nature of the 
students before him. 6 
Like the Gestalt psychologists, the neo-conservatives also stress 
the importance of insight. With the exception ofT. S. Eliot, all the 
neo-conservative writer considered in this study underscored the educa-
tional importance of insight regardless of whether they termed it the 
11 illative sense, .. 11 Seeing patterns, .. or simply 11 intuition." Generally, 
they conceived of insight as the power to integrate separate details into 
meaningful wholes. Insight was generally considered to be the product of 
a combination of the functions of the faculties of the imagination and 
reason although Kirk, following Newman, included other faculties as well. 
Generally, reason was to be employed by the individual as the final judge 
of the generalities arrived at through the use of the imagination. Of 
particular concern to the neo-conservatives was the utilization of in-
sight to abstract and interrelate general ideas and values. 
What method should a teacher employ to teach insightfully? The neo-
conservatives have not given us a clear answer to this question but 
enough experiments have been performed by Gestalt psychologists to give 
6rhe view of the Gestalt psychologists regarding 
students was similar to that of the neo-conservatives. 
however to view teachers more as guides than leaders. 
further details. 
the role of the 
The former tended 
See ibid. for 
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us some important clues.? Since insight is a process which occurs largely 
in the mind of the student, it would seem to be obvious that the teacher 
would have to rely on the discussion method rather than on telling the 
student the answer to a problem. It is important that the discussion take 
place in a structured situation where the teacher leads the student 
sequentially to the attainment of the particular insight that the teacher 
is seeking to convey. This sequential procedure would presumably begin 
with a review of all relevant material because insight is fundamentally 
< 
the power to integrate what has previously been learned into a structured 
whole. The teacher would then presumably ask the student questions 
designed to focus attention on those aspects of the whole which are rele-
vant to the attainment of the desired insight. The Socratic method of 
questioning has frequently been utilized for eliciting insights. 
To the neo-conservatives, learning at its best pertained to under-
standings more than to factual information and skills. The basic academic 
skills were to be acquired in the lower schools in preparation for the 
integrated understandings to be obtained in the colleges. The neo-conserv-
atives have therefore emphasized the content of learning. The techniques 
were considered important primarily as instruments for the acquisition of 
the understandings. In this respect, they diverged from the mental 
disciplinarians who stressed learning skills more than content and from 
the educational realists who placed greater stress on factual information. 
In general, the neo-conservatives advocated a primarily academic 
program of instruction since their concern was largely with ideas and 
values although they were, as we have seen, quite ready to utilize 
7Ibid., The Gestalt psychologists were of course not necessarily 
conservative themselves but they shared the conservative's emphasis on 
insiqht. 
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aesthetic and affective approaches to education for their cognitive 
value. With regard to those individuals who did not exhibit superior 
academic talent, most neo-conservatives believed that after these students 
have acquired enough formal education to function. usefully in the non-
I 
I 
I 
I 
academic world, they should be permitted and indeed encouraged to pursue \ 
' 
their education through practical experience. Bantock differed from the \ '1 
others in that he had greater confidence that these students would benefit 
from further instruction which would be primarily practical rather than 
academic in nature. Nevertheless, the neo-conservatives as a whole empha-
sized the importance of human differences in ability in planning learning 
programs. 
With regard to the agencies to be utilized in the educational 
process, the neo-conservatives agreed that while the major function of 
the school should be educational, other institutions should also play 
their parts. The family was especially emphasized as an agency ideally 
suited to convey instruction in morals, manners, and in the cultural 
traditions of society. The church was also considered important for 
supplying the basic religious instruction which all the neo-conservative 
writers under consideration so strongly emphasized, including even the 
skeptic, Irving Babbitt. 8 They were also concerned about the educational 
effects of such tools of popular culture as books, magazines, paintings, 
and musical compositions. This concern was especially evident in the 
writings ofT. S. Eliot and B. I. Bell but was to some extent true of 
all the writers under discussion. Although the school was considered to 
be the primary agency of formal education, other agencies of both 
formal and informal education were also therefore deemed to be important. 
Bsee page 101 of this study. 
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As proponents of the unique value of tradition, conservative writers 
would be expected to stress the educational importance of those agencies 
which have been the primary conduits of tradition -- especially the 
family and the church. In this respect, the neo-conservatives were 
being consistent with their basic philosophicat viewpoint. 
In the second chapter, the basic philosophical presuppositions of 
neo-conservatism were given and certain educational implications were 
inferred. On the whole, the exponents of neo-conservative educational 
thought have fulfilled our expectations concerning the educational entail-
ments of the conservative viewpoint. There is however one major area 
which they have neglected. Our inferences concerning the attitudes and 
methods of approach of the conservative school counselor have not been 
confirmed by our study of neo-conservative writers because the neo-con- . 
servatives have largely neglected the whole area of school counseling. 
Yet this is an important area of educational endeavor. By the study of 
the implications of neo-conservatism concerning school counseling, we 
can infer the general neo-conservative attitude on the nature of the 
individual student and his fundamental needs; for the counselor is con-
cerned to a considerable extent with the personal desires and problems 
of the student. 
As was pointed out in the second chapter, the conservative view 
of human nature has been characterized by an emphasis upon the weakness 
and irrationality of mankind. 9 Humans were not considered to be free 
and autonomous but were pictured as continually beset by anxieties. 
9see pages 39-40 of this study. 
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Their needs for security, status, and meaning were believed to be 
especially strong. Most of these needs could only be satisfied by. satis-
factory relationships between the individual and society. These anxieties 
have been increased during the twentieth century by the steady undermining 
of the traditional institutions of society. 10 The neo-conservatives have 
been especially concerned by the erosion of belief in traditional 
standards of value and by the rising tide of equalitarianism. 
These views obviously have many ramifications with regard to school 
counseling. 11 To the conservative school counselor, the importance of 
helping the student to find a meaningful philosophy of life which would 
enable the student to make satisfying choices cannot be gainsaid. This 
attitude is entirely consonant with the general neo-conservative stress 
upon the finding and discrimination of values. 
In addition, the conservative counselor would be concerned with 
enabling the student to find his proper place in the vocational, intel-
lectual, and social hierarchy. To a considerable extent, the work of 
the conservative counselor would be focused on helping the individual 
student to ascertain his vocational and educational assets and limita-
tions including a realistic understanding of what the student should and 
should not strive to achieve. In this respect his position would be in 
sharp contrast to his more equalitarian counter parts whose confidence in 
lOThe causes of this situation, as set forth by R. A. Nisbet, were 
analyzed on pages 37-38 of this study. 
llsee in particular pages 27, 30, and 44 of this study. 
t l 
I ~ 
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the efficacy of environmental influences would tend to make them more 
responsive to the desires of the students than to their capabilities. If, 
for example, a student expresses interest in a profession apparently un-
suited to his abilities, the more equalitarian type of counselor would be 
inclined to try to overcome the deficiencies of the student while the 
conservative counselor would be more inclined to suggest that the student 
change his goal. This difference in approach is based on a difference in 
estimation of the effectiveness of environmental influences. 
In view of the importance that the neo-conservatives have imputed 
to the relationships of the individual to society, it would seem to 
follow that the conservative counselor would seek to involve students in 
cooperative social endeavor as a means of relieving the anxieties that 
might interfere with schoolwork.l 2 This practice should not however, 
be interpreted as implying that the conservative would necessarily prefer 
cooperation to competition. The strong achievement orientation of the 
conservative would presumably militate against an indiscriminate 
acceptance of cooperation as a desirable value; for the conservative 
stress on selective excellence entails a certain amount of competition 
to meet standards of excellence if selection is to be an effective device 
for enhancing excellence. Other things being equal, whether competition 
or cooperation would be acceptable would depend upon which practice in a 
given situation would most enhance achievement. With regard to the 
school, cognitive achievements would be emphasized by the neo-conserv-
atives. 
l2see the discussion on pages 44-45 of this treatise. 
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In general, the values which the conservative school counselor 
would seek to effectuate would not be permissive in character but would 
include the hardier virtues which have figured so prominently in conser-
vative educational thought such as discipline and restraint. The con-
servative view of happiness has not been couched in terms of pleasure 
and relaxation but rather in terms of challenge and achievement. Yet the 
conservative ideal of happiness was not completely individualistic in 
nature; for while the individual was considered to be in need of striving 
for achievement, he was also deemed to be in need of sociability with his 
fellows. Above all, the individual was considered to be in need of a 
coherent philosophy of life. 
The two greatest deficiencies in neo-conservative educational 
thought are probably the absence of a systematic presentation of the 
educational dimensions of conservatism, and the absence of speculation 
pertaining to the implications of neo-conservatism with regard to 
guidance and counseling. It is hoped that this study will contribute 
toward alleviating these deficiencies. 
The greatest deficiency which exists in neo-conservative thought 
considered as a general whole is probably the absence of a detailed 
integration of conservative metaphysical thought with the findings of 
modern science. The importance of this task is obvious; for the con-
servative remedy for the perplexities of the contemporary age in the last 
analysis may be the truly viable one -- an emphasis upon the eternal 
verities and upon high standards of personal and social achievement. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The concluding task of this study will be a general overview of the 
structure of the study with attention to be given to some of the more 
salient highlights. By this means it is hoped that we may obtain a 
retrospective insight into the nature of conservatism in general and of 
neo-conservative educational theory in particular. 
In the first chapter, the general design of this study was given 
and the parameters thereof were clearly indicated. The need for a clear 
definition of conservatism was established. A definition was formulated 
based upon an analysis of scholarly usage of 11 conservatism11 and cognate 
terms. The essential elements of conservatism were identified as the 
advocacy of an aristocratic elitism and of the value of traditional 
authority. Both positions were seen to be ultimately based upon a 
hierarchical conception of values and of the nature of humanity. The con-
servative position therefore was predicated upon both the existence of 
and the desirability of hierarchy. 1 
In the subsequent section of the first chapter, the conservative 
position was contrasted with related views with which it has frequently 
been confused. The probable cause for this confusion was the lack of a 
clear conception of the nature of conservatism. Finally, near the end 
lsee pages 9-10 of this study. 
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of the chapter, the distinctive nature of neo-conservatism was discussed. 
The distinguishing characteristic of neo-conservatism was seen to consist 
not in the espousal of any unique doctrines not previously adhered to by 
other conservatives, but rather in an emphasis upon cultural (including 
both educational and intellectual) concerns in strong contrast to the 
primarily political concerns of eighteenth century conservatives. This 
change of emphasis was seen to be a response to the decline of belief in 
religious and moral values and to the rise of mass culture. 2 
The second chapter was devoted to an analysis of the fundamental 
neo-conservative concepts pertaining to the nature of the universe, man, 
and society as a means of explaining the basic reasons for the positions 
taken by neo-conservatives on educational and other issues. It was 
considered important to establish the neo-conservative position on these 
issues because some writers have chosen to deny that there was a general 
conservative philosophy. 3 In this study, an effort was made to extra-
polate the educational consequences of acceptance of the conservative 
viewpoint which would, it was hoped, be confirmed by the historical 
survey to follow. Such basic conservative concepts as hierarchy, 
natural law, and the inheritance theory of human-development were 
brought into the discussion as well as the conservative view of the 
psychological nature of humanity. 4 
2see pages 16-20 of this study. 
3see for example the reference to Michael Oakeshott on page 
of this treatise. 
4It should not be inferred that the writer was implying that only 
conservatives necessarily held each of these positions. 
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In the following three chapters, the neo-conservative writers on 
education were divided into three schools, those who have combined 
humanism with traditionalism; those humanists who while favorable to 
humanism have not made it a major element in their systems; and the 
basically religious approach to educational problems. T. S. Eliot and 
Russell Kirk represented the first school; Irving Babbitt and G. H. 
Bantock, the second; and Bernard Iddings Bell, the third school. The 
third, fourth, and fifth chapters were devoted respectively to these 
divisions of neo-conservative opinion. An analysis was undertaken in 
each of these chapters of the views and the historical significance of 
the writers who exhibited the characteristics of the three wings of neo-
conservative educational thought. 
In general, this classification of the subdivisions of neo-conserv-
atism was based upon the particular values which were emphasized by the 
writers in question. Most of these writers espoused classical humanism 
but some of these writers combined it with an equally marked emphasis 
upon traditionalism while other writers, although favorable to traditional-
ism, tended to emphasize more contemporary approaches. In the case of 
Bernard Iddings Bell, the approach was traditionalist without being 
especially humanistic in character. The particular traditions which 
Bell emphasized were religious in character, while Eliot and Kirk 
emphasized the traditions of the various cultures of the world as well as 
the intellectual and religious wisdom of the past. On the whole, the 
neo-conservative writers agreed as to the value of traditions that have 
been passed on through many generations, although they were far from 
agreement as to the efficacy of traditionalism in the contemporary 
' J 
169 
world. 
The sixth chapter was devoted to a summary and integration of the 
material presented in the preceding chapters relating to.neo-conservative 
educational thought. To put it more broadly, an effort was made to 
present the basic characteristics of neo-conservatism as a distinct school 
of educational thought. This overview was based upon an integration of 
historical, philosophical, and psychological methods of approach. 
Historically, neo-conservative educational thought represented a 
reaction against two marked trends of Western civilization in the twenti-
eth century -- the decline of belief in objective moral standards and the 
spread of cultural and educational equalitarianism. Contrary to the 
popular impression, Edmund Burke was not the primary source of inspira-
tion of the neo-conservative educational writers. Instead, the influences 
upon the neo-conservatives were varied in character although, among all 
the preceding schools of educational thought, that of the cultural human-
ists exhibited the strongest affinities to the thinking of the nea·-
conservatives. In fact, at least with regard to their educational think-
ing, the neo-conservatives can be regarded as representing a predominantly 
elitist type of cultural humanism. 
The major aim of education from the neo-conservative standpoint was 
the development of an elite characterized by the ability to discriminate 
between ideas and between values in terms of their nature and their worth. 
Such an aim implied the stressing of the analytical and synthetical 
reasoning abilities in the educational process. Also implicit was the 
emphasis upon the study of those subjects which most closely pertained to 
ideas and values - the humanities and the social sciences. 
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The neo-conservatives were also concerned about the transmission of 
traditional values. Tradition was considered to be a superior means of 
transmitting values, and long-term traditions were believed to embody a 
superior wisdom as the end products of the experiences of many genera-
tions. The neo-conservative advocacy of tradition not only covered the 
wisdom of the thinkers and writers of the past, but also includeq the 
values associated with the various folk cultures. 
To the neo-conservatives, learning was an interactive process which 
the teacher directed but in which the abilities of the students were 
among the determining influences. The attainment of insight was strongly 
emphasized. Insight was conceived of as primarily an integrative com-
petency whereby, through what was generally considered to be the coopera-
tion of the reason with the imagination, the individual would be able to 
11 see11 facts in relationship to a general holistic pattern. To induce 
the attainment of an insight, a teaching method which, in many of its 
characteristics, is similar to the Socratic method of discourse is 
clearly implied. With regard to the implementation of such a method, a 
considerable degree of student participation would obviously be necessary. 
In the implementation of conservative educational aims, the neo-
conservatives felt that the existence of high selective standards of 
admission and promotion, at least with regard to higher education, was 
essential. This attitude was based primarily upon the conviction that 
the ratiocinative potentialities of most individuals was too limited to 
make any attempt to train a mass population of sages very practical. To 
attempt to do so would inevitably lm,ter educational standards; thereby 
resulting in the neglect of the training of competent leadership. 
I 
il 
r 
An attempt was also made in the sixth chapter to depict the aims of 
the neo-conservative school counselor. On the basis of general conserv-
ative principles, it was believed that the counselor would have three 
basic aims: to help students to find a meaningful philosophy of life; to 
aid them in finding their proper places in the social, intellectual, 
and vocational hierarchy; to promote cooperative social activities among 
students. In general, the conservative counselor and teacher would both 
show an orientation to achievement values. Happiness would be considered 
more a matter of challenge and endeavor than of pleasure and relaxation. 
To the neo-conservatives, the value of creative tension far exceeded that 
of bland contentment. 
In the conventional history of educational thought, there has been 
a strong tendency to divide the educational right into the perennialist 
and the essentialist schools. One might well wonder if neo-conservatism 
can be fitted into either of these two categories. The answer must be in 
the negative. Aside from the fact that most of the prominent advocates 
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of both perennialism and essentialism fail to exhibit the aristocratic 
tendencies of the neo-conservatives, there are other reasons for this 
conclusion. The perennialists certainly emphasize the wisdom of the 
intellectuals and aesthetes of the past, but do not exhibit the emphasis 
upon the traditions of the various folk cultures of the world character-
istic of the neo-conservatives. Furthermore, the essentialist emphasis 
upon adaptation to the contemporary world does not find a counterpart in 
neo-conservative thought. While, in neo-conservative philosophy, there is 
some stress upon adaptation, as there is in most educational philosophies, 
it is not emphasized as much as adherence to values and ideas because of 
their own intrinsic worth. In fact, the neo-conservatives seem to be 
more interested in reconstructing society in a conservative direction 
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than in adapting to it. To this writer it seems evident that neo-conserv-
atism should be considered a distinct school of educational thought in 
its own right. To do any less would be to overlook the distinctive 
characteristics of the neo-conservative movement. 
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